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ABSTRACT
WORKING CLASS IN BRITISH FILMS 1950s-2000s:
IDENTITY, CULTURE, AND IDEOLOGY

Tongyun Shi
October 14, 20 II
Britain was the first country to industrialize with the Industrial Revolution and
therefore had the world's first industrial working class. In the 20 th century, the
traditional British working class went through many social and political changes,
represented especially by the post-war "rise" and a lasting "decline" since the 1970s, a
fate which is worth academic study.
Class matters not only in sociological sense, but also in cultural sense. This
dissertation, through close text analysis of seven British social realist films--two New
Wave ones, Room at the Top (Jack Clayton, 1959) and Saturday Night and Sunday

Morning (Karel Reisz, 1960); three bleak ones by independent directors, High Hopes
(Mike Leigh, 1988), My Beautiful Laundrette (Stephen Frears, 1985), and Sweet

Sixteen (Ken Loach, 2002); and two commercial comedies, Brassed Off (Mark
Herman, 1996) and The Full Monty (Peter Cattaneo, 1997), explores major themes in
the screen representation of British working class from the 1950s to the present and
analyzes the changes from the theoretical framework of British Cultural Studies,
probing into the relationship between identity, power, the impact of ideology and
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cultural

resistance

behind

the

working-class

identities.

It

also

adopts

an

interdisciplinary approach to the understanding and evaluation of the cultural identity
of British working class, with sociological and historical understanding of the issue of
class and working class provided.
The dissertation concludes that the British working class screen identity has
transformed from an image of masculine energy, pride and dignity of the 1950s and
1960s to "underclass" collective shame and loss of respect in the 1990s and 2000s.
The shift reflects changes in fundamental attitudes in British post-war society from
welfare egalitarianism to the

neo-liberal

enterprise culture.

The cinematic

representation has reflected and reinforced dominant ideological position, but at the
same time conveyed more left-wing progressive views. The dissertation therefore
calls for cultural policy support for socially purposive British national cinema to keep
social realism as a democratization of representation of national cultural life as well as
a sustained concern for working-class dignity.

Key Words: working class; films; Britain; cultural studies; identity; ideology;
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The Research Significance and Issue of Study
Britain was the first country to industrialize with the Industrial Revolution and
therefore had "the world's first industrial working class" (Roberts, 200 I, p. 81). At the
beginning of the 19th century four-fifths of its population lived in rural areas; by the
end, four-fifths lived in towns and cities. Briggs argues that the term "social class"
started to be used in the country only after the Industrial Revolution (as cited in Reid,
1998, p. 8) and Thompson believes that the English working class was originally
formed during 1780 and 1832 when they "came to feel an identity of interests" as
between themselves, and as against their rulers and employers (1963, p. II). "Class
consciousness" or "awareness" was of marked significance for the Victorian age, for
which reason Marx chose England as the model on which to base the development of
his ideas. The 20 th century witnessed the British labor movement developing into "one
of the strongest bulwarks of Britishness," fortressing working-classness as one
essential ingredient of British identity (Kumar, 2003, p. 169). However, the traditional
British working class has gone through many social and political changes, especially a
lasting "decline" since the 1970s after the post-war "rise" (Hopkins, 1991), leading to

the rhetoric of the "end of class" (Kirk, 2007, p. 2). Working class is deemed to have
departed the social scene, either as an economic entity, as a distinct cultural formation,
or as an agent of political change or action. Looking back in time, it is fair to say that
the politics of the 20 th century was largely about the achievements and failures of
working class power.
Does this imply that class no longer matters? The 20 th century witnessed drastic
capitalist development from Fordism to Post-Fordism, greatly raising people's living
standard and relieving the hardship of the working class. However, despite the
embourgeoisement cry since late 1950s, sufficient statistics on economic inequality
prove that class is the major influence on the distribution of income and wealth in
modem societies. The pivotal role of class described by Marx and Weber is still of
importance to the analysis of social equality today. Though not the only factor which
shapes people's social and political life, class is "arguably the most fundamental"
(Edgell,

1993, p. 115). After years of research on British postwar class

transformations, Gordon Marshall concluded in 1988 that "class is by far the most
common and seemingly the most salient frame of reference employed in the
construction of social identities" (as cited in Reid, 1998, p. 35). In the 21 st century,
Gerdinand Mount argued that there is a new class divide in Britain "as vicious ... as the
old one" (2004, front cover 2). Therefore, the issue of class is still of essential
significance and should be a worthy topic of academic concern.
Class matters not only in sociological sense, but also in cultural sense. As
Andrew Sayer claims in The Moral Significance of Class, "class matters to us not

2

only because of differences in material wealth and economic security, but also
because it affects our access to things, relationships, experiences and practices which
we have reason to value, and hence of chances of living a fulfilling life" (2005, p. 1).
It is absolutely true that class involves not only our relations to the means of

production, but also our behavior, our expectation from ourselves and others, and our
feeling of cultural dignity. In this aspect, it is more worthy of concern as "the gradual
decline" of working class culture has been "one of the most powerful, telling
developments in British society" since the early 1980s (Charlesworth, 2000, p. 2) and
with the new class divide, "the worst-off in Britain today are more culturally deprived
than their parents or grandparents" (Mount, 2004, front cover 2). The ultimate
deprivation as a consequence of all the other deprivations is "the deprivation of
respect" (Mount, 2004, p. 108) with the gradual loss of reverence for the working
class people, their effort and values. As a result of the destruction of Britain's
traditional industry and trade unionism in the past 3 decades, the working class
identity has shifted from the Victorian notion of the "deserving poor" and the
"affluent workers" of the 1960s to the present notion of social "waste," particularly
the underclass. Hence, a cultural analysis of the working class would meet the
challenge of the changed focus of the issue of class.
In Britain, there has been an extraordinary preoccupation with class. The
Observer Magazine issue for II September 1988 had "Class: The British Obsession"

as its front cover headline (Marwick, 1990, p. 1). The UNESCO Tension Project
survey recorded 60 per cent of the British identifying themselves as working class,
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revealing that "the British had among the highest levels of working-class
consciousness" (Mandler, 2006, p. 206). It needs to be noted here that although class
has long been a focus of the British, it is not thought a fit subject for public discussion.
The Establishment has spared no effort in cheering the post-war c1asslessness
progress. And the priority of social class as a way of interpreting society has been
sidelined in today's postmodern society, replaced by issues of gender, race, and etc.
Charlesworth points out that while universities celebrate ethnic diversity, "class as a
topic has sunk to the bottom of the hierarchy of intellectual objects" (2000, p. 14),
signifying a cultural decline and political abandonment of the working class. In the 18
years of Conservative rule from 1979 to 1997, the life of the unemployed received
little pUblicity as life on the dole was despised and ignored. The transformed
significance of class suggests that "having once been the fundamental source and
subject of conflict in the political culture of capitalism, class inequality is now the
problem that dare not speak its name" (Sayer, 2005, p. 224) and to reopen the whole
question of class in Britain is to "blunder into a minefield" (Mount, 2004, p. 11).
Class has obviously lost popularity, though it is still being talked about. And because
of the silences that shadow the speaking of class, works that do exist become even
more precious. Therefore my study of British working class from a cultural
perspective bears considerable academic as well as practical significance.
The reason that I choose an art form of film representation as my research
object is that social class and artistic representation have a natural bondage for over a
century. Marwick (1990) holds that to have a fully rounded understanding of class and
4

its significance, not only official and academic hard statistics (such as census reports,
sociological surveys) of occupational distribution and economic and political
inequality should be studied, but also those private and informal perceptions or
images (in letters, diaries, autobiographies, interviews, etc) as well as fictional and
media images (in novels, films, plays, photographs, etc.) need to be considered. For
Marwick, the fictional and media images are "quite illuminating when studied in a
comparative context" from which one can derive further insights into assumptions
about social structure, though they need "to be handled cautiously" (2005, p. 76).
Media representation is also crucial to the construction of class identity. Skeggs
in Class, Self, Culture suggests that class "is dynamic, produced through conflict and
fought out at the level of the symbolic" (2004, p. 5). She affirms that "[u]nderstanding
representation is central to any analysis of class" and that the popular media is the site
where the symbolic battle of representations can be demonstrated most visibly (2004,
p. 117). For Stuart Hall, there is no understanding of identity outside of culture and
representation, and representations "are not reflexive but constitutive and therefore
have a real, material impact" (as cited in Procter, 2004, p. 125).
Coming down to film representation, any film is part of the society which
produced it, and must "bear traces of some of the basic assumptions of that society"
(Marwick, 1990, p. 300). Besides, films do more than just "reflect" reality; they
"actively explain and interpret the way in which the world is to be perceived and
understood" (Hill, 1986, p. 2). In Britain, arguably, one medium in which the issue of
class is still alive is film (Bromley, 2000, p. 52). Therefore, studying how images of
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the working class have been conceived in British cinema not only makes sense, but
also can enlighten us with vital clues for understanding people in the ever-changing
British society.
One clear advantage of using feature films as evidence about class is that the
signifiers of class are never ambiguous. Social stratification can be vividly displayed
on the visual and aural screen through housing, decor, clothing, food, speech, life
style, and etc. Gillette argues that "social values exist in the mind as much as in their
outward manifestations" (2003, p. 16). The screen is most powerful in these outward
manifestations-the externalizing of the subjective awareness of being different
experienced by the working class.
Finally, class is an ever changing social and cultural existence. Frow invites us
to view class as a set of contestable relations with due attention on "processes of class
formation ... played out through particular institutional forms and balances of power ...
through desires, and fears, and fantasies (1995, p. Ill). Therefore, class is "not a
given, but a process," and it is "the process of evaluation, moral attribution and
authorization" that is "central to understanding contemporary class relations" (Skeggs,
2004, p. 117). My study of the screen representation of British working class identity
over different decades will explore the process that is fundamental for understanding
working class identity.
I would add that the feasibility of my research is greatly enhanced by the
existence of the social realism film tradition in Britain focusing on the exploration of
working class life and feelings.
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Thesis Statement

This dissertation aims to explore the cultural condition of the working class
through reviewing the representation of working class identity in British films from
the 1950s to the present. I examine the major themes of social realist films of different
decades, compare and contrast continuity and change in the representation of identity
on screen, and finally analyze the transformation pattern from British cultural studies
perspective, probing into the ideology and resistance behind the working-class
identities. The dissertation argues that there has been a changing perception of
working class on screen and it reflects the changing prevailing ideology. From "pride"
to "shame," the shifts in images reflect changes in fundamental attitudes in British
post-war society from welfare egalitarianism to the neo-liberal enterprise culture.
Class is the major concern for this study with due attention paid to gender and
race for their crosscut influence. While acknowledging that women and minority
ethnic people tend to be marginalized in academic debates on class which
oversimplifies the class identity formation, this dissertation is not intended to offer a
balanced account due to its limited space and priority concern.
Identity is an important matter as individuals and groups want to be seen and
considered as possessing cultural significance and dignity. Therefore this dissertation
ends with calling for cultural policy support for socially purposive British national
cinema to keep social realism as a democratization of representation of national
cultural life.
British Social Realism Tradition
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In Britain, there has been a rich tradition of social realist film-making from the
documentary movement in the 1930s, the New Wave in the late 1950s and early 1960s
to the contemporary scene. This social realism has been characterized by Raymond
Williams, when talking about theatrical representation, as a "conscious movement
towards social extension" (1977, p. 63) to cover the under-represented or
marginalized groups, specifically to bring "working class to the center of dramatic
action" (1977, p. 67). Within the British cinematic tradition, this has involved "the
making visible of the working class" (Hill, 1999, p. 135) at moments of economic and
social change. As Brown notes, "Realist characters in British films wear cloth caps,
not top hats" (2009, p. 30). In her 1999 article "Reality Bites (Again)" commenting on
the Cannes Festival, the journalist Vanessa Thorpe saw in the recent trends of British
film-making a return "to the hard-bitten tradition of social realism" and traced the
lineage back to the British New Wave's kitchen sink cycle of films (Thorpe, 1999).
This acknowledgement ofthe enduring relationship between British cinema and social
realism is also widely shared by scholars in film studies, e.g. John Hill (2000b, p. 249),
Samantha Lay (2002, pp. 1-2), Geoff Brown (2009) and Julia Hallam (2000, p. 261).
Social realism is "generally acknowledged to be a vital component of British cinema"
(Hutchings, 2009, p. 304) or "a major mode of expression in British screen culture"
(Lay, 2002, p. 2), constructing one of the three key genres of British national cinema. 1

1 The literary heritage genre and soeml realist genre form two most Important tradItIOns of BrItish national cmema, enJoymg both box-office
success and generous praIse from film critics They have been regarded as "quality" films because of their commitment to the portrayal of the
authentic and indigenous "British way of life" and have been promoted In terms of their cultural values. Therefore, the pursuit of a quality cmema
was the purSUlt of a natIonal cinema, dlstmct from Hollywood or European counterparts. The thIrd kmd

IS

the comedy genre, dating from Ealmg

comedy of the 19405 and 19505. Brian McFarlane and Robert Murphy in British Cinema Book point out that the three genres were the most
mfl uentIal in the 1990s
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The representation of British working class before the Second World War was
far from fair. Feature films of the 1930s tended to "portray working class caricatures
rather than full-bodied characters in their own right, and as plot ancillaries rather than
as the central focus" (Lay, 2002, p. 40). The documentary movement in the 1930s led
by Grierson "represented the first attempt" to portray the working class as real human
existence (Higson, 1995, p. 197), promoting social reform and cohesion through
objective and positive images and stories of working-class individuals and
communities. It was highly valued due to its infusion of social responsibility into
British cinema. Andrew Higson thus comments, "[i]n the case of British cinema, if
one movement has pride of place, it has been the documentary movement" (1995, p.
22), and for some writers, "the realism associated with the documentary movement
constitutes the only authentic national cultural tradition" (1995, p. 23). Second World
War films in the 1940s brought this tradition to a new height, largely increasing
working class representation, although they focused more on the loyalty of the
working class to the nation and social harmony in the special time of war and were
criticized as attempting to "flatten out the cultural and class differences" (Lay, 2002, p.
48). Then for a long time afterwards, it was hard to find films on working-class life in
British cinema. "The number of British films ... with working-class characters all
through, can be counted on the fingers of one hand," observed Lindsay Anderson in
1957, who viewed this rejection of three-quarters of the national population as
"ridiculous" and "characteristic of a flight from contemporary reality" (Hill, 1986, pp.
127-8).
9

This phenomenon was changed by the New Wave films of the late 1950s and
early 1960s, which placed industrial working-class characters at the center of their
narratives. The tendency was influenced by realistic Angry Young Man novels and
plays and was greatly helped by the efforts of cultural studies scholars like Richard
Hoggart and Raymond Williams and E. P. Thompson to inspire people to broaden
their notion of British culture and show their concern about ordinary people's life. The
films unfailingly demonstrated the "authenticity" and "realism" of the working-class
experience and inspired a new interest in the regional and class base of Britishness.
Represented by Room at the Top (Jack Clayton, 1959), Look Back in Anger (Tony
Richardson, 1959), Saturday Night and Sunday Morning (Karel Reisz, 1960), The

Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner (Tony Richardson, 1962), This Sporting Life
(Lindsay Anderson, 1963), and etc, the New Wave films focused on working class
male protagonists, displaying to full extent their masculine energy and sexuality, class
pride as well as anger, confidence in change for the better, and resistance as well as
conformity to consumerism. New Wave director Lindsay Anderson sought to
emphasize the urgency and importance of providing convincing representations of
working-class life. However, the New Wave "failed to sustain a renaissance" (Quart,
1993, p. 16) and social realism was to great extent only alive on the small TV screen
for almost two decades afterwards. 2
The 1980s saw a renewed interest, or rebirth, in social realism, in response to

2 19705 was a hard decade regardmg film finance and many directors of New Wave films ermgrated to Hollywood. Ken Loach, who began his
television and film career in the 19605 (famous for TV film Cathy Come Home, 1966), provided something ofa bridge between the New Wave
working class films of the early 19605 and the films of the 19905, bemg almost single-handedly responsible for sustaining socIal realism
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the harsh economic conditions of Thatcherism and greatly helped by the funding from
Channel 4. Working-class films of the decade can be easily defined by its
anti-Thatcherism, with the focus on the exploration of the damage brought by
de-industrialization, mass unemployment and poverty, severe cuts in welfare benefits,
leading to the statement that "some of the most potent political opposition to the
Thatcher government, therefore, appeared in the movie theatres rather than in the
House of Commons" (Friedman, 1993, p. xix). Films such as My Beautiful Laundrette
(Stephen Frears, 1985), A letter to Brezhnev (Chris Bernard, 1985), High Hopes (Mike
Leigh, 1988), RifJ-RafJ (Ken Loach, 1990) showed life as a difficult struggle in a
society dominated by social injustice, greed and racism; little sense of the corrupting
effects of affluence or embourgeoisement of the 1960s appeared in these films. With
the fragmentation of the traditional working class and the changing concern of
identity politics, films of the 1980s witnessed the polarizations along lines of gender,
ethnicity, and sexual orientation, apart from class. More working-class women, gays,
blacks, and Asians began to occupy central focus.
Working class representation was carried more strongly into the 1990s when the
economic and social damage brought by globalization, local industrial decline and the
restructuring of the labor market led to the redefining of British traditional working
class as non-working "underclass" in a post-industrial context. Similar to the New
Wave but different from the 1980s, the 1990s' films were more characteristically
"men's films" with an obsessive focus on white, non-working class, projecting
pessimistic images of alienation and masculine anxiety and a world of disintegration.

11

Stylistically they can generally be divided into 3 groups (Murphy, 2009a, p. 357). The
first group had directors like Ken Loach and Mike Leigh, who produced a large
number of films which dealt with the life of the poor and oppressed, projecting critical
images of contemporary life in post-Thatcherite Britain to international audiences.
These films include, for example, the bleaker films of Ken Loach's trilogy-Raining

Stones (1993), Ladybird, Ladybird (1996) and My Name is Joe (1999), Mike Leigh's
Naked (1993), Gary Oldman's Nil by Mouth (1998) and Lynne Ramsay's Ratcatcher
(1999), all are somber work that has been hailed as renascent "British grit" (Thorpe,
1999). The second group, represented by Trainspotting (Danny Boyle, 1996), Twin

Town (Kevin Griffith, 1997), dealt with young people accepting drugs, crime and
violence and bearing their hardship with hedonism. The third group was the feelgood
comedies represented by The Full Monty (Peter Cattaneo, 1997) and Brassed Off
(Mark Herman, 1996), in which the Sheffield steel workers regained self-respect
through collective stripping and Grimethorpe miners through their brass band
performance. The first group aimed at a minority audience and was generally
exhibited in art-house cinemas. The second, the petty crime genre, aimed at primarily
the young "core" audience and the third, social realist comedies, by contrast, intended
to catch a non-niche mainstream audience broader in terms of age and gender and
nationality. John Hill identified two kinds of endings: failure with the first group and
utopianism with the third group (2000a, p. 178). Loach and Leigh's works used class
in an explicit political sense and were regarded seriously in mainland Europe, but
have limited distribution in the UK and the US.
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The tradition of social realism continued into the 21 sl century. Films like Billy
Elliot (Stephen Daldry, 2000), Sweet Sixteen (Ken Loach, 2002), Vera Drake (Mike
Leigh, 2004), and This is England (Shane Meadows, 2006) were all well received,
suggesting that the national cinema has a genuine and vital commitment to the life of
ordinary British people.
Samantha Lay points out that there are three thematic concerns in contemporary
social realism: the crisis in masculinity, the de-politicization of the working class
through a shift in emphasis from production to consumption, and the prevalence of a
therapeutic discourse from the public to the personal (2002, pp. 104-106).
In conclusion, from statements, such as, "I'm working class and proud of it" in
Room at the Top (1959) to "We're obsolete. Dinosaurs. Yesterday's news." in The Full
Monty (1997), the working class experienced heartbreaking transformation from an
identity of masculine energy, pride and dignity to "underclass" collective shame and
loss of respect. Such identity transformation and its cultural significance is the major
concern of this dissertation.

Research Methodology
This dissertation is mainly a textual interpretation and ideological analysis of
British working-class films. The discussion of films is analytic rather than evaluative,
paying more attention to ideological attitudes than artistic merits. In exploring
working class

identity traits,

general

comprehensive

illustration

is always

accompanied with detailed case studies of certain films involving hermeneutic close
text analysis.

And the exploration of identity will focus around the economic status,
13

political consciousness, masculinity as well as personal values of the British
working-class on screen. The nearly 20 films discussed in the dissertation fall into the
period stretching between the 1950s and the 2000s, while emphasis is given to two
New Wave films--Room at the Top (Jack Clayton, 1959) and Saturday Night and

Sunday Morning (Karel Reisz, 1960), three serious social criticism films--My
Beautiful Laundrette (Stephen Frears, 1985), High Hopes (Mike Leigh, 1988) and
Sweet Sixteen (Ken Loach, 2002), as well as two mainstream commercial
comedies-- The Full Monty (Peter Cattaneo, 1997) and Brassed Off (Mark Herman,
1996) as weighty research objects. This selected focus is largely based on the
combinative concern of the artistic honor and commercial success won by the films,
as well as their different focus for the broad range of themes, e.g. High Hopes is
chosen for its anti-Thatcherism, My Beautiful Laundrette for race and class, and Sweet

Sixteen for its concern on underclass youth.
The dissertation adopts an interdisciplinary approach to the understanding and
evaluation of the cultural identity of British working class. It provides a sociological
understanding of the issue of class and working class, explores the historical
development-the rise and fall-of the working class, and finally analyses the
cinematic representation of working class identity, with an obvious emphasis on the
last approach as the topic of this dissertation fully displays.
Theoretically, the analysis of the identity transformation pattern is approached
from British cultural studies perspective, taking serious concern of the ideology
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behind. The study of relationships between class, culture, and film is an area of
interest within cultural studies.
Literature Review

There is quite some literature on British working class as well as its cinematic
representati on.
Books dealing with class from sociological and historical perspective generally
offer sociological theoretical understanding or social survey analysis of the issue of
class in Britain, and account for the changes in the collective experiences of the
working class.

Class in Modern Britain by Ken Roberts (2001) is marked by its clarity or
user-friendliness. Using sociological theory and class schemes and drawing on a range
of research evidences, the author identifies and analyses the main classes in
contemporary Britain, namely the working class, the intermediate class, the middle
class, and the upper class. The book also explores key debates about economic change,
globalization, changing gender roles, the ethnic composition of the nation, social
mobility and the relationship between class and politics. Roberts argues that Britain is
far from being a classless society and demonstrates that "class still permeates virtually
every part of its inhabitants lives, though there are important and fascinating changes
occurring to the size, character and composition of all the main classes" (2001, back
cover). In other words, class origin continues to be as important as ever in
determining people's life-chances. Class in Britain by Ivan Reid (1998) is also an
empirical research of class, with chapters on life-chances, income, employment and
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social mobility, education, leisure, and etc. What is especially impressive is its
conclusion entitled "Class in a Classless Society," in which he states that class is still
"a meaningful and useful concept" in Britain (p. 238) with "relative differences
hav[ing] resolutely remained, and in some cases widened" (p. 234); Britain is far from
a classless society based on free mobility by talent; and there is "little evidence" that
the Major Government in the 1990s provided the help which the Prime Minister saw
as necessary for all to achieve the maximum of their ability (p. 236).
Eric Hopkins's The Rise and Decline a/the English Working Classes 1918-1990
(1991) is a social history examining the social, political and cultural changes that have
happened particularly to the working classes from 1918 to 1990. It deals with such
basic aspects of working-class life as working and living conditions, the standard of
living, trade unionism, health, poverty, family, education and leisure activities. The
political history of the Labor Party and Labor governments is also substantially
covered. Hopkins argues for the post-WWII "rise" of the working class, with full
employment, increasing standard of living and political activities, and for the
"decline" since the 1970s to the present, with "the reduction in working-class political
and industrial authority, the changed patterns of employment and economic status, the
new instability of family life, and the change of image" (1991, p. 278). The traditional
working class has evolved into an underclass; working-class solidarity has become a
thing of the past; and the image of the working class has been defamed with the
propaganda of aggressive Conservatism, all of which contributing to the decline of
identity of the working classes as a whole.
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On British Cultural Studies, Barker's Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice
(2000) is a very comprehensive survey of all aspects concerned, such as key concepts
and methodology, culture and ideology, Fordism and post-modernism, media and
audience, youth style and resistance, cultural politics and cultural policy. Turner's

British Cultural Studies 2nd edition (1996) has a better focus on the British Cultural
Studies tradition--the Birmingham School--and ideology and politics of British
context. I benefited more from analysis of cultural politics and cultural ideology of
Barker's writing and of Birmingham School of Cultural Studies in Turner's work.
Kirk's Class, Culture and Social Change: On the Trail of the Working Class (2007)
has an informative chapter entitled "In Search of the Working Class: The Rise of
British Cultural Studies." Besides, sensing the poverty of representation of
contemporary working-class culture, authors for the introduction and first two
chapters of Cultural Studies and the Working Class (Munt, 2000) expressed extreme
sadness that class is in so many ways "the 'lost identity' of identity politics"
(Medhurst, 2000, p. 29) and strongly argued for cultural studies to continue to have as
one of its chief objectives "a concern to illuminate the present" (Munt, 2000, p. 7).
Books simply on films can be divided into two kinds-those purely on social
realism of working class representation and those doing general survey of British
cinema or focusing on a particular period or a specific decade with certain chapters on
social realism films.
Of the first kind, Samantha Lay's British Social Realism is a general
investigation of the realist genre. Lay begins by defining the term "social realism,"
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tracing its historical development, and examining the term through a consideration of
practice, politics, form, style and content. Then the chapters review the rich tradition
of social realist film-making in British from its beginning in the documentary
movement of the 1930s to the more hybrid contemporary forms, with reference to
social-historical contexts and with brief case studies of key texts. In so doing, Lay
reviews some relevant key publications and analyses the key themes and differences
in forms and practice. She affirms that there are three thematic concerns in
contemporary social realism: the crisis in masculinity, the de-politicization of the
working class through a shift in emphasis from production to consumption, and the
prevalence of a therapeutic discourse from the public to the personal (2002, pp.
104-106). The text brings out the concern that the focus on the private and the
personal "undermines the 'social' message and meaning as we focus on the individual
or family and their struggles without making connections to wider political, economic
and social factors" (2002, p. 121). Due to the limited space and the length on social
realism styles, the book only does brief case studies of 3 films.
John Hill's "From the New Wave to 'Brit-grit': continuity and difference in
working-class realism" in British Cinema Past and Present surveys the continuities
and changes in the tradition with more focus on a range of realist films from the 1980s
and 1990s--particularly works of Ken Loach, Alan Clarke and Mike Leigh, depicting
the polarization of British society and the fragmentation of a traditional working class.
Hill points out continuous trends such as downplaying of collective conditions and
actions in favor of the individual and personal, and a reconfiguration of public and
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private spaces. Hill's work is significant here in noting the common historical
association made within British cinema between social realist mode and the
representation of previously socially-marginalized and under-represented groups,
most specifically the working classes (2000b, p. 250).
Geoff Brown's "Paradise Found and Lost: The Course of British Realism" in

The British Cinema Book is a brief, general survey of British social realism from the
Documentary Movement to the 21 sl century. The history of British screen realism is
persistent and convoluted from the Documentary Movement, WWlI films, the New
Wave, Ken Loach, Mike Leigh, the 1980s, 1990s right to the 2006 This is England.
Brown argues that the late 1970s saw rebirth of the Hollywood escapist spectacle
attracting young people into the cinema to be amazed by special effects and the unreal.
Despite Ken Loach and Mike Leigh's realism, cinema of the 1980s was weighted
toward "fantasy, the surreal, and period nostalgia" (2009, p. 35), though realism was
much alive on television. Realism of the 1990s was more marked by a feel-good
mood and stereotyped representation. So, according to Brown, in present British
cinema's commercial sector, "Grierson's concern for 'recording ... the real world' finds
scant reflection" (2009, p. 37) and realist tradition was a "paradise lost--or at least
mislaid" (2009, p. 35). Brown concludes that with such diverse films and film-makers
"the Griersonian paradise may remain a conscious memory, and may even be
glimpsed form afar; but it is unlikely even to be regained" (2009, p. 37).
John Hill's book Sex, class, and realism: British Cinema, 1956-1963 is an
authoritative book and key reference in my analysis of New Wave films. Covering the
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years 1956-63 when films dealt genuinely with sexual themes, working class
aspirations and problems, the book explores the social problem films and the New
Wave films, offering valuable discussions of extensive filmography centering on sex,
class and realism. Hill prioritizes their thematic concerns, pointing out that in dealing
with the working class, there is the emphasis on "individual rather than collective
situations," on "interpersonal rather than socially structured conflicts" and on
"cultural attitudes rather political and economic relationships" (1986, p. 173). Hill
sees the New Wave films as presenting "a striking riposte to any complacent ideology
of 'classlessness'" (1986, p. 174). The book is also wide in its scope, surveying social
history, the film industry and introducing theories of realism in the first few chapters.
John Hill's British Cinema in the 1980s deals with the cinematic production of
the decade through a number of themes and issues closely related with the social,
economic, and cultural circumstances characteristic of the period. In discussing
working-class films, the analysis of class extends substantially to class and gender and
class and race, which is a unique contribution of the book. In Chapter 8 "Class, gender,
and Working Class Realism," Hill looks at class and masculinity and class and
femininity, seeing the loss of masculinity, community and collective action of
working-class heroes as a result of the harsh economic realities of the Thatcher era,
and identifying a new kind of working-class heroine in some "woman's films" which
deliberately play with class and gender roles for comic effect. The heroine's desire for
individual escape, from class and from traditional gender roles, is seen as a key theme.
Chapter 9 "Class, Politics, and Gender: High Hopes and Riff-RaJ!' takes the two films
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by two important British directors as case studies. It discusses class politics,
anti-Thatcherism,

and

cultural

barbarianism

associated

with

the

economic

beneficiaries. Chapter 10 '''Race' and Cultural Hybridity: My Beautiful Laundrette
and Sammy and Rosie Get Laid," again case studies of the two films, explores the way
in which the directors challenge traditional conceptions of race and cheer hybrid
identities-"living with difference" (1999, p. 208). The characters' identities are
constructed across different axes-black/white, male/female, and gay/straight.
British Cinema of the 90s edited by Robert Murphy contains two valuable
chapters: Claire Monk's "Men in the 90s" and Hill's "Failure and Utopianism:
Representations of the Working Class in British Cinema of the 1990s." Monk looks at
the changed images of men in general in the 90s' films, identifying the emergence of
"new lads" as well as growing masculine crisis. The part on working class male
violence in Naked (1995) and Nil by Mouth (1997) and on male insecurity and fears in
The Full Monty (1997) and Brassed Off(1996) is very inspiring. Coming up with such
impressive terms as "post-industrial male trauma," "post-patriarchal masculinities"
and "post-feminist male panic" (2000a, p. 157), Monk argues that British cinema's
preoccupation with men's self-scrutiny in the 1990s largely resulted from a perceived
crisis

III

male

economic

self-consciousness,"

the

power

and

"confessional

gender
and

privilege.

therapeutic

She

impulses"

takes
and

"the
the

"attentiveness to men and masculinity as subjects-in-themselves" (2000a, p. 157) in
this preoccupation with men as something new or unprecedented. John Hill examines
class conflicts in Loach's films and the more populist films such as The Full Monty.
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He points out two kinds of endings for them: failure with the bleaker films about the
very poor working class and utopianism with the feelgood comedies (2000a, p. 178).
Both Monk and Hill stress films' representation of the masculinity crisis of working
class, who are nostalgically patriarchal, jobless, impotent, and eager for respect.
Claire Monk's "Underbelly UK: The 1990s underclass film, masculinity and the
ideologies of 'new' Britain" in British Cinema Past and Present examines the
underclass films in terms of what they say about gender, class and national identity in
the context of the culture and politics of contemporary Britain. Monk argues that the
success

of Brassed Off and

The Full Monty

appears

"superficially-but

deceptively ... to mark the return with a vengeance of the class-consciousness and
sense of collectivity and community repressed in the 1980s" (2000b, p. 275). With
obsessive focus on white, non-working masculinity, these films transform underclass
material into an appealing, profitable and exportable commodity, which manifests the
abandonment of a socially committed British cinema and plays a paradoxical role in
New Labor's "re-branding" British national identity.
Paul Dave's Visions of England: Class and Culture in Contemporary Cinema is
a provocative exploration of class in relation with national identity in contemporary
cinema, especially during the 1990s. Focusing on such themes as "class, capitalism
and nation" (2006, p. xv), the book studies the influence of ideologies of
neo-liberalism on the representation of class across a wide range of films. While the
book is on all classes, it has two key chapters on the working class: "The Working
Class: Elegies" and "The Underclass: Fantasy and Realism," in which Dave addresses
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the themes of the "disappearing" working class in Brassed Off, The Full Monty,

Among Giants, Dockers, and Billy Elliot, as well as youth in crisis in Trainspotting,
all of which are elegies for an older, industrial, northern working class. The class
model Dave uses is one which rejects the "structural location" (Weberian) in favor of
class as "social relation" (Marxist). Making substantial reference of Ellen Meiksins
Wood's Marxist political analysis of capitalism, Dave seeks to show how the
representations of underclass "reveal more about a complex range of middle-class
attitudes towards the working class than they do about any contemporary
reappearance of the lumpenproletariat" (2006, p. xiii) and in so doing offers sharp
political critique of neo-Iiberalism.
Much academic work on British working class films is finalized in chapter form
edited into film study books. Due to their limited space, the authors can only focus on
a few films sharing common themes or films of a particular decade. Lay's book is a
historic survey of British social realism in all decades, yet is more successful in
comprehensively reviewing British research achievements on the genre. The authors
analyze from a variety of approaches, mainly social/historical and political. This
dissertation offers my unique contribution in that it aims to analyze the changing
perception and representation of working class identity through reviewing British
cinema of over half a century, so as to explore patterns of cultural change to offer a
humanities perspective study. To support patterns of cultural change, this study
includes an interdisciplinary approach using sociological and historical analysis.
Above all, the dissertation has a clear theoretical framework-British Cultural
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Studies.
In the present postmodern world, class has sunk to the bottom in the hierarchy
list of oppression. This is largely due to the fact that it is no longer a fresh subject for
interest and, according to Munt, poverty is "not sexy enough for the intelligentsia"
(2000, p. 7). It is also largely because of the Thatcherite/Blairite campaign to project
Britain as a classless society, making upward mobility connected to dreams of class
escape. Naturally, the result is a lack of representation and a shortage of work on
contemporary working-class culture. Munt calls for British Cultural Studies to
continue to have class as one of its chief concerns to illuminate the present (2000, p.
7). This dissertation of mine is intended as an effort to contribute to the continuation
of British Cultural Studies tradition.
Thesis Structure
This dissertation is organized into 8 chapters. Chapter I is an introduction of
research issue, research significance, research thesis and CONtent, literature review,
methodology, and my contribution. Chapter 2 deals with theoretical framework of
British Cultural Studies and key concepts such as culture, ideology, hegemony, class
politics, the postmodern "New Times," identity, representation, realism and
masculinity. Chapter 3 looks at class and working class in Britain from sociological
and historical perspectives. It looks at the sociological understanding of the condition
of British class and working class in the 20 th century and explores the rise and fall of
British working class from post-war affluence to the present decline and
fragmentation. A combination of sociological analysis and historical comparative

24

analysis of working class transformation is used. The chapter illustrates that Britain is
still far from a classless society and British working class has experienced massive
changes-"rise and decline" or "rise and fall "-due to post-industrial economic
development and Mrs. Thatcher's New Right politics. Chapter 4 focuses on working
class identity in New Wave films (1950s & 1960s), particularly in Room at the Top
(Jack Clayton, 1959) and Saturday Night and Sunday Morning (Karel Reisz, 1960).
Chapter 5 focuses on working class identity represented in the serious social criticism
films High Hopes (Mike Leigh, 1988), My Beautiful Laundrette (Stephen Frears,
1985), and Sweet Sixteen (Ken Loach, 2002) by independent directors. Chapter 6
focuses on working class identity in the commercial comedies of the 1990s
represented by The Full Monty (Peter Cattaneo, 1997) and Brassed Off(Mark Herman,
1996). In dealing with working-class screen identity in these three chapters, identity is
explored through themes and representations, and a direct relationship with the
broader social and cultural context will be established. Chapter 7 analyses the
continuity and change of British working class screen identity from the theoretical
framework of British cultural studies. Making wide reference of Raymond Williams
and Stuart Hall, it probes the relationship between identity, power, the impact of
ideology and cultural resistance. The chapter calls for cultural policy support for
socially purposive British national cinema to keep social realism as a democratization
of representation of national cultural life as well as a sustained concern for
working-class dignity. Chapter 8 ends the dissertation with a conclusion of the
research issue.
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CHAPTER II
BRITISH CULTURAL STUDIES ON CLASS AND WORKING CLASS

Raymond Williams, in his 1986 lecture "The Future of Cultural Studies," said
"you cannot understand an intellectual or artistic project without also understanding
its formation; that the relation between a project and a formation is always decisive;
and ... the emphasis of Cultural Studies is precisely that it engages with both" (as
cited in Munns & Rajan, 1995, p. 1). Therefore, this dissertation takes cultural studies,
particularly British Cultural Studies, as the theoretical framework to explore and
analyze British working class screen identity.
Cultural studies is a field defined by the international journal Cultural Studies
as "dedicated to the notion that the study of cultural processes, and especially of
popular culture, is important, complex and both theoretically and politically
rewarding" (Turner, 1996, p. 1). This notion is largely indebted to the writings of
Raymond Williams (1958), Richard Hoggart (1957), and E.P. Thompson (1963),
which greatly extended the meaning of culture to include the culture of the working
class. Hoggart's "personal history of everyday life in prewar Britain," Williams'
"strategic reorientation of the definition of culture towards the anthropological 'whole
way oflife,'" plus Thompson's "recovery of 'history from below,'" all placed class at
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the centre of cultural studies by directing fresh attention to the culture of the working
class (Turner, 1996, p. 217). Their writings were seen as founding work of cultural
studies.
The Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at the University of
Birmingham, also referred to as the "Birmingham School," is commonly regarded as
the birthplace or institutional origin of British Cultural Studies and had a pivotal role
in the later development of the theory. Richard Hoggart established the center in 1964
and was its Director during 1964-1968; then Stuart Hall replaced as Director during
1968-1979. "It is during the period of Hall's Directorship that one can first speak of
the formation of an identifiable and distinct domain called cultural studies" (Barker,
2004, p. 21), for which Hall was called "a 'founding father' of cultural studies"
(Procter, 2004, p. 141). The Centre developed many typical subject-matters as well as
the techniques of analysis of cultural studies. Greatly influenced by Althusser's
analysis on ideology and Gramsci's hegemony theory, the center's research priority
shifted from an initial interest in the "lived" culture of working class to the centrality
of the mass media, youth subcultures, race and gender.
Cultural studies rejects elitist notions of high-low culture or the critiques of
mass culture, holding that "the symbolic experiences and practices of ordinary people
are more important analytically and politically than culture with a capital C"
(McGuigan, as cited in Barker, 2000, p. 47). Instead of making judgment on the
formally and aesthetically "good" or "bad," it evaluates on political values and
ideological construction. There has been a conscious and consistent effort to prioritize
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marginalized

social
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from

underprivileged

working class

to

those

disempowered on the basis of gender, race, age, sexuality, geopolitical location or
colonialism. The focus has been on popular culture and oppositional subcultures, seen
as capable of resisting the hegemonic modes of capitalist domination. This
preoccupation positions cultural studies to the left of the political spectrum.
What differentiates cultural studies from other subject areas is its connections to
matters of power and politics and in particular to the need for social and cultural
change. Take the article "Putting Policy into Culture Studies" by Tony Bennett (1992)
as an example, cultural studies practitioners see themselves not just as detached
observers of cultural practices, but also as having a political obligation to promote
cultural change through providing useful tools for cultural/political activists and
policy makers.
This chapter surveys the theoretical framework of British Cultural Studies on
class and working class and defines certain key concepts such as culture, ideology,
hegemony, class politics, the post-modem "New Times," identity, representation,
realism and masculinity.
Culture: From Elitism to "A Whole Way of Life" of People

The concept of culture is central to cultural studies, yet this is a word open to all
kinds of explanations. Raymond Williams in Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and
Society took it as "one of the two or three most complicated words in the English
language" (1983, p. 87), and defines culture as having three broad active categories of
usage: the noun which "describes a general process of intellectual, spiritual and
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aesthetic development;" which "indicates a particular way of life, whether of a people,
a period, a group, or humanity in general" and which "describes the works and
practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity," with the third meaning in
most widespread use (Williams, 1983, p. 90).
The original meaning of the word "culture," according to Williams, is
"cultivation," which is linked to growing crops or rearing and breeding animals. Later,
the concept was extended to take in the active cultivation of the "human mind"
(Williams, 1981, p. 10), hence the idea of the cultivated or cultured person. Since the
late 19 th century, culture has referred mainly to the arts. Culture carrying the meaning
of aesthetic privileges was dominant until the mid_20th century.
In the 19 th century, English writer Matthew Arnold, in his famous book

Cultural and Anarchy, published in 1869, described culture as "the best that has been
thought and said in the world" and acquiring culture as the means toward moral
perfection and social good (as cited in Barker, 2000, p. 36). Culture is thus contrasted
to the "anarchy" of the raw and uncultivated masses. In this way, Arnold offered
justification for aesthetic and political preference of "high culture."
In the 20 th century, conservative literary critic F.R. Leavis shared with Arnold
that culture is morally and aesthetically the "best" of human creativity. F.R. Leavis
held that high or literary culture within the reign of an educated minority is to keep
alive and nurture the ability to discriminate between the best and the worst of culture.
For followers of Leavis, it was their duty to define and defend the best of culture and
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criticize "advertising, films and popular fiction, the worst of mass culture with its
'addictions' and 'distractions. '" (Barker, 2000, p. 36)
These approaches were commented on by Turner as "unashamedly elitist" and
by Bennett as a discourse of the "cultured" about the culture of those without
"culture" (Turner, 1996, p. 40). It was against such definitions of culture that cultural
studies struggled and through which it defined itself.
Raymond Williams in Culture and Society (1958) and The Long Revolution
(1961) applied the anthropological understanding of culture to post-WWII British
society and developed an understanding which stresses the everyday lived character
of culture as "essentially a whole way of life" (1958, p. 325). He actually formulated
this idea in his 1958 essay, "Culture is Ordinary:" "We use the word culture in these
two senses: to mean a whole way of life - the common meanings; to mean the arts and
learning -the special processes of discovery and creative effort. Some writers reserve
the word for one or other of these senses; I insist on both, and on the significance of
their conjunction ... Culture is ordinary, in every society and in every mind." (as cited
in Laing, 1968, p. 201) This famous notion that "culture is ordinary" legitimated the
serious study of working class life and of popular culture. Working-class
contributions to the construction of culture through their experience was given due
value, revealing the democratization of culture and politics.
This effort directly resulted from postwar radical changes, which entitled the
working class to welfare, health, employment and education, building a sense of pride
and hope for a fairer future into the social identity of working-class people. Munt
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emphasizes that "the principle that working-class identity emerged into a new
self-consciousness after the war is pivotal to comprehending the eventual
consolidation of working-class cultural studies" (Munt, 2000, p. 2).
Hoggart's The Uses of Literacy, published in 1957, explores the widespread
changes with English working-class life and culture from the 1930s to the 1950s. In
the first half ("An 'Older' Order"), which is more autobiographical, Hoggart gives a
sympathetic, humanist and detailed account of the lived culture of the working class
in the 1920s and 1930s, which is signified by a deep sense of community feeling. For
Hoggart, the working classes value two things above all else: the family and the
neighborhood. The neighborhood is where "one knows practically everybody" (1998,
p. 39) and its grip is strong. In the second half ("Yielding Place to New"), Hoggart
gives a rather acid account of the explosive development of mass entertainment
directed at the new "affluent" working class, expressing anxieties about erosion of
working-class values and commercialization of working class culture. For Hoggart,
the 1950s sees the shift towards "the creation of mass culture" which is "in some
important ways less healthy" (1998, pp. 9-10). The working class, while economically
more secure as beneficiaries of the welfare state, stands in danger of losing their
self-identity, e.g., the solidarity and collective care of their communities. Hoggart's
central legacy to cultural studies is "the legitimacy he accorded to the detailed study
of working class culture, that is, to the meanings and practices of ordinary people as
they seek to live their lives and make their own history" (Barker, 2004, p. 86).
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Raymond Williams was more influential with a more enduring legacy than
Hoggart and Thompson. His Culture and Society, published in 1958, is a cultural
history focusing on great cultural thinkers and literary writers between 1750 and 1950.
He established himself with the enlightening opening account of the four meanings of
the word "culture"-as "a general state or habit of the mind," "the general state of the
intellectual development, in a society as a whole," "the general body of the arts," and
"a whole way of life, material, intellectual and spiritual" (1958, p. xvi). The long and
heavy conclusion chapter deals with mass communication and working class culture
formation, which, according to Williams, should be viewed in a positive light. He sees
the concept of "mass" as carrying an elitist disdain and suspicion signifying an older
word "mob," and famously declares that "[t]here are in fact no masses; there are only
ways of seeing people as masses" (1958, p. 300). He developed a notion of "common
culture" or "culture in common" which he saw as inspired by the radical postwar
socialist changes and would enable the many not the few. A common culture is not an
equal culture, yet equality of being is essentially necessary to it. Inequality which
denies the essential quality of being is "evil" and intolerable as it "rejects,
depersonalizes, degrades in grading, other human beings" (1958, p. 317). In The Long

Revolution, published in 1961, he reaffirms that "culture is a description of a
particular way of life which expresses certain meanings and values not only in art and
learning but also in institutions and ordinary behavior" (1961, p. 41). In dealing with
the history of mass education, the reading public, the popular press, the realist novel,
which involves wider public participation, the book argues that this expansion of
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culture simply forms part of the long revolution towards a more democratic society. In
this process, society should provide "the skiIIs of literary and other advanced
communication, to all people rather than limited groups" (1961, p. xiv). This "cultural
redistribution" is crucial for Williams in the development of his conception of a
common culture (Kirk, 2007, p. 43). Williams continued to study the mass media,
publishing Communications in 1962 and Television, Technology and Form in 1974,
both being taken up as much with intervening in cultural policy as with any form of
ideological or semiotic analysis of texts. Unlike Hoggart, who was skeptical of mass
culture, WiIliams trusted working-class potential autonomy to make sound judgment
and choices in a consumer society. From the 1970s, Williams shifted his earlier
concern for a democratic theory of culture to his engagement with Marxism and
consequent analysis of the political role of culture in class-divided societies.
E.P. Thompson, a social historian, published The Making of the English

Working Class in 1963--a "history from below" (Barker, 2000, p. 38) about the lives,
beliefs, attitudes and practices of working people during the late 18 th and early 19th
centuries. Like Williams, Thompson conceives of culture as lived and ordinary, and
he is concerned with not only the cultural but also the socio-economic aspect of this
history. Attacking ruling class history for leaving out the working class, with "[t]he
blind alleys, the lost causes, and the losers ... forgotten" (1963, p. 12), Thompson aims
to rewrite the history of working class culture in order to redress the imbalance of its
representation in "official" histories to "rescue" the casualties of ruling class
history--"the poor stockinger, the Luddite cropper, the 'obsolete' hand-loom
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weaver. .. from the enormous condescension of posterity" (1963, p. 12). Thompson
stresses the active and creative role of the English working class in bringing
themselves into being as the title suggests that "[t]he working classes were not simply

made by history but took part in its making" (Procter, 2004, p. 38).
Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams and E.P. Thompson were the forefathers
of cultural studies initiating this decisive tum in post-WWII Great Britain.
Working-class

academics

such

as

Hoggart

and

Williams-the

scholarship

boys-began to speak for themselves, exploring working-class cultures "from
within," and "focused on working-class culture as a point of origin for the first time in
British intellectual life" (Munt, 2000, p. 4), shedding light on the ordinary experiences
of those traditionally excluded from the analytical gaze. Thus, British working-class
culture became "the text, as well as the theory" for cultural studies (Munt, 2000, p. 4).
Their way of studying working class culture was coined by Richard Johnson (director
of CCCS after Hall) in 1979 as "cultural ism" (Procter, 2004, p. 38). This
"cultural ism" is a form of historical cultural materialism, favoring the exploration of
the meanings of lived culture within the context of its material conditions, as well as
"humanist" as it places human experience and agency central to the formation of class
and culture. In short, it is a less exclusive, more democratic understanding of culture,
examining the place of culture in class power.

Althusser on Ideology and Gramsci on Hegemony
Turner takes ideology as the most important concept in the foundation of
British cultural studies, quoting James Carey to affirm his position: "British cultural
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studies could be described just as easily and perhaps more accurately as ideological
studies for they assimilate, in a variety of complex ways, culture to ideology" (Carey,
as cited in Turner, 1996, p. 182). While Marx defined ideology as "the system of the
ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man or a social group"
(Althusser, 1971, p. 107), the concept is later understood as "ideals, meanings and
practices which, while they purport to be universal truths, are maps of meaning which
support the power of particular social groups" under the influence of Gramsci (Barker,
2004, p. 97).
British cultural studies in its early years was clearly marked by "an extremely
close relationship" with Marxist ideology and the centrality of class (Lacey, 2000, p.
40). Marxist ideology holds that "the ideas of the ruling class are, in every age, the
ruling ideas, i.e., the class which is the dominant material force in society is at the
same time its dominant intellectual force" (Marx, as cited in Barker, 2000, p. 49).
Consequently, culture is political as well as ideological. To be more specific, in
capitalist society it is in the interests of the bourgeoisie to promote the notion of the
social world as highly individualistic and competitive. By covering "the genuinely
social and collective nature of human life" believed by Marx, the bourgeoisie can
largely minimize the possibilities of effective proletarian resistance to capitalism
(Edgar & Sedgwick, 1999, p. 190). To great extent, the failure of proletarian
revolutions to materialize is due to the fact that the working class suffers from "false
consciousness"-the mistakenly bourgeois world view serving the interest of the
capitalist class represented by the ethos of the free market of "equality" which
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obscures the true nature of exploitation. For Marx, there is a direct causal relationship
between the economic base and the cultural superstructure, a stand which has been
termed as "economic determinism" or "economic reductionism." However, such
Marxist account of ideology was challenged and underwent two important revisions
in the 20 th century, one being Althusser's structuralist approach to ideology and the
other being Gramsci's theory of hegemony.
Althusser was the most influential structuralist imports to the CCCS, with his
re-readings of Marx in texts such as For Marx (1965), Reading Capital (1968) and

Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (1971) and his famous notion of the
"Ideological State Apparatuses" (lSAs). In his essay "Ideology and the Ideological
State Apparatuses" (ISAs), he argues that "[i]deology is a 'representation' of the
imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence" (1971, p.
153) and is a far more effective means for maintaining class power than physical force
of the State. Ideology masks the real exploitative nature of capitalism by displacing
the emphasis of thought from production to free labor exchange and by stressing the
character of people as individuals to fragment the vision of class. The ideology of the
ruling class becomes the ruling ideology through the installation of the ISAs, which
he designates as family, religious institutions, the education system, the system of law,
the media, political parties, etc. ISAs "function 'by ideology'" (1971, p. 149) and is
"secured ... by the ruling ideology" (1971, p. 142); hence, the ISAs are "the site of
class struggle, and often of bitter forms of class struggle" (1971, p. 140). For
Althusser, ideology "hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects"
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(1971, p. 162) and "has the function of 'constituting' concrete individuals as subjects"
(1971, p. 160), which represents a kind of anti-humanism as the subject (person) is
seen not as a self-constituting agent.
Althusser in For Marx raised the notion of "over-determination" to mean that
there are other determining forces-the ideological and the political-than just the
economic, which breaks with the mechanistic Marxist base-superstructure version.
Althusser also argues that ideology is not an illusory veil (false consciousness), but "a
system (with its own logic and vigor) of representations (images, myths, ideas or
concepts)" (as cited in Barker, 2000, p. 56), stressing ideology's semiotic character.
In short, Althusser made unique contributions in revealing the way in which
ideology works through material practices and institutions (IS As) and that "there is no
'real' uncontaminated by signification and ideology," which implies that "ideology
becomes the very site of struggle," rather than a false consciousness to shrug off
(Procter, 2004, p. 45).
An important legacy of Althusserian structuralism for Hall is its move beyond
the humanism of the culturalists. Hall saw that Althusser viewed "experience" "not as
an authenticating source but as an effect: not as a reflection of the real but as an
'imaginary relation'" (as cited in Procter, 2004, p. 45). Yet Hall felt that Althusser
overemphasizes the system or structure of signs and representations. Ideology is seen
as directly imposed from above, which denies agency and the possibility for
resistance or active struggle. To compare and summarize, classical Marxism was
flawed in "its emphasis on the determining role of the economy," Williams'
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culturalism was flawed in "its emphasis on the determining role of human
experience," and Althusserianism was flawed in "its emphasis on the determining role
of language and ideology" (Procter, 2004, p. 46). And it was through Gramsci that
Hall and the CCCS were able to address the limitations of Althusser and
structural isms.
The theory of hegemony was developed by Italian theorist Antonio Gramsci in
the 1920s and 1930s to explain the popularity of fascism in Italy despite its
restrictions on people's liberties. Since the first publication of Gramsci's works in the
English language in the late 1960s and helped by Stuart Hall's promotion, the theory
has played a significant part in the development of British cultural studies, with
hegemony becoming a core concept of the field during the 1970s and 1980s, for
which Turner defines British cultural studies as "neo-Gramscian" (1996, p. 210).
Hegemony deals with the nature of authority in social relations and has been
defined as the process of "making, maintaining and reproducing" the "authoritative
set of meanings, ideologies and practices" (Barker, 2004, p. 84). The essence of
Gramsci's hegemony is that the ruling groups (class, sexual, ethnic, etc) in democratic
societies exercises social authority and leadership over the subordinate groups through
various forces, but essentially "consent." As Gramsci argues, in the liberal-capitalist
state, "consent is normally in the lead, operated behind 'the armour of cohesion'" (as
cited in Hall, 1977, p. 332). So for Gramsci, social power is not a simple matter of
domination on the one side and subordination or resistance on the other. Hegemony
resists revolutionary resistance by working through negotiation, incorporation,
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concession and consent rather than by simple oppression. In this hegemonic
leadership, the subordinated groups consent to the "common sense" view offered by
the dominant group because they are convinced that this will do them good. For
Gramsci, common sense is the most significant site of ideological conflict and in the
struggle to forge "good sense" the class character of capitalism can be recognized. In
short, Gramscian hegemony describes "the process of establishing dominance within
a culture, not by brute force but by voluntary consent, by leadership rather than rule"
(Procter, 2004, p. 26).
The consent from the people is largely achieved with the help of intellectuals
sympathetic to the ruling class who will offer justifications of the domination
persuasively, and through such institutions as the media, school, church, and family.
Hegemony is temporary and unstable as it needs to be constantly re-won and
re-negotiated, which makes culture a terrain of conflict and struggle over meanings
and opens up the possibility of challenges to it. Power is not something that can be
secured once and for all.
In comparison with the theories of Marx and Althusser, Hall points out that a
weakness of the Marxist account of ideology is its failure to account for the "free
consent of the governed to the leadership of the governing classes" (as cited in Turner,
1996, p. 192). Althusser's assessment of ideology also could be accused of a rigidity
that discounted any possibility of change. Hegemony theory manages to explain both
processes of maintaining the cultural power of the ruling minority as well as the active
or inactive consent of the powerless majority and is able to concentrate on explaining
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the process of change. Thus, it is "a more sophisticated and fluid paradigm of social
critique" (Mikula, 2008, p. 85).
Hegemony theory carried long-lasting influence in cultural studies because of
its emphasis on popular culture as a site of ideological struggle, with the ruling class
trying to win hegemony but resisted by marginal and disempowered groups. Popular
culture was thus seen as "a conduit" which could both "promote hegemony" and
"prompt resistance to it" (Mikula, 2008, p. 86); in other words, popular culture is
"both dominated and oppositional, determined and spontaneous" (Turner, 1996, p.
196). Due to this open possibility of political intervention, Hall takes popular culture
very seriously. He argues that popular culture is a "contradictory space," a site of
continuous negotiation: "we should always start from here: with the double stake in
popular culture, the double movement of containment and resistance" (as cited in
Procter, 2004, p. 25). Hall also challenges the notion that the popular is an authentic,
pure expression of the working class, believing that there are no popular cultural
forms that "'belong' to a particular class and whose meaning can be guaranteed
forever;" rather, the struggle "depends upon the success or failure in giving popular
culture 'a socialist accent,' not as class versus class but the power bloc versus the
people" (Procter, 2004, p. 29).
The theory of hegemony was of central importance to the development of
British cultural studies. It facilitated analysis of "the ways in which subordinate
groups actively respond to and resist political and economic domination" (Edgar &
Sedgwick, 1999, p. 165). This emphasis on resistance is significant for British cultural
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studies, which became more interested in the resistance to, rather than the
reproduction of, dominant ideologies. This can be seen in the study of the "rituals of
resistance" associated with a range of working-class and youth subcultures as well as
the emphasis on agency within audience studies in exploring popular culture and
media.

Stuart Hall and the CCCS
Hall's major concerns and profound influence mainly lie in 4 areas: the analysis
of the media, the practices of subculture resistance, the construction of political power,
and diasporic hybridity studies, the first three all being closely related with class.
Gramsci has had a greater influence than any other intellectual on Stuart Hall.
As having been mentioned earlier, with the contribution of Hoggart, Williams
and Thompson, British cultural studies was working class cultural studies. This
preoccupation with the working class culture continued into the 1970s with
publications such as the CCCS collections Resistance Through Rituals: Youth

Subcultures in Post-War Britain (Hall & Jefferson, 1976), Learning to Labor: How
Working-Class Kids Get Working-Class Jobs (Willis, 1977), Subculture: The
Meaning of Style (Hebdige, 1979) and The "Nationwide" Audience (Morley, 1980)
(Kirk, 2007, p. 45). For the writers, the cultural field bears all the marks of unequal
power relations. The cultural became the key arena for contestation or discursive
struggle if the political and the economic had appeared settled. Gramsci's influence of
hegemony theory allowed writers to celebrate agency of the subordinated in their
subcultures. This preoccupation "revolutionized the study of popular culture from the
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mid-1960s to the mid-1980s by dismantling the orthodox critiques of mass cultural
forms and practices" (Turner, 1996, p. 217). It was a rediscovery of working class
with the agency of struggle.
Mass media analysis came to dominate the CCCS's research from the 1970s
and has been its longest-running focus, overtaking Hoggart's concern of studying the
everyday "lived" cultures of the working class. The Center approached the media as
ideological and hegemonic institutions. Seeing the media as having "progressively
colonized the cultural and ideological sphere" (Hall, 1977, p. 340), Hall tried to
investigate the relations between media and ideology, namely structures of power and
politics of the media, the ideological effectiveness, through textual analysis of
signifying systems. In other words, Hall is more interested in the political rather than
the linguistic implications of media messages.
In his renowned essay "Encoding and decoding in the media discourse" (1973)
and "Encoding/decoding" (1980), analyzing television discourse, Hall raised a new
theory of communication, which challenges the traditional linear model and suggests
a circuit, in which receivers become active consumers leading to the reproduction of
meaning. For Hall, the "message form" encoded by the sender might or might not
generate the designed and expected meaning as the audience are not passive recipients.
It is at the moment of decoding, that the television message acquires "social use or

political effectivity" (as cited in Procter, 2004, p. 65). So the connotative level is a
significant site of ideological intervention and contestation because its "fluidity of
meaning and association can be more fully exploited and transformed" for production
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of hegemony (as cited in Procter, 2004, p. 66). Hall also addressed political ideology
through his notion of dominant or "preferred meaning:" though encoded meanings
might be "accepted" or "rejected" by the viewing audience due to their diversified
lived experience, institutionally shaped discourses strive to make hegemonic codes of
dominant elites more effective to promote preferred readings. So, televisuallanguage
"constitutes rather than reflects the world" with systematic distortions (Procter, 2004,
p. 71). To summarize, "Encoding/decoding" argues that televisual discourse plays a
key ideological role in securing the values and meanings of the dominant cultural
order through "consent." However, these dominant or preferred meanings are always
open to contestation and transformation. In this sense, the media is not just a vehicle
for selling ideology, but more a site of ideological struggle.
David Morley's The "Nationwide" Audience represented a productive shift of
CCCS

to

reception

studies.

It

is

an

empirical

research

to

test

Hall's

encoding/decoding theory carried out by Morley, one of Hall's former students. The
research is a media group project at the CCCS (1975-7) on the British television show

Nation-wide, a popular early evening magazine program broadcast by the BBC.
Morley tested the hypothesis of dominant, negotiated and oppositional readings by
screening an episode of the show to different audiences grouped in terms of class,
occupation, race, and etc. This "ethnographic" approach revealed that "audience
responses are highly contradictory and are not rigidly determined by class or social
position" (Procter, 2004, p. 71). So class does not directly determine audience
responses. Morley's work was soon followed by numerous studies of soap opera and
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the significance to popular audiences of mainstream film and television genres. In
these works, Hall's renowned "encoding/decoding" principle provides a key mode for
understanding the reception of media texts.
On subcultures resistance, much attention was on British postwar urban youth
subcultures--their rituals and practices that generated meaning, resistance and pleasure.
In Resistance through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-war Britain (1976), Hall et

al. read British postwar change as from hegemonic consent to "law and order"
coercion based on Gramsci's theory of "hegemony." Hall et al. analyzed ideology in
the early postwar years through the key terms of "affluence," "consensus" and
"embourgeoisement" and challenged the idea that so-called affluence, combined with
the political consensus around welfare state, produced a classless society. For Hall,
affluence and classlessness are myths or "full-blown" ideologies, discourses which
work to "cover over the gaps between real inequalities and the promised utopia of
equality-for-all and ever-rising consumption to come" (Hall and Jefferson, 1976, p.
37). So, affluence, consensus and embourgeoisement, while embodying evident
postwar social change, were by no means innocent, descriptive terms but "ideological
onslaught" (Hall and Jefferson, 1976, p. 25) used to "dismantle working-class
resistance" by generating "spontaneous consent" (Hall and Jefferson, 1976, p. 40).
Such ideological hegemonic myths exploded in the 1970s with rising unemployment,
freezing wages and youth cultural revolts. All over the decades, deep-rooted and
strong was "the stubborn refusal of class - that tired, 'worn-out' category -- to
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disappear as a major dimension and dynamic of the social structure" (Hall and
Jefferson, 1976, p. 25).
Resistance through Rituals proclaims the presence of class, especially the
working class, not as a political force, but as a cultural presence activating symbolic
refusal or resistance of dominant value systems through marginal youth sub-cultures.
Sub-cultural styles came to embody expressions of collective identity. Style is crucial
here and style, or ritual resistance, is about using and adapting cultural signs. Hall et
al. argue that "Commodities are, also, cultural signs," which "have already been
invested, by the dominant culture, with meanings, associations, social connotations"
(Hall and Jefferson, 1976, p. 55). Through the adoption and adaptation of particular
styles, spaces and objects (e.g. the safety pin of the punk), signs are re-signified and a
subversive style and collective group consciousness come into being. So, through
stylization, things are "disarticulated from their dominant meanings, and rearticulated
in new contexts" (Procter, 2004, p. 92).
Hall et al. made it clear that hegemony is not "given" (guaranteed once and for
all), but a site of continuous struggle: "It has to be won, worked for, reproduced,
sustained" (Hall and Jefferson, 1976, p. 40). This unique feature grants youth
subculture resistance an important role to play. However, sub-cultural styles and
rituals can only be used to resist, negotiate or live through subordinate class
experience; they cannot provide a solution to crisis. In other words, the subcultural
resolution is a highly "symbolic" struggle "fated to fail" (Hall and Jefferson, 1976, p.
47). Though the symbolic acts of ritual resistance are seen as tragic in the sense of
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being empty of any political or institutional effect, Hall et al. 's study conferred a kind
of dignity on their subjects. The seriousness of concern to the sub-cultural identities is
quite absent in the mainstream media which delivered simply scare stories of youth
delinquency. Hall et al. suggest that it is through moral panic that "dominant
culture ... seek[s] and find[s], in 'youth', the folk-devils to people its nightmare"
(Hall and Jefferson, 1976, p. 74). In Policing the Crisis, Hall et. al. further denounce
the labeling of "moral panic" as being used by the establishment as a convenient
means of legitimating authoritarian exercise of control and maintaining state
hegemony: it "provide[ s] the basis ... for cross-class alliances in support of
'authority"', particularly when the state is in "crisis" (Hall et. aI., 1978, p. 177).
Dick Hebdige's Subculture: The Meaning of Style (1979) sees "style" as the
essence of sub-cultures and attempts to "discern the hidden messages inscribed in
code on the glossy surfaces of style" (Hebdige, 1979, p. 18). For Hebdige, the central
point behind sub-cultures lies in the "communication of a significant difference"
(Hebdige, 1979, p. 102). Through analyzing the British post-war subcultures such as
the Teddy Boys, the Mods, the Punk, the Reggae, the Skinhead, etc, Hebdige explores
their semiotic resistance to the dominant culture. Marginalized subcultural groups
gained symbolic solidarity and independent identity through the fusion of fashion and
musical styles.
Paul Willis's Learning to Labor: How Working-Class Kids get Working-Class

Jobs aims to expose the reasons or logic which constrain or determine working-class
kids getting working-class jobs, through analyzing the cultural and economic modes
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of reproduction that make this possible. It focuses on "the determinants of a social
class base out of which a particular class habitus shapes the trajectory of the lives
lived" (Kirk, 2007, p. 49). Willis argues "that it is their own culture which most
effectively prepares some working class lads for the manual giving of their labor
power. We may say that there is an element of self-damnation in the taking on of
subordinate roles in Western capitalism" (as cited in Kirk, 2007, p. 49). Willis
explains that the working-class kids intentionally refuse to follow school discipline or
study hard. They are not impressed by the common belief of self-salvation/upward
mobility through educational success. They do not even care the practical need that
successful school learning can possibly lead to some type of more decent and
meaningful work. They are very pessimistic about what they can target. The boys'
resistance and struggle is "a curious kind of hubris" (Kirk, 2007, p. 49); it seems that
these working-class kids blindly "attempt one heroic last stand to define themselves,
their autonomy and agency" (Kirk, 2007, p. 50). But it is highly tragic and hopeless
that such defiance can bring nothing except harm. Through mocking the ideological
interpellation of the school system and celebrating agency, working-class kids are
more firmly fixed in the relationship of production they resist in the first place (Kirk,
2007, p. 50). They can get no more than repeating the low-technique jobs of their
parents.
Finally, Hall's effort in combining Althusser's ideology and Gramsci's theory
of hegemony as analytical tool led Cultural Studies after the 1970s to divert its
attention to studies on power.
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The winning of consent can be typically exemplified by British working class
voting so many times for Margaret Thatcher (Prime Minister 1979-1990), who is a
right-wing Conservative liberal, yet seen as identified with their interests. In her first
prime ministerial term (1979-1983), Britain's Gross Domestic Product fell by 4.2 per
cent and unemployment rose by a record 141 per cent to over three million (Procter,
2004, p. 97). By the end of her second term, large scale de-industrialization reshaped
the landscape of class formations, forcefully eclipsing those working class in the
former industrial heartlands. The trade union power and labor movement as well as
the Labor Party itself were profoundly weakened. Nevertheless, the Conservative
Party secured a third term in office, making Thatcher one of the most popular leaders
of the postwar period. Such unmatched outcome inspired Hall to develop a theoretical
analysis which could explain the reasons for the continued electoral success of Mrs
Thatcher's neo-liberal, right-wing Conservative Party and explore what the Left might
learn from those reasons. In so doing, Hall coined the term "Thatcherism" (Procter,
2004, p. 98), which he felt was hegemonic ideological interpellation based on such
images as nation, family, neo-liberalism, competitive individualism. He also raised
the notion of "New Times," a project Hall and some other Left intellectuals launched
between 1988 and 1989 through Marxism Today-to force the Left to "move with the
times" (Hall and Jacques, 1989, p. 14). Theorists of "New Times" state that Western
capitalism is witnessing the emergence of a "two-thirds, one-third society" (Hall and
Jacques, 1989, p. 17), implying that two-thirds of the population are relatively well
off with "rising expectations" while one-third are either engaged in de-skilled
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part-time work or become the jobless underclass that is "left behind on every
significant dimension of social opportunity" (Hall, 1989, p. 118). The postmodern
New Times in Britain is characterized by the diversity of social and political
upheavals including "the success of 'Thatcherism,' the decline of traditional
working-class politics, the emergence of a politics of identity and consumption, and
most importantly the challenge these represent to the left" (Turner, 1996, p. 219).
Hall's study of the 1980s produced an ongoing critique of Thatcherism, which
was first published as a series of essays in the socialist monthlies Marxism Today and
The New Socialist and subsequently collected in two books: The Politics of
Thatcherism (1983) and The Hard Road to Renewal (1988).
For Hall, the uniqueness of Thatcherism lay in its capacity to "identify itself
with 'the people'" (Hall and Jacques, 1983, p. 10) and to "construct around itself an
active popular consent" (Hall and Jacques, 1983, pp. 22-23), securing hegemony even
among the working class whose economic interests was hardly the concern of
Thatcher Governments. Thatcherism cut across divides and conflicting interests,
including class interests, by deploying "the discourse of 'nation' and 'people' against
'class' and 'unions'" (Hall and Jacques, 1983, p. 27). And this political hegemony is
distinctly featured as "authoritarian populism:" "[fJree market, strong state, iron
times" (Hall and Jacques, 1983, p. 10), a successful combination of "populist" appeal
with the imposition of authority and "law" and "order." To be specific, by
"populism," Hall means something more than the ability to secure electoral support,
but "the project, central to the politics of Thatcherism, to ground neo-liberal policies
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directly in an appeal to 'the people;' to root them in the essentialist categories of
commonsense experience and practical moralism - and thus to construct.. . classes,
groups and interests into a particular definition of 'the people'" (Hall, 1988, p. 71). By
"authoritarian," Hall means the arousal of populist sentiment must be transformed into
"the identification with authority, the values of traditionalism and the smack of firm
leadership" (Hall, 1988, p. 72). As a matter of fact, Thatcherism was only committed
to rolling back the state for free market; in all other aspects she is always prepared to
strengthen state power and control for national recovery and social order.
Hall argues that this hegemony of the right, which destroys the post-war
political consensus of social democracy, proves the success of ideological
interpellation, as the consent was structured around the ideological mobilizations
across class lines around "the resonant themes of organic Toryism -- nation, family,
duty, authority standards, traditionalism, patriarchalism--with the aggressive themes
of a revived neo-liberalism--self-respect, competitive individualism, anti-statism"
(Hall, 1988, p. 157). For Hall, it is imagery--ideological representation--as opposed to
policy that "Thatcherism" secured its political success in the 1980s. In "Gramsci and
Us," writing in the aftermath of Thatcher's third election victory in 1987, which is
about Thatcherism's success and challenge and the Left inability to cope with the
changing world, Hall explains, "People don't vote for Thatcherism, in my view,
because they believe the small print. People in their minds do not think that Britain is
now a wonderfully blooming, successful, economy. Nobody believes that, with 3 3/4
million unemployed, the economy is picking up ... What Thatcherism as an ideology
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does, is to address the fears, the anxieties, the lost identities, of a people. It invites us
to think about politics in images. It is addressed to our collective fantasies, to Britain
as an imagined community, to the social imaginary. Mrs Thatcher has totally
dominated that idiom, while the left forlornly tries to drag the conversation round to
'our policies. '" (Hall, 1988, p. 167)
In "The Empire Strikes Back," Hall took the Falklands War (1982-3) as an
example to illustrate how Thatcherism, in constructing the war into a populist cause,
built its success partly in making people think politics in images. Thatcher's first term
did not achieve much, but was saved by the War. The War, which cost a fortune, was
largely fought on the grounds of moral principles, articulated through a series of
images, such as Winston Churchill and Britain's imperial greatness. The nostalgic
language of empire was enormously popular with the British electorate, with "52
percent of manual workers" and "more men than women" prepared to vote Mrs
Thatcher according to an opinion poll (Hall, 1988, p. 69). Mrs Thatcher made full use
of the war to glamorize Englishness, imperial nostalgia, patriotism and patriarchy,
traditional (moral) values - Thatcherism's ideological imagery. Hall sees this project
of ideology as one of "regressive modernization" or even "reactionary modernization"
(Hall, 1988, p. 164), by which he means that Thatcherism's vision of the future is
founded upon and legitimated through a backward looking, nostalgic turn to the past,
e.g. combining liberal free market discourses with conservative themes such as
nationhood and empire.

New Times: The Changing Face of Politics in the 1990s (Hall and Jacques,
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1989) was written near the end of Thatcher's reign to draw some conclusions about
the deep political, economic, social, and cultural changes now taking place in western
capitalist societies. Hall identifies "a qualitative change" (Hall and Jacques, 1989, p.
12) in advanced capitalist countries increasingly characterized by "diversity,
differentiation and fragmentation" (Hall and Jacques, 1989, p. 11). The rapid wave of
de-industrialization since the early 1980s has resulted in shift of economy from
manufacturing production to a predominantly service sector as well as shift towards a
more flexible, specialized and decentralized form of labor process. More people work
on flexi-time and part-time base. This has led to the weakening or even the demise of
traditional working class, their politics, and their culture. For Hall et ai., New Times
creates new subjectivities. There is an end of old collective solidarities with the "self'
being "more fragmented and incomplete, composed of multiple 'selves' or identities,"
and hence the subject "is differently placed or positioned by different discourses and
practices" (Hall, 1989, p. 120). With the death for good of the working class, agency
is sought elsewhere in cultural studies. Hence, the concern with class is shifted to
concerns with new social movements and identity politics of the margins.
Hall sees in New Times "a leading role for consumption" with greater emphasis
on choice and product differentiation, and on "the 'targeting' of consumers by
lifestyle, taste and culture rather than by the Registrar General's categories of social
class" (Hall, 1989, p. 118). Characterized by such words as "proliferation,"
"diversity" and "multiplication," Hall identifies in processes of market expansion "the
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opening up of the individual" and "the democratization of culture" (Hall, 1989, p.
128).
Hall also advises that the renewal of the Left had to begin by learning from the
lessons of Thatcherism. A decade before Tony Blair became British Prime Minister,
Hall was able to predict and warn the danger "that the Left will produce, in
government, a brand of New Times which in practice does not amount to much more
than a slightly cleaned-up, humanized version of that of the radical Right" (Hall and
Jacques, 1989, p. 16). Reality proved that New Labor in office since 1997 under Tony
Blair seemed to have learned those lessons only too well. The re-branded,
re-packaged Labor Party was fully aware of the importance of entering into the
ideological struggle over image and imagery that was central to Thatcherism's
success. Hall's fear came true as the New Labor's effort was "less an attempt to
re-articulate the new times for the Left, than ... to reoccupy the old terrain of the
Right" (Procter, 2004, p. 114).
The Marginalization of Class and the Moral Significance for the Study of Class

Yet since the 1970s the CCCS gradually began to move away from
working-class subjects and youth subcultures to other aspects of identity. From the
mid-1980s, in both social science and cultural studies, interest in gender, race,
sexuality, ethnicity, etc., arose to replace the former interest in class. According to
Martin Barker and Anne Beezer, class, at best, "has become one 'variable' among
many" and, at worst, "has dissolved away altogether" (as cited in Medhurst, 2000, p.
22).
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Turner offers three reasons for this change. The first is the challenge from other
marginalized groups with rising consciousness; the second, the decline in the
influence of Althusserian theories of ideology and the subsequent tum to Gramsci;
and the third, Thatcherism, which, with its radical neo-liberal cultural ethos and social
reforms, defied any attempt to continue to stick to class interests (1996, pp. 217-218).
In essence, the shift is a consequence of the recognition of "the diversification of
social struggles" as the "structures of the modem state and society complexify and the
points of social antagonism proliferate"--in short, "the proliferation of the sites of
power and antagonism in modem society" (Hall, 1988, p. 168), a new cultural trend
seen and named as New Times, which I have just mentioned.
Hall was also responsible for "recovering the issue of race" as one key concern
of cultural studies, very possibly due to his West Indian background (Turner, 1996, p.
69). From 1980s or early 1990s, Hall spent more time and energy developing his
theory on "difference," celebrating hybridity in today's globalized culture.
Cultural studies' gradual withdrawal from a predominantly class-based analysis
is read by some critics as "a retreat from politics" (Turner, 1996, p. 220) or "signs of
political exhaustion" (Turner, 1996, p. 221). For Kirk, the "displacements" and
"forgettings" of class elides domination, subordinating relations of exploitation and
"[d]iasporic hybridity cannot stand outside class relations as a mode of cultural
identity" (Kirk, 2007, p. 69). Reid sees the situation as "not unlike coal mining, the
decline in which is related neither to the lack of coal nor to its utility, but to the
changing and comparative attraction of other fuels" (1998, p. xix).
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Munt is extremely sad to see that within the hierarchies of oppression, "class
has sunk to the bottom because it is not sexy enough for the intelligentsia" and that
there is a poverty of representation with few work on contemporary working-class
culture (2000, p. 7). In the last two decades, there has been much public call for
positive images of women, racial minority, and gays and lesbians, but no such
equivalent urge for working-class representation. Academics of working-class
background within universities "are encouraged to see 'others,' but not themselves"
(2000, p. 7). Medhurst shares Munt's sadness that class is in so many ways "the 'lost
identity' of identity politics" (2000, p. 29) and that too many academics speak from "a
position of 'class blindness'" (2000, p. 28).
Munt views it "a kind of shame" in cultural studies putting primary interest in
audience studies and thus placing "the locus of responsibility onto readers, rather than
producers" (2000, p. 8). She strongly holds that cultural studies should continue to
have as one of its chief objectives "a concern to illuminate the present" (2000, p. 7).
The reality is harsh. With the destruction of Britain's traditional industry and trade
unionism, working class has been perceived from the Victorian notion of the
"deserving poor" to the present notion of social "waste," particularly the underclass.
Their production labor, which can be their only social contribution, is now
discouraged and lost, making them redundant and useless. Kirk (2007) and Skeggs
(2004) in their works also strongly argue for the cultural significance for the study of
the post modern working class identity. This is a position widely shared, e.g. by
Andrew Sayer (2005), Ferdinand Mount (2004), as I have covered in Introduction
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Chapter.
Cultural Studies is the study of everyday life, and the present British everyday
life is still saturated with class relations as convincingly illustrated in Reid's Class in

Britain and Hopkins' The Rise and Decline of English Working Class 1918-1990, both
of which argue against that class differentiation has withered away in contemporary
Britain. The fact that not everybody believes this "doesn't make it untrue," though the
phenomenon displays the success of liberal pluralism ethos (Munt, 2000, p. 10).
Munt suggests that, since working-class studies formed "the backbone" of
many disciplines, an '"ethical and integral" approach needs to be adopted to combine
the study of working-classness with that of gender, race, sexuality, etc. "If you take
out 'class' from an exploration of gender and so on, you ignore a crucial determining
factor of the experience of being a woman, man or transgendered person" (Munt,
2000, p. 10). And some effort has already been made towards this direction, e.g. in
Munt's Cultural Studies and the Working Class (2000) and in Kirk's Twenty-century

Writing and the British Working Class (2003). Class was what ignited Cultural Studies,
after all, and should always bear a mark seriously. Skegges warns that "[ w ]hen class
becomes reduced to a matter of etiquette and taste, we know there is something
clearly very wrong and very bourgeois happening" (2004, p. 44).
Key Concepts
Having established the theoretical framework of British Cultural Studies, it is
necessary here to explain some of the key operating concepts of the study. While
quite a few concepts have already been covered in my exploration of British Cultural
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Studies, such as "culture," "ideology," "hegemony," "cultural'politics," here I would
add four more essential concepts, namely "identity," "representation," "realism" and
"masculinity." Four more concepts, "class," "class consciousness," "working class"
and "underclass," will be dealt with in Chapter III, which is sociological and historical
understanding of class and working class and therefore a more appropriate place for a
detailed elaboration ofthe terms.
The word identity connotes both sameness as well as difference. It comes
through identification and differentiation. Psychology and psychoanalysis focus on
identity "as a person's essential self, or the subjective idea of oneself as an individual"
while social sciences emphasize "the communal and cultural aspects of identity
formation" (Mikula, 2008, p. 92). Identities are socially constructed and "cannot
'exist' outside of social and cultural representations and acculturalization" (Barker,
2000, p. 165). It is social and cultural as ''there are no transcendental or ahistorical
elements to what it is to be a person" (Barker, 2000, p. 167). Identity is an essence
which can be signified through signs of taste, beliefs, attitudes and lifestyles. So,
Barker summarizes that "identity is concerned with sameness and difference, with the
personal and the social and with forms of representation" (Barker, 2000, p. 166). Until
the latter half of the 20th century, social sciences interpreted collective identities of
social groups related to class, gender, ethnicity, race, nationality, etc. as "relatively
stable categories" (Mikula, 2008, p. 93).
The issue of identity is central to cultural studies as cultural studies examines
"the contexts within which and through which both individuals and groups construct,
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negotiate and defend their identity or self-understanding" (Edgar & Sedgwick, 1999,
p. 183). Identity has been a continuous concern of cultural studies, though such
concern greatly intensified from the 1990s to the new millennium, making identity
politics "the central theme" of cultural studies (Barker, 2004, p. 53) marked with new
characteristics. Identity subjects under close investigation shifted from working class
people to women, ethnic minority, homosexual groups, etc. and identity within
cultural studies has been understood much more through the notion of difference.
Besides, identity is not a "fixed 'thing' that we possess but an emotionally charged
symbolic description of ourselves" and is never stable but "a process of becoming"
(Barker, 2004, p. 53).
Identity politics refers to political activities mobilized to struggle for the equal
treatment of specific identity groups-usually marginalized social groups. It is
concerned with such people making identity claims for maintaining cultural rights
within society and culture. Identity politics is "a sub-set of cultural politics" and is
thus also concerned with "the 'power to name' and to make particular descriptions
stick" (Barker, 2004, p. 95).
Identity relies heavily on representations-practices and norms often used in
the mass media to present images of particular social groups. Presentations are not
"innocent reflections of the real" but are "cultural constructions" (Barker, 2004, p.
177). The representations of identities are "political" in the sense that construction
and consequences of representations are closely bound with power and ideology
which regulates society through enabling some kinds of identities to exist while
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denying others. Therefore, the "politics of representation" is a central concern for
cultural studies scholars. For Hall, "there is no understanding of identity outside of
culture and representation," for which he prefers the use of "cultural identity;" and
"representations are not reflexive but constitutive and therefore have a real, material
impact" (Procter, 2004, p. 125).
Class representation is a key concept for this dissertation. Skeggs holds that
"[u]nderstanding representation is central to any analysis of class" and that it is "the
process of evaluation, moral attribution and authorization" as well as awareness and
resistance of such that are central to understanding contemporary class relations (2004,
p. 117). In Outlaw Culture (1994), bell hooks denounces the representations of
poverty in the mass media and calls for intervention in existing systems for an
alternative representation around poverty which would refuse worthlessness, shame,
and the idea of perpetual aspiration: "To change the face of poverty so that it becomes
once again, a site for the formation of values, of dignity and integrity, as any other
class positionality in this society" (as cited in Haylett, 2000, p. 72).
Realism emerged as a mode of oppositional or reform-seeking expression and
representation in the 19 th century. There is no universally agreed definition for it, but a
common understanding is that realism presents life as it really is or shows things as
they occur. Williams in "A Lecture on Realism" noted three emphases which are
common to all forms of realism, namely, "the secular, the contemporary and the
socially extended" (1977, p. 65). The secular means the actions are ruled by reason
and logic instead of superstition and mysticism, reflecting the progress of humanity.
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The contemporary means the story is set in the present in terms of setting, character,
and social issues. The socially extended means "a conscious movement toward social
extension" to broaden the range of characters and topics to include marginal or
under-represented groups and issues in society, specifically the extension to themes of
"working-class Iife, bringing the working class to the center of dramatic action" (1977,
p. 63, p. 67). In addition, realist texts are influenced by the political intent of the artist,
carrying "specific ideological features" and offering "a moral lesson" to people (1977,
p. 64). Drawing on the work of Williams, Marion Jordan suggests that in social
realism, "life should be presented in the form of a narrative of personal events;" that
"these events are ostensibly about social problems;" that the "characters should be
either working-class or of the classes immediately visible to the working classes;" that
"the locale should be urban and provincial;" that "the settings should be commonplace
and recognizable;" that "the time should be 'the present'" and "that the style should
be as to suggest an unmediated, unprejudiced and complete view of reality" (as cited
in Creeber, 2000, pp. 195-196). In British film criticism, "social realism" is often used
interchangeably with "kitchen sink" realism, or "working-class" realism.
Masculinity refers to qualities or appearance traditionally associated with men.
As a cultural concept, it is an identity category that refers to "the cultural
characteristics associated with being a man" (Barker, 2004, p. 115) or "normative and
socially and culturally constructed patterns of manhood" (Mikula, 2008, p. 119). In
patriarchal societies masculinity and femininity are set in simple binary opposition
and heterosexual masculinity is typically constructed as the normative standard and
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the foremost source of empowerment. Masculinity has traditionally valued strength,
action, control, assertiveness, work, independence, competitiveness, aggression,
camaraderie, and etc. Devalued were relationships, verbal expression, domestic life,
tenderness, women and children. Masculinity is "a matter of representation;" it is
"constituted by ways of speaking about and disciplining bodies" (Barker, 2004, p.
115). Hence, it is a site of continual political struggle over meaning in the context of
multiple modes of being a man. As Cornwall and Lindisfarne point out, "Hegemonic
masculinities define successful ways of 'being a man;' in so doing, they define other
masculine styles as inadequate or inferior" (as cited in Mikula, 2008, p. 119).
Masculinity is not an unchanging given of nature. Since the late 1970s, for the
first time some men in the West have seen themselves as experiencing a
"problematic" masculinity, or "crisis" of masculinity due to post-industrial social and
cultural changes. Cultural critics in the fields of feminism and queer studies have also
strived hard to challenge the patriarchal maleness and destabilize normative social
roles. To accompany this, there has been an upsurge of interest in the study of men
and masculinity. Within cultural studies, critics have focused on "the ways in which
media and cultural texts and cultural practices construct and disseminate
representations of men and maleness, and on the role these representations play in
negotiating notions of the masculine in society" (Mikula, 2008, p. 120). With a
substantial number of men implicated in depression, alcoholism, drug abuse, violence
and crime and even suicide, it has been argued that the central problems of men's
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lives are "rooted in the adoption of impossible images of masculinity that men try, but
fail, to live up to" (Barker, 2004, p. 115).
In this chapter, I have surveyed the development of British Cultural Studies,
which serves as the basic theoretical framework for this dissertation in general as well
as for my ideological analysis of British working-class identity and representation in
Chapter 7 in particular. The next chapter will look at British class and working class
from the sociological and historical disciplines to provide contextual understanding of
the issue of class and working class.
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CHAPTER III
CLASS AND WORKING CLASS IN BRITAIN:
SOCIOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING

Britain is the first country to industrialize with the Industrial Revolution and
therefore had "the world's first industrial working class" (Roberts, 200 I, p. 81). By
the end of the 19th century, the working class had become a knowable, measurable and
organizable force, potentially powerful. Between the later half of the 19 th century and
early half of the 20 th century, the working class won suffrage, strengthened trade
unionism, consolidated the Labor Party, and facilitated community support. New
strength was gained in the two postwar decades due to full employment and affluence,
from which working class youth benefited most. But the official claim of Britain as a
classless society has not been approved by the general public and has been severely
criticized by sociologists and cultural scholars. After the Second World War, the
traditional British working class has gone through many social and political changes,
especially a lasting "decline" since the 1970s after the post-war "rise," leading to the
rhetoric of the "end of class" (Kirk, 2007, p. 2) and the coinage of the "underclass"
(working class without jobs). Working class is deemed to have departed the social
scene, either as an economic entity, as a distinct cultural formation, or as an agent of
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political change or action.
This chapter will look at class and working class from sociological and
historical perspective to provide contextual knowledge and arguments for a
comprehensive understanding of the issue of class and working class. It will explore
the definition and classification of class and working class, assess the class or
classless nature of British society and offer a general survey of the rise and fall of
British working class conditions. It concludes that British working class is still a
substantial social existence whose identity change is worthy of serious concern.
Defining and Classifying Class and Working Class

The working people in Britain had been known "as the 'the lower orders,' 'the
masses' or even 'the mob,' 'the rabble' or 'the swinish multitude,' depending on the
attitude of the observer" (Hopkins, 1991, p. 2). "Working class" as an identity
category was formed and came into popular use in the early years of the 19 th century
in recognition of their position as wage earners faced with an intensification of
capitalist relationships of production. The contemporaries and later historians
identified the group as a working class, or more often "the working classes" due to the
diverse range of occupations and distinctions of status involved. By the 1840s, then,
middle classes and working classes had become common terms. The former became
singular first. The latter became singular from the 1840s but still today alternates
between singular and plural forms, often "with ideological significance, the singular
being normal in socialist uses, the plural more common in conservative descriptions."
(Williams, 1983, p. 64) The single and plural forms have the same signification and
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have been used interchangeably, though Marxist historians customarily use the
singular to emphasize the economic homogeneity of the workers (Hopkins, 1991,
preface vii).
E.P. Thompson chose the singular form for his book The Making of the English
Working Class as he sees the difference as the following: '''Working classes" is a
descriptive term, which evades as much as it defines. It ties loosely together a bundle
of discrete phenomena. There were tailors here and weavers there, and together they
make up the working classes. By class I understand a historical phenomenon, unifying
a number of disparate and seemingly unconnected events, both in the raw material of
experience and in consciousness. I emphasize that this is a historical phenomenon. I
do not see class as a 'structure,' nor even as a 'category,' but as something which in
fact happens ... in human relationships." (1963, p. 9)
The definition of working class can be found in some social welfare documents
before the Second World War, which at the time concerned only the problems of one
social group--the statutory working class or working classes. So the first piece of
industrial injuries legislation, the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897, and the first
legislation on national health insurance and unemployment insurance shortly before
the First World War were restricted to those employed "by way of manual labor," with
doubtful cases being settled by the income limit (Marwick, 1990, pp. 61-62). A more
detailed definition was provided by the Housing Act of 1925 and 1936: "the
expression 'working class' includes mechanics, artisans, laborers and others working
for wages hawkers, costermongers, persons not working for wages, but working at
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some trade or handicraft without employing others except members of their own
family, and persons other than domestic servants, whose income does not exceed an
average of three pounds a week, and the families of such persons who may be residing
with them" (Marwick, 2005, p. 80).
Social scientists have offered two opposing ways of thinking about class. Wood
puts it in Democracy Against Capitalism that "There are really only two ways of
thinking theoretically about class: either as a structural location or as a social
relation" (1995, p. 76). Class understood as a location is Weberian in which class is
imagined in terms of social layers, strata, identities and groupings. Class understood
as a determining relation is associated with Marxism and historical materialism in
which class is understood as the force or relationship which shapes such identities and
groupings.
Marx argued for the polarization of social classes in capitalist societies, with the
bourgeoisie or capitalist class who own the means of production on one side and the
proletariat or working class who have to sell their labor-power on the other. He
claimed in the Communist Manifesto (1848), "Society as a whole is more and more
splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each
other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat" (as cited in Edgell, 1993, p. 2). He forecasted that
conflict between the two classes, due to conflicting economic interests, would lead
eventually to working-class revolutions which bring the downfall of capitalism.
Marxist tradition tends to trace all social inequalities to the root of economic
differences; the economically dominant class is also expected to dominate politically
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and culturally. Marx did not foresee that the actual ownership of the means of
production may be less important in a modern capitalist society, where ownership
may be divorced from effective control by professional managers.

In comparison with Marxist political philosophy, Max Weber's sociological
analysis of class favored a more layered or hierarchical account of social inequality.
He attached importance to differences in status between groups, particularly
occupational groups. His conception centered on the market-people's class positions
are determined by differential life-chances distributed by the capitalist market
(Marshall et ai., 1988, p. 17). In other words, classes arose in the labor market based
on the various assets or resources (skills, qualifications, ownership of stocks of capital,
the ability to labor) that individuals could offer. While both Marx and Weber
conceptualized class in economic terms, Weber stressed more than Marx the class
advantages which draw from knowledge or skills. Thus the Weberian try to make
differentiations within Marxism's proletariat class, in order to explain the higher
levels

of

material

reward

and

status

gained

by

intellectuals

and

managers/administrators and the reason why their class interests and cultural identity
may accord more closely with those of the property-owning bourgeoisie (Edgar &
Sedgwick, 1999, p. 67). So, what was crucial for Marx was experiences at work
(relationships to the means of production), but for Weber the process of gaining work
(or hiring labor) and the rewards (life-chances) (Roberts, 2001, p. 3). Weber also
added analyses of differences in power and social status. Status is the honor or
prestige attached to the styles of life of different social positions. So class is also seen
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as a cultural, rather than purely economic, phenomenon.
Max Weber contributed to developing Marx's theory of class in the broader
context of what has since become known as social stratification--the division of a
society into hierarchical layers. Social stratification is essentially about groups'
relationships to social wealth, yet it concerns not only wealth and income but also
power and prestige, life style, education, values, beliefs, etc. Therefore it is the most
all-embracing term used in sociology when analyzing inequalities. Most social
analysts see social class, which has an economic basis, as the most important and
fundamental form of social stratification. Marwick sees "stratification" as "an ugly
metaphor drawn from geology" (Marwick, 1990, p. 4).
Weber's analysis of social relations in the sphere of the market has been
criticized as obscuring the capitalist exploitative nature in the realm of production.
The notion of market sovereignty and equality (all are "free" labors and equal
consumers) obscures the "real" base of inequality on the level of production (Barker,
2000, p. 49). The Weberian approach can be reduced to an account of class purely in
terms of occupational difference. Marxists such as Wood keep writing to expose the
exploitive nature of capitalism and for class to be seen as social relations. Yet the
Weberian approach to class relationship has been more widely accepted. Reid in his
book Class in Britain, which concerns the empirical reality of social class differences,
defines social class as "a grouping of people into categories on the basis of
occupation" (1998, p. 10) for the reason that occupation is "easily collected and
simple to treat" (1998, p. 11). Due to its user-friendliness, occupation has been seen as
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"the best single indicator" of social standing and socio-economic circumstance of a
person or a family in government census, sociological and commercial research
concerns despite its limitations (1998, p. 10).
Apart from Marx and Weber, Marwick defines in Class: Image and Reality in
Britain, France and the USA since 1930 that "Class, in the historical and popular
usage of this book, suggests overlapping areas of inequality, particularly in power and
authority, income and wealth, conditions of work, life chances and lifestyles (1990, p.
170). And E. P. Thompson in 1978 defines class as "a social and cultural formation",
one which cannot be "defined abstractly ... but only in terms of relationship with other
classes." Class is "a very loosely defined body of people who share the same
categories of interest, social experiences, traditions and value-systems, who have a
disposition to behave as a class, to define themselves in their actions and in their
consciousness in relation to other groups of people in class ways." (as cited in Kirk,
2007, p. 7) So, social classes are seen as economic as well as cultural products within
a societal and historical setting. The basic assumption is that "differences between
classes and strata are caused by and persist because of their differing access to almost
all social resources, to power positions and to opportunities that, in general, are to the
decided advantage of some and the decided disadvantage of others" (Reid, 1998, p.
14).

Class is also a matter of perception. Class locations tend to get into people's
heads and influence their minds, their consciousness and unconsciousness. Reid holds
that there are two ways of looking at the existence of social class: "objective
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existence" and "subjective existence" (Marx had recognized them both). Reid's
"subjective existence" ("to the extent to which people in society perceive, or accept,
social class") (1998, p. 9) equals class consciousness. E. P. Thompson says, "class
happens when some men, as a result of common experiences ... feel and articulate the
identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose
interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs ... Class-consciousness is
the way in which these experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in
traditions, value-systems, ideas and institutional forms," (1963, pp. 9-10). Here, it is
important to note Marx's distinction between "a class in itself' and "a class for itself."
While the former is a social group that is determined by a common economic position,
the latter refers to a group which is collectively aware of that economic determination
and consequently of its real interests in social change. In seeking to explain why the
working class haven't become a revolutionary force, Marx believed they were unable
to recognize their exploitation and were suffering from "false consciousness" and
therefore not a class for itself (Reid, 1998, p. 9). That is to say, a group of genuine
class consciousness needs to overcome the illusions of ideology and false
consciousness. Faced with the harsh realities and influenced by Gramsci's theory,
present-day Marxists tend to accept that, apart from economic determinants, other
factors-capitalist politics, ideology, etc-can play important roles in class formation.
In summary, all the definitions of class have common denominators.
Sociologists all agree that classes have an economic foundation and people with
common experiences of making their livings are classed together. All class academics
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commonly agree that class matters. "Class is related to people's wealth, health,
education, but this is just the beginning of the list" (Roberts, 2001, p. 6). In this aspect,
cultural scholars pay more attention to the emotional ingredients of this "long list."
The book entitled Class Matters, edited by Pat Mahony and Christine Zmroczek
(1997), deals extensively with the emotional politics of class. Medhurst argues that
"Class is felt, class wounds, class hurts, and those of us on a cusp between classes
bruise particularly easily" (2000, p. 21).
While defining class is not easy, the classification of class is even more
challenging. The difficulty lies in defining appropriate class boundaries for statistical
purposes. Clearly there is no single measure of social class in Britain. Historically,
there have been schemes of the Registrar-General (1911), John Goldthorpe (1972),
and Eric Wright (1980s), representing the official, sociological and Marxist
perspectives respectively.
Britain was the first country in the world to institute a national census in as
early as 1801, and was the first to introduce by Registrar General in 1911 an explicit
class hierarchy as one of the forms in which census data could be presented (Marwick,
1990, p. 56). The five-class scheme of 1911 went as follows: Class I, professional etc.
occupations; Class II, intermediate occupations (including proprietors of businesses,
managers and bankers, as well as certain professions not considered good enough for
Class I-school and university teachers among them); Class III, skilled occupations;
Class IV, partly skilled occupations; Class V, unskilled occupations (Marwick, 1990, p.
56). The scheme was also considered to have six classes with Class III subdivided
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into Class lIla comprising lower-level white-collar workers, and class IIIb comprising
the skilled manual workers (Roberts, 200 I, p. 24).
The Registrar-General's census class scheme is occupational, based on the
assumption that society is a graded hierarchy of occupations ranked according to
expertise and skill. Besides, the class allocations tend to be intuitive. Despite this,
sociologists were generally happy to use the scheme due to its simplicity and clarity.
It remained the UK's official (government) class scheme up to 1998, when it was

replaced by a new scheme not so much different. The 1998 Office for National
Statistics (ONS) official UK class scheme was based on John Goldthorpe scheme
which had been used for the large-scale Oxford survey of social mobility in England
and Wales in 1972 with only slight modifications. The ONS scheme has eight
categories, four of which middle-class, three working-class, plus an eighth category of
non-workers and long-term unemployed, which is an addition to the Goldthorpe
scheme. The details are as follows: 1.1 Employers (large organizations) and senior
managers, 1.2 Higher professionals, 2 Lower managerial and professional, 3
Intermediate (e.g. clerks, secretaries, computer operators), 4 Small employers and
own-account non-professional, 5 Supervisors, craft and related, 6 Semi-routine (e.g.
cooks, bus drivers, hairdressers, shop assistants), 7 Routine (e.g. waiters, cleaners,
couriers), 8 Never worked, long-term unemployed (Roberts, 2001, p. 25).
The need for recognizing the 8th category has intensified since the 1970s due to
economic recession, deindustrialization, and cuts in welfare expenditure. Its growth
has become characteristic of the class structure of advanced capitalist societies.
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Compared with the 1911 scheme, the 1998 scheme continues to measure social
class by occupation; but different from the instinctive base for the 1911 scheme, the
1998 one has an explicit theoretical rationale as Goldthorpe had well justified his
categorization from a Weberian conception of class. Besides, while the majority
categories of the old scheme were working-class, the new one made its majority
categories to be middle class for the first time and added a petit-bourgeoisie and an
underclass. The Office for National Statistics says: "Definitions like manual and
non-manual have stopped being relevant. We have moved towards a service-based
economy, and our social classifications have to adapt to that." (Bromley, 2000, p. 55)
Marxist class schemes can be best represented by the Wright Scheme 3
constructed by Eric Ohlin Wright, an American sociologist. His class scheme has been
used in an international comparative research project to which the British contribution
was Social Class in Modern Britain, a study conducted by Gordon Marshall and his
colleagues (1988), all then at Essex University. The Wright scheme classified
individuals not according to their occupations but by their jobs. Due to its confusing
complexity, sociologists consider it less useful.
In general reading, we more often encounter a system of classification used by
Institute of Practitioners in Advertising (IPA) and commonly adopted by social
scientists and political scientists, particularly in the analysis of voting and party
allegiance, which defines as follows: A. Higher managerial, administrative or
professional, B. Intermediate managerial, administrative or professional, C 1.

3 For more detaIls, Roberts (200 I) has a table of the scheme on p. 34; Edgell (1993) has 2 tables on p. 19 and 21
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Supervisory or clerical, and junior white-collar workers, C2. Skilled manual workers,
D. Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers, E. State pensioners or widows (no
other earnings), casual or lowest grade workers, long-term unemployed. (Coxall et al.,
2003, p. 27)
In general, nowadays, most class theorists have become Weberians. Discussions
of capital and labor seem out of date. Yet, occupation is not the same as class.
Designating by occupation evacuates structural inequality and exploitation from
perceptions of lived experience. Munt sees in it a tendency to "depoliticize class
analysis so that it naturalizes social divisions, to take the engine of protest and replace
it with a resigned, imperceptible social organicism" (2000, p. 3).

Looking at Class: Britain--A Class or Classless Society?
While on the one hand class has been acknowledged as an important feature of
British society and key ingredient of British national identity, on the other hand the
enthusiasm for claiming a classless Britain has always been strong after the Second
World War among political scientists, journalists, and particularly politicians, such as
Conservative prime minister Harold Macmillan (1957-63) and John Major
(1992-1997) and Labor prime minister Tony Blair (1997-2007). Yet their optimism
met the opposition of sociologists with facts and figures. For a better understanding of
the true picture, a close look at the class or classless nature of British society is
necessary here.
Before the Second World War, "three-class society held strikingly true for
Britain in 1939" as Marwick observes (2005, p. 78). In September 1937, even the
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conservative BBC was persuaded and convinced by the Institute of Sociology to hold
over its radio a discussion of social stratification and class conflict, which was bravely
entitled "Class: An Enquiry" (Marwick, 1990,

p. 153). A heart-searching

documentary series on "Class" was broadcasted in the autumn of 1938, at the end of
which, Prof. T.H. Marshall, sociologist, was again able to "raise the voice of sanity"
by claiming that Britain did have an upper class, as well as a working class and a
middle class (Marwick, 1990, p. 160). What is essential in the pre-war period is that
class differences were sharp and there was an obvious lack of communication
between different classes.
Yet the Second World War and the reforms after it became a turning point
which permanently disrupted the old pattern. The cruelty of the war pressed for the
whole society to unite and fight a "People's War," which Churchill worked hard to
mobilize with the rhetoric "All are united like one great family; all are standing
together. .. " (Sinfield, 1989, p. 10). For the simple purpose to win the war, politicians
promised a vision of drastic postwar social reform to bring true democracy and social
justice to its people. At the same time, forceful state intervention was practiced in
organizing wartime production and living, which immediately helped toward the
direction.
Class integration and equality was greatly facilitated by the common war effort.
Through conscription and war production, men and women from different class
backgrounds were thrown together in the armed forces, in factories and offices,
serving the national needs. In this, there was an unprecedented mobilization of the
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working class. In return for their endeavor and sacrifice, the government guaranteed
workers and their families a real improvement in their living conditions through such
paternalistic measures as food rationing and subsidies, higher nutritional standard, and
etc. On the other hand, war integration greatly aroused the working class
consciousness as well as the sympathy from the middle class. As George Orwell
observed in 1944, "a considerable growth of political consciousness and an increasing
impatience with class privilege" was to be found among the manual working class
(Taylor, 2005, p. 371). The war greatly increased the bargaining power of the working
class: their labor was earnestly sought for and they had their representatives in the
seats of power. Out of this grew a sincere sense of pride and self-confidence as well as
high expectations with the working class. The temporary social mix caused by large
scale evacuation awakened middle class families and aroused their genuine concern
about the appalling conditions of the slum children. So the common war effort
mobilized middle-class understanding of and sympathy for the working class. The
middle class were more willing to support improvements in working-class conditions.
The Conservative Churchillian government won the war, but lost the election
immediately followed in 1945. By voting the Labor Party to form "the people's
government," the British people voted for change and for social inclusion. The
working class had done their bit. Their war contribution was crucial to the saving of
their country in its hour of need. Ernest Bevin, leader of the Transport and General
Workers Union and Minister of Labor and National Service in Churchill's wartime
coalition government, so acknowledged in 1940, "Without our people this war cannot
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be won nor can the life of the country be carried on" (Taylor, 2005, p. 371). Now, if
their war sacrifice were to be remembered, the working class should become the
beneficiaries of a grateful nation.
In 1942, the Beveridge Report was produced by a government committee
setting out a system of national security aiming to provide for all an egalitarian
"safety-net" below which nobody would be able to fall. Between 1942 and 1944, the
government published a series of white papers such as Social Insurance, Employment
Policy, A National Health Service, and The Public Schools and the General
Educational System which made places in British public schools (privately funded)
available to suitable children whose parents could not afford the high fees. The Butler
Education Act 1944 made secondary education compulsory and free for all children,
and allowed a whole new generation of able working class children to move up the
educational ladder, many of them as far as university. The Labor Government of
1945-50 put welfare state into effect with the passing of National Insurance Act (1946)
(on social security benefits), National Health Service Act (1946) (on free medical
treatment), and some minor acts such as The National Assistance Act and Family
Allowances Act. So the world's first comprehensive state welfare system looking after
people "from the cradle to the grave" came into being in Britain.
Yet reforms in the 1940s could not play immediate magic. Austerity and
rationing continued until the late 1940s F.M. Martin's investigations, conducted in
Greenwich and Hertford in 1950, came to such a conclusion, "The great majority of
our subjects thought in terms of a three-class system, and most of them described
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these classes by the same set of names-upper, middle and working" (Marwick, 1990,
p. 268). The Glass Survey of 1949 brought out the extreme immobility of the British
occupational structure (Marwick, 1990, p. 284).
The two postwar decades was from poverty to affluence in the narrating of class,
represented

in

the

wide

use

of three

key

terms--affluence,

consensus,

embourgeoisement. From 1951 to 1964 there was full employment, sharp increase in
productivity and income, and the wide availability of new technologies. Statistics
showed that "total production (measured at constant prices) increased by 40 per cent,
average earnings (allowing for inflation) by 30 per cent, while personal consumption,
measured in terms of ownership of cars and televisions, rose from 2Y4 million to 8
million and I million to 13 million respectively" (Hill, 1986, p. 5). The welfare
benefits were not targeting the working class only, but all citizens of the nation.
Politically, the Conservatives had controlled the government most of the years since
1951, whose election victories were much based on working-class votes; they largely
followed the welfare state, mixed economy and educational reforms put in place by
the Labor Party in the period 1945-51. The success of welfare capitalism with mixed
economy appeared to negate the need for Labor's continuing commitment to public
ownership. At the 1959 Labor Party conference, Gaitskell, the Labor leader, even
proposed to remove the Clause 4 of the Party constitution concerning the public
ownership, though failed to do so. The Party also began to woo the new and rapidly
growing white collar, scientific and technical classes. Consensus was a dominant
political practice and discourse until 1979 when Mrs Thatcher came into power with
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her neo-liberalism right-wing politics. Both parties shared a political commitment to
welfare state, which aroused a great deal of national pride.
The working class naturally benefited tremendously from such changes.
Academics (mainly political scientists and journalists) began to speak of an affiuent
"new working class" (Roberts, 2001, p. 89), or "affluent worker" (Goldthorpe et aI.,
1969), who, through gradual embourgeoisement, was being assimilated into the
middle-class economically, culturally and politically. Market researchers discovered
the new "teenage consumer" with his commitment to style, music, leisure and
consumption (Abrams, 1959). With the relative classless nature of the youth culture,
youth became a "new class" (Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 22). Hence the talk of Britain as
a classless society emerged from the late 1950s, with the belief that capitalism was
undergoing fundamental changes, equality had gone as far as necessary, and the old
class divisions were in the process of being dissolved.
Politicians were also in favor of such optimism. In 1957, Harold Macmillan
(PM 1957-63) boasted that "most of our people have never had it so good" and that
"the class war is over and we have won" (as cited in Hill, 1986, p. 5, 6). Macmillan
himself told the electorate "You've never had it so good" (Lowe, 1989, p. 574). This
mood is even shared by the Labor Party leader Hugh Gaitskell: "The day is gone
when workers must regard their stations in life as fixed-for themselves or for their
children" (as cited in Laing, 1968, p. 7). With "affluence" and "mobility" dominating
public discourse, the traditional base of Labor support was undermined. And there
seemed no point preaching class consciousness if "class" was no longer in existence.
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It was generally believed that as the working class were better paid, they adopted

middle-class lifestyles and values and lost political militancy.
However, despite the growing prosperity, income and class inequalities
continued to exist. "In 1961, 1 per cent of the adult population derived 10 per cent of
total post-tax incomes (Le. much the same as the poorest 30 per cent) while the richest
5 per cent enjoyed much the same income as that of the poorest 50 per cent. Figures
for the distribution of private wealth reveal a similar picture. According to estimates
made by The Economist for 1959-60, 88 per cent of tax payers owned only 3.7 per
cent of private wealth while the richest 7 per cent owned 84 per cent." (Hill, 1986, p.
9) Moreover, these figures retain a remarkable consistency with figures of the early
1950s. Yet the political debates tried to avoid dealing with the unpleasant social and
economic facts.
The embourgeoisement thesis was mainly promoted by political scientists and
journalists, but not much supported by sociological surveys. The most thorough and
influential research interrogating the embourgeoisement thesis was conducted in the
mid-1960s by John Goldthorpe, David Lockwood, Frank Bechoffer and Jennifer Platt
in Luton, which was a rising new industrial city and therefore a more valid sample.
Two hundred and twenty-nine (male) manual workers at three establishments in Luton
(a car manufacturer, an engineering company and a chemical plant) were interviewed.
Fifty-four white-collar employees were also interviewed as a comparison group. In
their book on this research The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure (1969), the
findings and interpretations rejected the embourgeoisement thesis based on the
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folIowing reasons: "First, the vast majority of their respondents identified with the
working class. Second, they were nearly all not only trade union members but
regarded trade union representation as indispensable. Third, 71 per cent had voted
Labor in the most recent general election (a higher figure than for the working class
nationalIy). Fourth, the manual workers had few if any white-collar friends." (Roberts,
2001, p. 91) The Luton survey denied embourgeoisement so convincingly that after it,
"the thesis lay dead and buried" in sociology (Roberts, 200 I, p. 91).
Britain in the 1970s was troubled with world oil crisis, economic recession, low
rate of growth, high level of inflation, and a deterioration in industrial relations such
as the coal miners' militant strike, culminating in the so-called "winter of discontent"
of 1978-9 when over one million low-paid public service workers were on strike for
nearly three months due to Callaghan Labor government's pay freeze for inflation
control. Under such embarrassing context, the voice of classlessness weakened,
replaced with an official recognition of some of the realities of class. Throughout the
decades, census reports had continued to make use of the (unsatisfactory) I-V
classification; then the 1975 edition of the Central Office of Information publication,
Social Trends, was devoted to Social Class (Marwick, 1990, p. 322).

In 1980, shortly after Mrs Thatcher came into office, two opposing voices
around the issue of classlessness were simultaneously heard. Arthur Scargill
(President of the National Union of Mineworkers, 1982-2002) continued to tell people
that "in a capitalist society it is inevitable that there will be class conflict. There are
only two classes in Britain. The ruling class which arms and controls the means of
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production, and the working class which provides the labor. There is no such thing as
a middle class. How do you become a member of it? A building worker may earn
more money than a man in pinstripes. Does this make the building worker middle
class? It is an illusion." (Sunday Mirror, September 7,1980; as cited in Mount, 2004,
p. 132). Conversely, Norman St John-Stevas, the Conservative Leader of the House of
Commons, said: "I think that class is largely an irrelevancy in contemporary British
society. Some people may use it as an excuse for their own failures, but 1 think we
have very largely a mobile society, a society open to talent. The talented child or
young person is able to reach the top of any profession or activity to which that child
sets his or her mind, provided that the ability is there ... We talk a lot about class in
British society, but I think its social significance is very small." (The Listener, 1980;
as cited in Reid, 1998, p. 236). Generally, with Mrs Thatcher's reform policies, terms
like "decline of class" and "classless society" continued to be common terms.
Mrs Thatcher (Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990) practiced drastic economic
reforms which terminated the political consensus. Her "revolution" of monetarism
and privatization to cure the "British Disease" of relative economic decline was
commented as removing class from the political landscape. Many of Thatcher's
reforms were delivered in the rhetoric of "empowerment of the people" (Storry &
Childs, 2002, p. 177), shifting power away from the Establishment and the trade
unions to individual consumers and the free market. For example, parents were treated
as consumers buying education and were encouraged to participate in school
governance. Council houses were sold to tenants at discount prices. Employees were
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encouraged to buy company shares for share-holding democracy. British society
became fragmented with life revolving around the individual, the family, and the idea
of a better life through home ownership and consumer goods. She encouraged private
health insurance and personal pension schemes, the growth of which marks the arrival
of what Bennett terms a "post-welfare paradigm" (as cited in Barker, 2000, p. 122).
Thatcherism benefited a substantial amount of people. However, the Thatcherite
reform was at the cost of high unemployment rate, growing industrial conflicts and
larger gap between the rich and the poor, and tougher law and order. Sinfield
remarked that, with the Thatcherite New Right, the British experienced "a return to
the conditions" that the postwar settlement "was designed originally to avoid:
unemployment, poverty, social rupture and authoritarian government" (1989, p. 3).
The distribution of wealth became more concentrated in the 1980s. The poor became
poorer, with 20 percent of the people living under the poverty line, "reversing a
forty-year pattern where incomes were gradually growing more equal." By 1988 the
best-off tenth of the population enjoyed nearly nine times more income than the
worst-off tenth, though the general earnings of the working public increased. (Quart,
1993, p. 20) The country was also morally broken by the contrasting decaying
industrial North represented by mining and steel towns and booming South dominated
by high-tech and financial industries and office skyscrapers.
The coming of a classless society continued to be acknowledged in the 1990s.
Thatcher's policies were largely inherited by her successor John Major, who was very
idealistic in saying: "I think we need a classless society, and I think we need to have
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what I refer to as social mobility. And what I mean by social mobility is the capacity
of everybody to have the help necessary to achieve the maximum for their ability."
(The Guardian, 28 November 1990; as cited in Edgell, 1993, p. 121) The 1997

election ended the 18 years of Conservative rule and the trauma of Thatcherism; but
optimism seemed to have outrun reality. New Labor, with its Third Way politics,
appeared to have avoided the term "social class" from their political vocabulary. As
Munt pointed out, "Class differences are seen by many as irrelevant to Blair's Cool
Britannia; since the death of Di, we are New Britain, cobbled together in a new
national truce of participatory politics" (2000, p. 2). Prime Minister Tony Blair put
forward his own populist wording in December, 1998: "slowly but surely, the old
establishment is being replaced by a new, larger, more meritocratic middle class"
(Marwick, 2005, p. 87).
Yet sharp class division continued to be spotted through sociological surveys,
although in certain technical aspects, the old blue-white-collar divide has crumbled.
Findings from a nationally representative sample on questions about jobs and labor
market experiences in the early 1990s illustrated big contrasts between middle-class
and working-class jobs: "The chances are that a middle-class employee will initiate
and decide his or her own daily tasks, and supervise someone. The chances are that a
working-class employee will do none of these things." (Roberts, 2001, p. 8). Social
Trends listed explicit divergence in the distribution of wealth in 1999 as follows:
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Table 1: The distribution of marketable wealth (adults aged 20 or over), 1999

Category 0/ Population

Percentage a/wealth owned

Most wealthy 1%

23%

Most wealthy 5%

43%

Most wealthy 10%

54%

Most wealthy 25%

74%

Most wealthy 50%

94%

Source: adapted from Social Trends, 2002, as cited in Coxall et al. 2003, p. 25

Pronouncing the death of class is premature. Politicians' feel-good mood was
definitely not shared by the postwar British general public with their self-assigned
class as reflected in surveys and opinion polls. According to Marshall et aI's empirical
survey conducted between I March and 3 July 1984, of a final sample of 1,770 people
of working age they interviewed, 73 per cent of the respondents felt class to be an
inevitable feature of modem society. "Sixty per cent of our sample claimed that they
thought of themselves as belonging to one particular social class and well over 90 per
cent could place themselves in a particular class category" (1988, p. 143). Within this
90 per cent, 58 per cent claimed to be working class and 42 per cent middle class
(1988, p. 144). One general conclusion was, in most respects, persuasive: "The
growth of the service class and the contraction of the working class reflects the
transformation in the occupational division of labor in Britain since the war-the
decline of manufacturing and manual laboring together with the expansion in the
services sector and of professional, administrative, and managerial jobs-it does not
signify a reduction in the inequalities of class life-chances. More 'room at the top' has
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not been accompanied by greater equality in the opportunities offered to get there."
(Marshall et aI., 1988, pp. 137-138)
The British Social Attitudes survey included a self-assignment question on
social class every year between 1983 and 1991. In each year about 98 per cent of
respondents answered the question, among which around two-thirds placing
themselves as upper working or working class, and

around a quarter classifying

themselves as middle class. A vast majority of them (about 82 per cent) did not think
they had crossed the boundary between working and middle classes. And 58 per cent
of respondents acknowledged "feeling very or fairly close to other people of the same
class background." Between two-thirds and three-quarters each year claimed to the
extent of "a great deal" or "quite a lot" that their class affects their opportunities. The
highest perception of class disadvantage was in 1991, with but 3 per cent claiming
"not at all" and 21 per cent "not very much." (Reid, 1998, pp. 32-33)
In a MORI poll in 2002 based on interviews with 1,875 people, 68 per cent
agreed with the sentiment: "At the end of the day, I'm working class and proud of it,"
compared with 52 per cent backing the statement in a similar poll in 1999. Fifty-five
per cent of those who would normally be categorized as middle-class by occupation,
claimed to have "working-class feelings." (Hickley, 2002) More media surveys in the
2000s confirmed that quite some people with good income still claim to be working
class.
With decades of social progress and improvement, it is nevertheless quite
surprising that so many people describe themselves as "working class," particularly
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for those who should be counted as middle class according to economic criteria.
Why politicians' optimism was not shared by the general public? Professor
Ringen argues in 1997 that "[w]hat is peculiar in Britain is not the reality of the class
system and its continuing existence, but class psychology: the preoccupation with
class, the belief in class, and the symbols of class in manners, dress and language" (as
cited in Mount, 2004, pp. 49-50). There are some obvious or possible reasons for this.
Firstly, some people who have got middle class jobs but with working class
origin can't wholeheartedly feel middle class. Andy Medhurst takes his own
experience as an example: "although I am paid a middle-class salary to do
middle-class things, I never think of myself as an entirely middle-class person. I
simply do not feel middle-class." He explains that "class is not just an objective entity,
but also (and mostly?) a question of identifications, perceptions, feelings." Yet
equally he cannot pretend to be working-class any more. So he feels living in a space
between and his sense of class identity is "uncertain, torn and oscillating--caught on a
cultural cusp." (2000, p. 20) This mixed feeling is nothing new. Richard Hoggart
illustrates in The Uses of Literacy, "Almost every working-class boy who goes
through the process of further education finds himself chafing against his environment
during adolescence. He is at the friction point of two cultures ... " (1998, p. 225).
Besides, some of such people prefer to be seen that they had resisted the charms of
embourgeoisement and still stand shoulder to shoulder with the fellows of working
class they originated from. In such cases, it is a "downward mobility of the mind"
with an "endearing moral gesture" (Mount, 2004, p. 102).
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Secondly, it is a high possibility that, public perception of the concept of class
has undergone changes. Many people are using "class" in a very different way in
defiance of the traditional connotations of class categories. In post-manufacturing
capitalism with more jobs shifted from manufacturing to service sector, many
white-collar work force might be categorized as in middle-class occupation, but have
been proletarianized in income, a situation particularly true with jobs occupied by
women. Braverman in developing his neo-Marxist thesis challenged the view that the
routine non-manual worker is a member of the middle class in monopoly capitalism
as "a drastic misconception of modern society" (as cited in Edgell, 1993, p. 67).
Thirdly, people feel less secure in the present post-modern world characterized
by growing number of temporary or part-time jobs. This deepening insecurities
around long-term employment and property ownership have led people to recognize
that whatever their occupation is, "economically they are 'working-class'" (Bromley,
2000, p. 53).
Fourthly, Sayer (2001) holds that "in evading acknowledgement of their social
position, people want to be 'ordinary' without being read as superior because they do
not want to be held as responsible for perpetuating or agreeing with inequality." This
is why so many concepts, such as mobility, reflexivity and individualization, are
developed by academics to enable mis-recognition and evade responsibility for their
privilege and position. (Skeggs, 2004. p. 116)
Having put elite view of Britain as a classless society and the public view of
Britain as a class-bound society in binary opposition, it is now sensible to review the
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criteria with which a classless society should be.
Edgell

(1993)

lists

three

main

conceptions

of classlessness

widely

acknowledged by sociologists: total classlessness, one-class classlessness, and
multi-class classlessness. Total classlessness is an extreme form, such as Marx's
prediction

of

a

communist

equality.

One-class

classlessness

refers

to

embourgeoisement; with declining class differences and class conflicts, everybody is
middle class. Multi-class classlessness refers to societies where "civic equality
co-exists with the progressive fragmentation of the class structure and class
consciousness" involving "the equal opportunity to be unequal." (pp. 118-120)
Multi-class classlessness has been called "non-egalitarian classlessness" by Ossowski,
who views it as carrying political importance in "legitimizing social differentiation"
based on individual ability (Edgell, 1993, pp. 120-121). Mount also lists three kinds
of classlessness: equality of income, equality of one lifestyle (convergence of lifestyle)
and equality of opportunity (2004, p. 45). Mount's equality of opportunity equals to
Edgell's multi-class classlessness. Both of them see their last point as the one that
really counts. Equality of opportunity has been the declared goal of most British
politicians since the war, Tory or Labor.
Essential to this "equality-of-opportunity" classlessness is free social mobility.
During his campaign for the leadership of the Conservative Party and the country,
John Major stated that "I think we need a classless society, and I think we need to
have what I refer to as social mobility. And what I mean by social mobility is the
capacity of everybody to have the help necessary to achieve the maximum for their
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ability" (Guardian, 28 November 1990; as cited in Reid, 1998, p. 235). Free social
mobility symbolizes a fair or "meritocratic" society in which the social and economic
status of individuals would not be inherited, but depend on their own talents and
efforts. Political intervention would be necessary to monitor the practice and remove
the inequalities of conditions. Equality of opportunity is the concept that is mostly
used by politicians and academics concerning class.
Mobility can be divided into absolute mobility and relative mobility. Relative
mobility equals to social fluidity which refers to the degree of openness in a society
"in the sense of how equal are chances of access to different class situations for
individuals for different class origins" (Goldthorpe, 1987, p. 305). According to John
Goldthorpe, the issue of class formation is best analyzed using absolute mobility data,
whereas the issue of openness is best considered using relative mobility data.
Goldthorpe undertook a large-scale survey of male mobility (male's occupation
in comparison with their father's) in Britain in 1972 and updated it in 1983. His
findings revealed that there had been an increase in the rate of absolute mobility, but
no improvement in relative mobility chances. He even found that "the return of mass
unemployment has created a serious new risk of what can only be regarded as
downward mobility-and that this risk is much greater for men in working class

positions" (1987, p. 269). Goldthorpe came to the conclusion that, despite economic
growth and a political strategy of egalitarian reform, "no significant reduction in class
inequalities was in fact achieved" (1987, p. 328). He added that economic growth and
the increase in absolute mobility had "served effectively to distract attention away
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fonn the issue of whether at the same time any equalization of relative mobility
chances was being achieved" (1987, pp. 328-9).
A comparison of Goldthorpe's

1972 survey with the National Child

Development Study (NCDS) of samples born in 1958 surveyed in 1991 when they
were aged 33 is informative and enlightening here. Fourteen per cent of the
Goldthorpe fathers had middle-class jobs compared with 27 per cent of the sons; in
the 1991 NCDS survey, 36 per cent of the males held middle-class jobs. The size of
working class shrank from 55 per cent to 44 per cent of the male population between
the Goldthorpe generations and remained at 43 per cent of the NCDS sample.
(Roberts, 200 I, p. \98) Besides, 16 per cent of the Goldthorpe working class sons had
reached the middle class by 1972, compared with 26 per cent ofNCDS working-class
males climbing up into the middle class (Roberts, 2001, p. 199). From this, we see
evidences of absolute mobility and growth in middle class population, but the
long-term numerical reduction of the male working class seemed to be ending. With
regard to relative mobility, 16 per cent of the Goldthorpe working class sons had risen
to the middle class by 1972, yet of those from middle-class families 59 per cent had
remained there. Fifty-seven per cent of the Goldthorpe sample who were born into the
working class had remained there whereas only 15 per cent of those who had begun
life in the middle class had descended that far. (Roberts, 2001, p. 199) And NCDS
shows that 61 per cent of those who began life in the middle class had remained there
(Roberts, 2001, p. 201). So the middle class children are much more likely to become
middle-class adults. Working class upward mobility was not due to any equalization
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of life-chances. As Goldthorpe concluded, the change in mobility patterns is not a
reflection of a more "open" society, but the number of middle-class jobs has
outstripped the capacity ofthe middle class itself to fill them.

Social Trends have identified the advent of "the super-rich" and the growth in
the numbers of "the poor," defined by the EU as those on less than 60 per cent of
median national income. The figure for "the poor" had been fairly steady in the 1960s,
1970s and early 1980s, "fluctuating between 10 and 15 per cent, then it rose steeply
from 1985 (the 'Thatcher effect' with a vengeance) to a peak of 21 percent in 1992.
From the mid-1990s onwards it stuck at around 18 per cent, whereas it was at 16 per
cent in France and Germany." (Marwick, 2005, p. 88)
Educational reform has widened the opportunities for working-class children.
Education is widely seen by the working class as a way to escape. However, the
middle class has taken full advantage of all postwar educational reforms and benefited
as much as the working class from the expansion of higher education, which has
"mostly enabled the not-so-brilliant children of the middle class to attend university"
(Mount, 2004, p. 50). Mount attacked that with the New Labor's policies in "the
post-comprehensive era" as compared with the Old Labor's promotion of
comprehensive schools in the 1960s--the Department of Education has simply
"confirmed the Downers in their down-ness" ( Mount, 2004, p. 278).
So, as Field comments in Unequal Britain (1973), "Despite the growth in
national wealth the age-old inequalities remain. The position of the poor has improved.
But so, too, has that of the rich." (as cited in Reid, 1998, p. 240) Reid sees classes in
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the Britain of the 1990s experience "not only differing life-styles" (quality of life)
"but also differing life-chances" (quantity of life) (1998, p. 234). On the whole,
middle-class expansion has shed significant influence and the class structure has been
much less rigid and much more difficult to map. The working class, instead of having
died, has simply been driven into new habitats and acquired new forms and
boundaries, displaying very different characteristics from the working class of the
1950s and 1960s, or of the 1970s, which was coined by Rowbotham and Beynon as a
new "working class in-the-making" (2001, p. 3). Relative deprivation and the
"underclass" are now more serious social and political problems challenging
po I icymakers.
To conclude, after the Second World War, while some people dismiss social
class completely, many others believe that it remains a vital ingredient of British
society. Both Class in Britain by Reid and Class in Modern Britain by Roberts use
sufficient statistics to prove that Britain remains a profoundly unequal society. In
social surveys and opinion polls working-class people still refuse to see themselves as
middle-class and many in white-collar occupations deny middle-class status imposed
on them. Hence, we can come to the conclusion that classless Britain is more illusion
than hard reality. R. Hoggart in his 1995 book The Way We Live Now described the
claim that we are all classless now which has been said for at least half a century as
"one of the most commonly voiced misconceptions" (as cited in Reid, 1998, p. 236).
Edgell believes "the 'withering away' of class" is "a sociological fantasy" (1993, p.
115). The argument is that the changes in themselves have been "insufficient to cause
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even the decline, let alone the death of class" (Roberts, 2001, p. 13). Gareth S. Jones
simply sees class as a "life-sentence" (as cited in Dave, 2006, p. 104).
As far as the nature of British class society is concerned, Storry and Childs
conclude that "it is still possible to divide British society into three broad
classes-upper, middle, and working", though the nature and composition of each
class have undergone change (2002, p. 179). Mount prefers "The Uppers" and the
"Downers" binary opposition, which he develops from the concept of "two nations"
in Disraeli's Sybil (1845), in which the Queen is said to reigns over "Two
nations"-"THE RICH AND THE POOR"

4

(Mount, 2004, p. 115). David

Cannadine's Class in Britain, in accounting for the dominant perceptions of class in
Britain from the early 18 th century to the present, claims three enduring, overlapping
but differently structured models: the hierarchical which views society as "a seamless
hierarchy of individual social relations" (editor, Cannadine, 1998, front cover 2), the
triadic which saw class as "upper," "middle" and "lower," and the dichotomous which
saw society as polarized between the two extremes of "us" and "them." Cannadine
argues that it is the hierarchical vision of British society which "has had the widest,
most powerful and most abiding appeal" (1998, p. 22) or "has been the most
pervasive and persuasive" (1998, p. 167). Furthermore, in analyzing the serious
impact of Margaret Thatcher's attempt "to change the way we look at things" and
John Major's vision of a "classless society," Cannadine leads readers' attention to the
4 In Sybil (1845), Disraeli wntes of a "younger stranger" suggesting the Queen reigns over "Two nations"-"THE RICH AND THE
POOR"-"between who there

IS

no intercourse and no sympathy; who are as ignorant of each other's habits, thought and feelings, as if they were

dweJ1ers in different zones, or inhabitants of different planets; who are fanned by a dIfferent breeding, are fed by a different food, are ordered by

different manners, and are not governed by the same laws" (Mount, 2004, P 115)
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role of politicians in shaping social identities in modem democratic Britain,
illustrating class as "social description, social perception, social identities and political
creation" (1998, p. 171).
Since the 1990s, social class differences and inequalities have become less
central concerns politically, socially, and culturally, due to shifting concerns to gender
and ethnicity. However, social class remains the most fundamental form of social
stratification as most of the vital social differences can be seen to have an economic
base. Reid's view that "being Black, female or elderly and middle class is different
from being Black, female or elderly and working class" (1998, p. 238) is widely
shared, and this dissertation takes the same view. Class difference will continue to
feature prominently, along with those of gender, ethnicity and age, in the 21 st century.

The Rise and Decline of British Working Class
British working class experienced drastic changes in the 20 th century. The
suffrage movement, working-class co-op, trade unionism, the Labor Party politics,
and etc. all to great extent empowered the working people. Changes since the Second
World War have been enormous. With the working classes' entitlement to welfare,
health, full employment and education, a sense of positive social identity for
working-class people was formed which "destroy[ed] the Victorian imaginary of the
lumpen, threatening masses who lurked on the edges of British society like a savage
breed" (Munt, 2000, p. 1). The postwar economic and political changes greatly
contributed to changes in social ideology and people's mentality. However, the later
post-industrial occupational restructuring transformed the pattern of labor force, and
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greatly weakened the traditional manual workers, leading to Hopkins' conclusion that
"there was a rise up to the seventies, and a decline thereafter" (1991, p. 265). Three
interrelated trends made a particular impact on the working classes between 1980 and
1997: first, the transformation in the country's industrial relations; second, a resulting
decline in the power, influence and size of organized manual working class; third,
greater division between people with work and without work and hence the shaping of
the underclass.

The rise and decline of working-class politics.
Britain had a strong correlation between class and political behavior. British
trade unions and the Labor Party were two institutions that appealed for solidarity on
the basis of class position and class interests, representing the special strength of the
British working class. Trade unionism was strong until the 1980s and the Labor Party
was deeply rooted in working-class political culture via numerous Labor clubs in
working-class areas until the 1990s. However, it is paradoxical that, as Marwick
lamented, "Britain, with the most clearly defined class structure and highest degree of
class consciousness, yielded the least in the way of class-related violence" (1990, p.
204), or "Britain, with the most developed class structure, was the most stable and
cohesive society" (1990, p. 205). George Orwell traced post-war working-class
inactiveness to the fact that the availability of cheap luxuries made life more bearable
(Hopkins, 1991, p. 37). Industrial actions were generally reformative rather than
revolutionary in nature and the Labor Party has transformed into a "catch-all" party
aiming to seek the support of the great majority of citizens.
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Trade unions and industrial actions.
Trade Union movement has a long history in Britain and has played a forceful
role in industrial relations. The

1860s saw the establishment of a more

institutionalized trade union movement with legal status and the setting up of a central
organization the Trades Union Congress (TUC) in 1867. In the Victorian period only a
minority of the best-paid and most skilled workers--around 10 per cent of the work
force--belonged to unions. Yet from the 1880s onwards, membership extended to
semi-skilled and unskilled workers. By the First World War, all the main industries
and manual occupations had trade unions and membership rose from only 2 million in
1910 to the peak of over 8 million in 1920, at which point nearly half the workforce
was unionized, though membership collapsed to just over 4 million in 1933 due to
unsuccessful strikes in the 1920s and high unemployment caused by the Great
Depression. (Savage, 1994, p. 55) Taking into consideration that the working class
amounted to three-quarters of the population at that time, the union influence was
enormous.
The second half of the century was divided into three distinct phases in union
development. Between 1945 and 1969, union density remained very stable at a little
above 40 per cent, with membership increasing slowly, but only to the extent of
keeping up with an ever-larger work-force. Between 1969 to 1979, membership and
density grew significantly, rising from over 9 million and 45 per cent union density in
1969 to a peak of 13,289,000 members and 54 per cent in 1979 (Abercrombie &
Warde, 2002, pp.86-7; Gallie, 2000, p. 309). According to Marwick, since
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membership covers both middle-class as well as working-class occupations, it can be
seen that "union membership among working-class males must have been a good 80
percent throughout this entire period" (2005 , p. 83). Since 1979, with the
parliamentary acts of Conservative governments to curb union influence, there has
been an annual fall in membership. By 1989 the number had fallen to just over 9
million. In the 1990s, membership was lower than at any time since 1945: in 1995,
membership was as low as 8,089,000 and union density was down to only 33 per cent
(Gall ie, 2000, p. 309); in 1997, 7.9 million, or 30 per cent of employees (Abercrombie
& Warde, 2002, p. 84); in 2000, there were 76 unions representing only 6.8 million
workers (Storry & Childs, 2002, p. 189). So the trade union movement did not cover
the majority of UK employees until the 1970s since when membership has declined.
The changing trend in union density is shown in more detail in the figure below:
Figure 1 Trade union density, UK, 1900-95 (Gall ie, 2000, p. 310)
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Another important change in the trade union development was the occupational
composition of membership represented by an expansion among white-collar workers
in the last 3 decades of the 20

th

century, suggesting a weakening of the traditional

98

individualism among non-manual employees. Between 1971 and 1979, while manual
worker membership increased by 602,300, white-collar membership rose by
1,379,000 (Gall ie, 2000, p. 310). And since 1980, the decline of membership has
mainly involved manual workers. This shift reflected the post-industrial changing
occupational structure and the collapse of the manual traditional manufactory
industries such as steel, coal, textiles and vehicles in which the union used to be
strong. So, by the end of the century, manual workers made up a minority of the total
union membership. The archetypal trade union membership was now "a professional
university graduate in a relatively well-paid and secure white-collar job in the public
sector" and only one in five private sector industrial workers were any longer in
unions (Taylor, 2005, p. 383). Under such circumstance, it is fair to conclude that the
present-day trade union movement is no longer rooted in the working class.
With regard to industrial actions, the working class faced major periods of
conflict in the late 19th and early 20 th centuries. Strikes were frequent in the 1920s,
cumulating into the General Strike of 1926 called by the Tue and lasted 9 days. After
the Second World War, the unions played a more prominent role in national politics.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Tue was routinely consulted about economic and social
policy and was for a time responsible for delivering wage restraint in exchange. At the
same time, individual unions had used industrial actions to influence government
policy. For example, in the 1960s boom, especially in the South East and Midlands
where investment in cars and engineering was heavy, the labor movement was able to
take successful industrial actions to push up wages. The strikes were largely due to the
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impact of new technologies, new management strategies, and etc. Conflict was firmly
related to wages and conditions and there is little evidence of any ambitions for
revolutionary change. And strikes were always the resort of desperate workers. Even
in its heyday, strikers found it difficult to mobilize and expect the automatic
sympathetic solidarity of the entire working class. Besides, one worker's wage
increase tended to be another's price rise.
In the mid-l 960s, the economy under the Wilson Labor government was
worsened by the balance of payment deficit and large numbers of strikes, e.g. the
dockers' strike in May 1966. Wilson's attempt to reform trade unions and curb
unofficial strikes through introducing a bill faced strong opposition within the Labor
party and from the TUC, and therefore failed.
In the 1970s, trade unions were seen as having the power to bring down
governments. The Industrial Relations Act (1971) reformed trade union law in an
attempt to cut down strikes and curb extremists. It set up a National Industrial
Relations Court and introduced a "cooling-off period" and ballot for strikes. Although
it was relatively a moderate and sensible measure, the unions opposed it with a wave
of strikes, the most serious of which being the miners' strike in 1974, which put the
whole of British industry on a three-day working week due to the shortage of
electricity resulting from not enough coal. Huge anger and complaint was aroused
from the general public as candle-light was even used at home. The Conservative
Heath government resigned as a result. In 1978-79, the local authority trade unions
caused the largest stoppage of labor since the 1926 General Strike, which is called the
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"winter of discontent" by the media, demanding larger pay rises against Callaghan's
government's Social Contract, which developed from an understanding between the
Labor Party and the TUC and involved voluntary wage restraint in return for more
employment in order to curb the record-high inflation rate of the time. Unions of
public service workers refused to accept Callaghan's proposal to extend the Social
Contract for a further period by keeping pay rises below 5 percent. Again public
resentment was aroused as services at hospitals, in refuse collection and in public
transport were all influenced. Prof. Eric Hobsbawm in his 1978 Marx Memorial
Lecture noted: "We now see a growing division of workers into sections and groups,
each pursuing its own economic interest irrespective of the rest ... The strength of a
group lies not in the amount of loss they can cause to the employer but in the
inconvenience they can cause to the public." (Taylor, 2005, p. 381) The Labor
government's inability to contain the strikes contributed to Margaret Thatcher's
Conservative victory in the 1979 general election and facilitated forthcoming
legislations to curb the trade unions.
Conservative governments between 1979 and 1997 strived hard to alter the
balance of political and industrial power in favor of the capital and employers. Mrs
Thatcher viewed the trade unions her prime political villains, whose commitment to
collective rights and blanket protections stood in direct conflict with her strong belief
in free market and individual effort. The union's inflationary wage claims and
destructive strikes in the late 1970s provided Thatcher with good excuses to take
radical actions to restrain union power. Between 1980 and 1993, eight major Acts of
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Parliament were passed to weaken and marginalize trade unions step by step, e.g. the
Employment Act (1982) and the Trade Union Act (1984) which restricted the
operation of closed shops and made trade unions more accountable for their actions.
In short, the Acts outlawed the closed shop, curbed picketing, banned sympathetic
solidarity strikes and secondary picketing, imposed the use of secret ballots for the
election of union leaders and of postal ballets for the approval of strikes, and required
trade union officials to be elected periodically. The highly unionized public sector
was attacked, with such policies as the privatization of nationalized industries, the
closure of coal mines, and the restructuring of welfare services like the National
Health Service, which indirectly undermined traditional systems of collective
bargaining. (Abercrombie & Warde, 2000, p. 85; Taylor, 2005, p. 383; Roberts, 2001,

p. 102)
The bitter, year-long, coal-miners' strike of 1984-5 resulted from the decision
of the National Coal Board to close 20 mines leading to 20,000 miners losing their
jobs. The strike split the National Union of Mineworkers and ended in total failure for
the miners. The strikers could not mobilize effective support in other sections of the
working class due to the ban of sympathetic actions. Mrs Thatcher responded with
saving substantial coal beforehand, importing much coal and oil, and subsidizing
other energy. She won the nation's admiration for her toughness in confronting and
defeating the left-wing, uncompromising, and militant miners' union leader Arthur
Scargill. The event, added with a rise in unemployment in the declining
manufacturing industries, led to a loss of about one-fourth of the country's union
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membership. Thus, the union power was profoundly reduced and organized labor was
weakened. Strikes became rare ever after and, when attempted, were usually
unsuccessful. In 1997 only 235,000 working days were lost, more than a hundred
times fewer than in 1984 (Abercromie & Warde, 2000, p. 94).
The unions' damaging defeats such as the 1984 miners' strike and The Times
dispute at Wapping (1986) facilitated unions to make adjustments by adopting
conciliatory policies to bargain with employers for the best possible deal, offering
no-strike agreements and accepting arbitration.
The Labor party.

The Labor Party was originally a party for the working class. Its rise was
largely indebted to the enfranchisement to large number of working class people and
to trade union support and sponsorship.
The Chartist Movement of the 1830s and 1840s paved the way for universal
manhood suffrage. Before 1832 the overwhelming majority of the general public were
denied the vote for being poor. The Reform Acts 1932 and 1867 ensured manhood
suffrage to about 60 percent of adult males in towns, with men only entitled to vote if
they had some form of property. This right was extended to male workers in the
countryside with the Representation of the People Act 1884, which amended the
Reform Act 1867. The Representation of the People Act 1919 gave universal suffrage
to women of 30 years old or over with property restrictions; at the same time it
widened the male franchise by lifting the property restrictions, so that all adult males
of 21 years old and over were now given the vote. The Representation of the People
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Act 1928 made women's voting rights all equal with men, lowering the age to 21 and
over with no property restrictions. The Representation of the People Act 1969
extended the suffrage to all people of 18 and over.
The Labor Party was established in 1900 (then named the Labor Representation
Committee, changed to the Labor Party in 1906) principally by the trade unions,
which had already learnt the limitations of industrial actions and sought political
representation to gain legal protections. Trade unions were connected to the Labor
Party directly through affiliation of members and indirectly through the Trade Union
Congress. Throughout the 20 th century, the trade unions were the Labor Party's main
source of financial support.
The rise of the Labor Party was aided by the two world wars, the 1920s
depression and the Liberal Party splits after the First World War. The Party increased
its number ofMPs from 36 in 1914 to 57 in 1918, of whom 25 were members of the
Miners Federation of Great Britain (Hopkins, 1991, p. 8). Then it grew extremely fast
in the I 920s, coming in second place to the Conservative Party in 1922 election,
forming minority governments in 1924 and in 1929 when it obtained 287 seats
(Savage, 1994, p. 84), though both short-lived. It was not until 1945 that the Labor
formed its first majority government. Socialism in the 1918 constitution of the Labor
Party embodied a willingness to use any means including nationalization to attack
poverty. The 1945 Labor victory consolidated the gains of the working class with
welfare state, nationalization of key industries, and etc. On working-class gains, a
leader ofthe Transport and General Workers Union declared in 1949: "Let there be no
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mistake about it, we have made substantial progress in working-class conditions
during the life-time of this government" (Marwick, 2005, p. 82).
Yet, of the 53 years from 1945 to 1997, Labor was only in office for 17 years:
1945-1951 (Clement Attlee), 1964-1970 (Harold Wilson), 1974-1976 (Harold Wilson),
and 1976-1979 (James Callaghan). And at no time in the 20 th century did a Labor government serve two full terms in office. The Conservative Party had two extremely
long continuous periods of governance, one from 1951 to 1964, the other from 1979
to 1997. Since 1979, there has been a decline in the political and economic power
exercised by working-class agencies, for after 1979 the Labor Party was out of office
for 18 years.
It was only after the drastic reforms of the New Labor that the Labor Party was

reelected and in office for 13 years: 1997-2007 (Tony Blair) and 2007-2010 (Gordon
Brown). Unlike the trade union-influenced, deal-making, socialist-flavored old Labor,
Tony Blair set out to forge New Labor as a democratic, market-oriented,
efficiency-conscious, inclusive party of the radical center. New Labor's philosophy
was summed up as a "Third Way" between unrestricted free market capitalism
(associated with Margaret Thatcher) and centralized state socialism (associated with
"old" Labor). Unlike Thatcherism, the Third Way saw a large role for government;
unlike social democracy, the Third Way stressed the responsibilities of individuals for
their own welfare and the welfare of their families. The New Labor revised the party's
old constitution by getting rid of Clause Four, concerning the "common ownership of
the means of production", and ended trade union direct sponsorship of Members of
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Parliament. It was also anxious not to identifY too closely with the aspirations of its
core working class voters. These measures suggest that Labor has become a
"catch-all" party, aiming to sweep as many as possible into Blair's "big tent".
However, Blairism has also been criticized as functioning "in Conservative coat", its
policies not much different from those of Mrs Thatcher. The Job Seekers' Allowance
and government Welfare-to-Work measures have pressured the unemployed to take
part-time and temporary positions.
The Labor Party for a long time attracted most support from the working class.
The association between Labor and the industrial working-class towns has been close
and important, with the party more identified with municipal services and state
intervention. However, the assumption about the natural relationship between class
and vote was challenged during the 1970s and 1980s by class dealignment theorists.
Labor's working-class support was by no means either solid or universal. Trade union
membership does not correlate with voting Labor.
Working-class class awareness has always been strong, yet involvement in
Labor politics has certainly declined. Many simply stopped participating, except in
voting. The reduced energy of trade unions and the ethos of the "New Labor," which
neither proclaims nor prioritizes working-class interests, mean that one previous
source of a sense of solidarity has declined. And revival seems very unlikely.
To conclude, the working class have lost the trade unions in the sense that most
manual workers are no longer members, and they are no longer the section of the
workforce that is most likely to be unionized. The working class have also lost the
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Labor party in the 1990s, for the leadership of the New Labor made it clear that "it did
not wish to be associated with any particular class," and that "it valued its links with
employers as much as its relationship with organized labor" (Roberts, 2001, p. 109).

Transformation in working and living conditions.

Work and employment.
In the course of the 20 th century, there was a huge shift of structures of
occupation and patterns of employment.
In the early decades of the century, the core industries were manufacturing,
trade and transport. In 1901, a good third of the labor force were engaged in
manufacturing industry, and if those employed in mining and construction were taken
into account and added to the figure, then the proportion rose to about 46 per cent.
Trade and transport took another 22 per cent. A further 22 per cent belonged to
service industries. Lastly, agriculture employed 9 per cent. (Hopkins, 1991, p. 2) In
the later decades, there were the expansion and diversification of manufacturing
industries and the sharp decline of coal mining. However, employment in manufacture
experienced decline which was relative after 1951, absolute after 1968 and disastrous
after 1979 (Beynon, 2001, p. 32). With restructuring and contraction in the 1970s,
closure of plants and mass redundancies greatly weakened organized manual labor in
coal, iron and steel, engineering, shipbuilding, textiles and auto production. Take
coal-mining for example, it had 740,000 miners in 1947, but the number had declined
to 230,000 by 1983 and to just 12,000 by the end of the century (Beynon, 2001, p. 27).
The British car industry was also especially badly hit by rounds of take-overs and
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mergers. Between June 1979 and January 1981, Mrs. Thatcher's first 3 years, 23 per
cent of all manufacturing jobs were lost, with only 5.4 million remaining in 1981.
Overall, between 1979 and early 1991, manufacturing employment fell by more than
2 million. (Hill, 1999, p. 6) By the 1990s, employment in the manufacture,
construction and mining made up no more than a quarter of the country's jobs
(Beynon, 2001, p. 32). Mrs Thatcher's privatization reform led to roughly 2 million
jobs being shifted from the public to the private sector (Roberts, 2001, p. 103). Train
drivers are now among the country's best-paid manual workers.
With the shift from Fordist (mass production of standardized products,
intensification of management) to post-Fordist production (disorganized capitalism,
flexible specialization) and the ever-increasing importance of service industries, the
second half of the century saw a massive increase of the clerical as well as
professional and managerial occupations. "Between 1911 and 1981 white-collar
workers (i.e. professional, managerial, supervisory and clerical) increased from under
14 per cent of the occupied population to over 43 per cent" (Edgell, 1993, p. 66). By
the 1990s, services provided over 15 million jobs and 70 per cent of total employment
(Beynon, 2001, p. 32). Accompanying this change, there has been a substantial
growth of new and more diversified types of employment, e.g. part-time work,
temporary work (either in casual jobs or on short-term contract), self-employment
(especially in the 1980s), and flexible work, which are termed by Roberts as
"sub-employment" (2001, p. 114) and "Mickey Mouse jobs" (2001, p. 104),
employees of which are termed sarcastically by Huw Beynon as "hyphenated
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workers" (2001, p. 34). In the hotel industry, part-time employment made up 26 per
cent of all jobs in 1971 (21 per cent for women and 5 per cent for men); by 1991, the
percentage flied to 44 percent of all jobs in the industry (33 per cent for women and
II per cent for men) (Beynon, 2001, pp. 35-36). And employment growth in the
1980s and 1990s mainly lay in the sphere of part-time jobs. This post-Fordist change
signifies the end of secure full-time long-term employment for a large section of the
labor force creating a pool of long-term unemployed; yet it has boosted female
employment in the job market, though many are in vulnerable positions. In the first
half of the century, women formed only 30 per cent of the workforce; but from the
mid-century the percentage rose continuously and reached 44 per cent in 1997 (GaBie,
2000, p. 318). A natural consequence of all these changes is the drastic reduction of
the size of the manual workers and its percentage in the general work force. The
census reported that in 1951, there were 15.6 million manual workers, constituting 72
per cent of the workforce, but by 1991, the figure was only 9.8 million, representing
42 per cent (Abercrombie & Warde, 2000, p. 152). In 2001, they made up only 27 per
cent of workers (Storry & Childs, 2002, p. 191).
With regard to unemployment, while there were one million unemployed in
1924, the figure rose to 2.5 million in 1931 (Lowe, 1989, p. 450, 477) pressed with
the world economic crisis in 1930-1. The problem was greatly relieved with post-war
relative full-time employment, so in 1954, the registered unemployed was only
260,000 (Kirk, 2003, p. 78). But the long-term relative economic decline and the oil
crisis pushed unemployment in the 1970s towards two million (Roberts, 200 I, p. 96).
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Then with Mrs Thatcher' s curbing inflation at the expense of mass unemployment,
between 1979 and 1982, the figure more than doubled and stayed at over 3 million
from 1982 until 19865 (more than 10 per cent of the work force), then dropped to
over 2 million in 1991 (Hill, 1999, p. 6). In 1982, 40 per cent of all male workers in
Liverpool were jobless (Kirk, 2003 , pp. 78-79). The most vulnerable groups were the
craft, operative and non-skilled workers. Unemployment situation in the whole 20 th
century can be explicitly shown with the following maps.
Figure 2: Unemployment rates, UK, 1900-96 (Gall ie, 2000, p. 314)
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Figure 3: Numbers unemployed, UK, 1900-96 (Gall ie, 2000, p. 314)
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2003 , p. 78)
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Roberts accurately summarized main changing trends as "a shift of manual
employment from extractive and manufacturing industries to services, from large to
small establishments, from city-center locations and older industrial estates to
out-of-town Greenfield sites, and increases in the proportion of women and ethnic
minorities in the manual (as in the non-manual) workforce" (2001, pp. 100-101). The
working class is more fragmented now than in the past.

Life experiences.
The work for the working class in the 19th century was usually arduous and
often dangerous; workers needed to cooperate and depend on each other for physical
safety and mutual support. Thus came the working-class comradeship, or mateyness,
and the "us-them" frame of mind. At the same time, the families had to live close
together to where the workers were employed. Working-men's clubs, pubs, football,
chapel, brass bands, etc. were developed and became the foundations of
working-men's leisure and working-class community. Material hardship could hardly
be coped without family and community support. So, cooperative movement was
developed during the 19 th century, which played a major educational, social and
political role. The most successful type was the consumers' cooperative: stores owned
by shoppers, and therefore able to pass-on any profits to ordinary members.
By the 1890s, a distinctive working-class culture had emerged, based upon a
sense of neighborhood and mutual support. And soon a labor movement consisting of
co-operative societies, trade unions and the Labor Party became a unirying force.
These values were called "populist", involving a pride in work and in mutual support
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in combating poverty, a delight in having a good time, a derision of privilege, which
were all celebrated by Richard Hoggart in The Uses of Literacy (1957).
The state intervened in working-class life, making limited and slow progress in
all aspects. Workers' welfare started to be built before the First World War. The first
National Insurance Act of 1911 compulsorily insured all workers against ill-health
and introduced an insurance scheme against unemployment for workers most subject
to unemployment; an old age pension scheme was also introduced in 1908 (Hopkins,
1991, pp. 25-26). After 1918, municipal activity increased extensively in the
provision of hospitals, education and housing. The Labor became a party increasingly
identified with the provision of urban public services. The establishment of the state
welfare system during the first Labor majority government immediately after the
Second World War marked the historical high of Labor achievements. In addition,
working hours were much reduced. Starting with The Coal Mines Act (1908)
introducing a maximum eight-hour working day for miners, the 54-hour common
week before 1919 was reduced to 48 hours in many industries in the year. The 1930s
saw a noticeable spread of the five-day week. The Holidays with Pay Act (1938)
benefited about half of the manual workers in the country. (Hopkins, 1991, pp. 16-17)
Elementary education became first compulsory in 1880, and then free in 1891
(Hopkins, 1991, p. 2) and secondary education was made compulsory and free in
1944. General improvement in physical safety at work was achieved with dramatic
fall over the century in the number of people who were killed at work. With the
postwar apparent job security, national welfare system, rising real wages and the
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arrival of paid holidays, Britain's working class were said to "have come into their
own;" and for the first time in history, "they were at least no longer on the defensive"
(Taylor, 2005, p. 374).
So, in the 1950s, there was a traditional picture of typical, usually male,
members of the working class. They left secondary school to easily get a job as a
manual worker. They spoke with a regional accent and lived in a close-knit
community of terraced houses. They enjoyed a pint down the local pub, a bet, a trip to
the football match and a tour to a scenic spot such as a beach. They joined trade
unions and always voted Labor and enjoyed a shared experience. They also
passionately got involved in popular culture. According to Hoggart's account, the
main threat was not from bulldozers and urban redevelopment so much as the mass
media-the press, radio, the cinema, and especially television. Moreover, the
imported American culture was seen as destroying traditional working-class culture
and replacing it with something more shallow and less authentic.
In the 1960s, the working class continued to benefit tremendously from the new

way of life brought over by general affluence. Their living standard further rose with
continuing wage increase, better housing, better health, more equal education from the
practice of comprehensive secondary schools by the Labor government and the
expansion in higher education, more consumer durables and longer holidays. Goods
and services formerly associated with the middle classes, such as soft home
furnishings, television sets, washing machines, motor cars and holidays abroad, were
now being enjoyed by more and more working-class families. All this brought
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positive and lasting gains to the working class and particularly to women, who
benefited substantially from the labor-saving washing machine, fridge, and car as well
as from mass advertising. Working class popular culture, like fashion, rock music,
subculture style, the glossy magazines, all flourished. The working class "as a whole
attained unprecedented visibility" (Marwick, 2005, p. 83). Meanwhile, social moral
standards became much more tolerant, leading to the terming of the decade as the
permissive "swinging" sixties. Along with security of employment and the
permissiveness of the society came the significant increase in individual liberty. All
this seemed to indicate "the dawning of a new age for the working classes" (Hopkins,
1991, p. 268). Sociologists much talked about the homogenization of incomes and
living standards of skilled workers and white-collar workers.
The rise in living standard tended to encourage working-class families to tum
themselves inwards. Academic such as Zweig drew attention to how affluence made
nuclear families less dependent on kin and neighbors, thus weakening one of the roots
of traditional working-class culture (Roberts, 2001, p. 90). The spread of
consumerism, the explosion of material and cultural goods like the telly, glossy
magazines, cinema, fashion and etc. were seen to represent "progress" (affluence) and,
conversely, "decline" (erosion of traditional values). Many Labor leading members
began to criticize the working class for pursuing a guiltless materialism and a more
individualistic attitude toward life. The belief that the British proletariat could be
expected to play the revolutionary historical role of launching a class war became
shattered. The working class were gradually being shifted from producers to
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consumers and even trendsetters. Their collectivism based on sectional self-interest
also undermined the general worker solidarity. More public spending on welfare,
health and education also led to rise in taxation and statutory and compulsory wage
restraint.

Upward

social

mobility

certainly

increased

but

the

extent

of

embourgeoisement was still only relative and limited, according to the Luton
investigation report.
In the 1970s, working class suffered from economic crisis and industrial
restructuring. The decade witnessed more industrial disputes and strikes, some big
events caused great inconvenience to people's daily life and ignited their anger. The
media was full of sensational negative coverage of strikers. So the miners simply had
to be defeated with whatever means and "the 'nation' had to be mobilized against the
miners by projecting the crisis right into the heart of every British family" (Hall, 1988,
p. 20). The happenings were made full use of by Mrs Thatcher in her later tough
stance in curbing trade unions. After the mid-1970s, the working class were faced
with mass unemployment and more unstable part-time jobs. There was obvious
division between those who remained in work and those who were either out of work
or in low-paid jobs. However, women in the decade harvested a lot, especially with
the emancipating acts. The Equal Pay Act 1970 stipulated. equal pay for equal work
and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and 1986 legally ended discrimination against
women in employment, education, housing, as well as in other service areas. More
married women went out to work. Yet as married women earners were more likely to
be found in families where their spouses were working than where the spouses were
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unemployed, the income gap widened between families with jobs and without.
In the 1980s, working-class life was much influenced by privatization,
deindustrialization, the record-high mass unemployment, Mrs Thatcher's notion of
enterprise culture and individualism. In 1989 Alan Sinfield observed that
unemployment in Britain was not just a consequence of recession, but "40 to 50 per
cent has been variously estimated as due to government policies" (1989, p. 254). Tom
Narin in The Breakup of Britain suggested that economic policy Mrs Thatcher's experiment -

what he termed

was "no more than an attempt to utilize the recession to

hasten and complete the dominance of financial capital. The apotheosis of 'Freedom'
is de-industrialization: southern hegemony permanently liberated from the archaic
burden of the Industrial Revolution's relies, the subsidies that prop them up, and the
trade unions that agitate for them." (as cited in Kirk, 2003, p. 78) The steepest decline
was in the skilled manual jobs in manufacturing and extractive industries, replaced by
industries of service, finance and information technology.
Poverty increased with high unemployment and the cut in welfare and public
spending by the Thatcher government. The post-war trend of convergence of social
classes was stopped and reversed as inequalities widened on a significant scale. An
underclass was seen to be emerging whose deprivations are many and severe. But on
the other hand, the living standards of people with jobs continue to improve,
especially for those with jobs in those rising professions.
Home ownership was promoted with the sale of council houses at discount
prices. So was the ownership of shares, especially in the newly privatized industries
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of gas, water and electricity; the first issues of shares in these industries were very
heavily publicized. "In 1987, 25 per cent of all men owned shares: among skilled
manual workers, the figure was 17 per cent, among the semi-skilled 13 per cent, and
among the unskilled, 9 per cent" (Hopkins, 1991, p. 273). Working class voters, the
aspiring and respectable in the working class in particular, were found to ally more
with conservative neo-liberal values of personal choice and individual freedom than
with those of Labor, which were turning more toward the Left. Thus, "working class
individualism" was seen in rise (Taylor, 2005, p. 382).

In the 1990s, much of the Thatcherite ideologies and policies were followed.
Working-class house ownership continued to grow. "In 1996, 77 percent of skilled
manual households, 56 per cent of semi-skilled and 38 per cent of unskilled either
owned outright the house in which they were living in or were in the process of
purchasing it on a mortgage" (Abercrombie & Warde, 2000, pp. 157-158). While life
was easy for a new aristocracy of labor (of technicians and technologists) and the
affluent workers, the overall condition of the low-paid appeared to have deteriorated,
their life being marked by a loss of basic dignity and respect as well as limited
self-worth. With lack of companionship and the anxiety about the security of
employment and its low pay, people did not feel attached to a future, living in
miserable hopelessness. New Labor introduced in 1999 a national minimum wage and
a ceiling on compulsory working time, which were welcomed, but also viewed by
Roberts as reluctant and half-hearted measures as the minimum pay is extremely low,
and the ceiling on working time can be easily breached (2001, p. 102). The publicly
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funded-welfare to work scheme to eradicate long-term unemployment was
commented as pressing the unemployed to take whatever poor jobs offered. Some old
culture and values survived, such as the brass bands which were still playing, but the
problem for the faithful was that "the old roots have gone" and working-class power
have waned (Roberts, 2001, p. 89).
On the whole, manual workers work longer hours. In 1998, the average
working week for a male manual worker was 44.1 hours; for non-manuals, 38.1 hours
(Abercrombie & Warde, 2000, p. 153). Manual workers have far less attractive
prospect of promotion and suffer from greater insecurity of employment. As Reid
comments, "It is difficult to see that political activity and social change in the 1980s
and 1990s has done much other than to sustain, or even increase, existing class
differences" (1998, p. 239).

The "Underclass" and Devaluation
Since the 1980s, the major division within British society has been between
those with work and those without. A new underclass is seen to have developed and to
be expanding. The term "underclass" was only used in a very limited sense in the
1970s by a few sociologists. 6 In the early 1980s, Ralf Dahrendorf pointed out the
increasing size of an "underclass" caused by mass unemployment and the devaluation
of wage work, and its threat to British society and thus made the word better known.
In the New Right political discourse of the early 1990s, the term "underclass" came

6 For example, A. Giddens in The Class Slnu.:ture or the Advanced Societies (1973) and 1. Rex and S. Tomlinson, Colonial
ImmIgrants in a British Clly (1979)
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into wider use, with the promotion by Charles Murra/, to refer to the section of
the working class whose existence is characterized by a combination of "illegitimacy,
violent crime" and "the tendency to drop-out from the labor force" (Murray, 1996, p.
25).
The "underclass," according to

Roberts

(2001),

refers to "excluded

groups"-people "who are left out and deemed beneath the working class" (p. 110).
It includes the following types of people: those who are very poor (welfare-dependent

or single parent family); those who suffer chronic unemployment (either long-term or
recurrent); those who are persistent criminal offenders; those with serious alcohol or
drug dependency problems; those with serious physical mental or psychological
disabilities (pp. 110-111). Roberts holds that an underclass has not been a reality yet,
though "a real future possibility" (p. 117) if the level of unemployment persists.
What must be stressed here is that the term "underclass" does not refer to "the
poorest of the poor," but is highly ideological in the sense that it is not a "degree" of
poverty, but a "type" of poverty. It covers "those who no longer share the norms and
aspirations of the rest of society, who have never known the traditional two parent
family, who are prone to abuse drugs and alcohol at the earliest opportunity, who do
poorly at school and who are quick to resort to disorderly behavior and crime."
(Sunday Times, 23 May 1995, as cited in Haylett, 2000, p. 71). Thus, the underclass is

seen to be characterized not so much by its lack of work and poverty as by its
7 Charles Murray is an Amencan neo-conservatlve

SOCial

scientist, pioneer of "Wlderclass" theory. He was invited by the right-wing Sunday Times

and the Institute of Economic AffaIrS to consider whether an underclass simIlar to the one he had discovered in America existed m Britain. He
assessed in 1990 that a British underclass was "emergmg" and in 1994 that the crisis was "deepening" Murray CIted the persistent unemployment

among able-bodied yOlmg men, rise in violent CrIme, high rates of single mother, etc. as eVidences of the existence of tmderclass in Britain
(Roberts, 2001, P 112)
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attitudes and lifestyles. The underclass involves the most disadvantageous sections of
a generally disorganized working class: excluded and detached, cut off from the
consumer society and the normal, respectable working-class way of life, and
politically apathetic. This group "makes up about 10 per cent of the population,
having doubled from 5 per cent in 1979" (Haylett, 2000, p. 81).
The underclass debate was drawn into social policy debates as Murray took the
"over-generous" welfare as the original cause of the formation of a British underclass.
While the Left held that the underclass phenomenon was caused by unemployment,
poverty and inadequate welfare leading to social exclusion, the Right emphasized the
lack of qualification, skills, motivation and appropriate attitudes as primary reasons.
The tendency is obvious of the privileged to blame the victims for their poverty or at
least to try to distinguish between the deserving and the undeserving poor: the
Victorian notion of the "deserving poor"--the good poor, who are industrious and
know

their

place,

as

opposed

to

the

underclass--the

bad

poor,

the

"working-class-gone-wrong" (Munt, 2000, p. 8), those "workshy scroungers" or "idle
thieving bastards" (Roberts, 200 I, p. 112), who deserve nothing. Murray's underclass
theory is in some ways "comforting for the already comfortable" (Roberts, 2001, p.
113). It assures them that they are not to blame, and that spending more of their taxes
on welfare will actually do harm to the recipients. Generally, the underclass concept
conceals the systematically destructive effects of capitalism on particular sections of
the working class, e.g. the young, single mothers, ethnic minorities and the
unemployed. It does this by moralizing these same effects in terms of individual and
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cultural failings. On the other hand, it locates the source of value in society outside
the working class. In its political discourse, the New Labor government addressed the
issue of under class as "social exclusion," and proposed to solve it by providing "equal
opportunities" through education and training, especially for the young unemployed.
By equalizing the underclass as simply social exclusion, the New Labor stance is
thought to be too neutral for lack of sympathy.
This out-of-work underclass is divided from those in work. Sociologists are
uncertain whether it is included or excluded from the working class. Roberts holds a
mixed attitude. In his Class in Modern Britain, the ONS category 5, 6 and 7 is termed
as "working class" and category 8 as "underclass" (2001, p. 25), and he writes "but a
series of' excluded groups' have been separated from the working class proper" (2001,
p. 118). But he identifies that though this disadvantaged group differs from the
"respectable" section of working class, a close look from the aspects of their work and
market situations, characteristic life chances and especially class consciousness
proves that the underclass should not be separated from working class. The self
definition of excluded groups always remains working class. (2001, pp. 1l3-116)
Stephen EdgeJl in Class: Key ideas argues that it is more useful "to regard the
underclass as the underemployed and unemployed fraction of the working
class ... distinctive in its poverty" rather than as a separate social grouping (1993, p.
80).
In conclusion, there is no convincing evidence to prove that class differentiation
has withered away in contemporary Britain. In the 20 th century, much has altered in
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working-class work and life with occupational restructuring and labor reorganization
and the configuration of daily life. The traditional working class and manual workers
is shrinking or in long-term numerical decline. Their community is lost. Manual
workers become more mixed in gender and ethnicity. Higher absolute rates of upward
mobility coexist with unemployment and precarious jobs. Resulting from the
structural changes as well as the legislative restrictions since the 1980s, the trade
unions have been greatly weakened.
At the same time, working-class living and consumption patterns have changed.
There is no doubt that working class living standard greatly improved with the
increase in productivity, shorter working hours and paid holidays, rise in real wages
and larger choice in consumer products. New modern housing has replaced the old
ones, though the relocation of which is thought to have destroyed working-class
communities. Television and motor cars brought people more family-centered.
Continuing education has become more general. Though for the long-term
unemployed the story is different. Family instability has been a headache for society,
especially with underclass single-parent.
Working class has become more heterogeneous within itself. Those in skilled
and rare trades, such as plumbers and electricians, are earning good middle-class
salaries. Train drivers and firefighters perceive themselves as "professionals" and
reject what they claim as "manual workers' wages". At the bottom is the "underclass"
of the unfortunate, welfare-dependents, causal and miserably paid workers-more
generally known as "the poor." (Marwick, 2005, pp. 84-85) Class structure becomes
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more blurred and complicated to define and classifY. Attention also needs to be paid to
the different situation of women, youth and ethnic minorities. The expansion in
private service jobs and public services provided women with more opportunities for
advance than was possibly for men. Women's wages have become an essential part of
household income. Women have become more independent, attending increasing
all-female social activities outside home, an extreme example being the popular male
striptease performance by the most famous Chippendales, who were viewed by
women as sex objects. But women without skills suffer from boring low-paid
part-time jobs or joblessness. Ethnic minorities experience an "ethnic penalty"
(Roberts, 200 I, p. 211). Their occupational achievements are lower, their risks of
unemployment are higher, and they live in run-down inner-city areas. Youth are more
fragile in the labor market, haunted with crisis of masculinity as they are unable to
obtain men's jobs and cannot shoulder family duties.
So Britain's working class today has been transformed and fragmented. In this
process,

it

has

been

disempowered,

devaluated

and

marginalized.

For

disempowerment, it has lost the trade unions 8 in the 1980s and the Labor Party in the
I 990s; the co-op has become just another retailer; working men's clubs and

community bonds have been largely replaced by television and commercial leisure.
This results, in a disorganized working class which has lost its capacity for collective
actions. There is little hope for "the poor" to remedy their inferiority; protest is
useless. For devaluation, it is now very difficult to develop shared knowledge of its
8 The trade umons have changed their names to less confrontational, more winsome and more technical-soundmg titles, e.g Amicus and Unison.
The Mineworkers became the Mine Technicians; ·'worker" became a ·'taboo word"
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(Mount, 2004, pp 60-61)

interests and common inspirations. "Identifying with the working class is no longer
associating oneself with a powerful group, or a way of life with features that others
should envy" (Roberts, 200 I, p. 109). Beverley Skeggs' (1997) ethnographic study of
83 young working-class women in an industrial town in north-west England for over
12 years found that "working-classness was treated as a stigma" (Roberts, 200 I, p.
109). For marginalization, few spoke any longer of or on behalf of the working class.
The country is "now dominated overwhelmingly by the broad, diverse and ill-defined
middle classes" and ''the very term-class-is now often frowned upon and even
derided as obsolete for our understanding of the post-industrial age" (Taylor, 2005, p.
386). The advice of governments to working-class parents and their children favor
individual escape-"get qualified and get out" (Roberts, 2001, p. 109). Unfortunately,
in a society where over a third of all jobs are still working-class, the dream is not so
easy to come true.
Working class images in social realism films have recorded vividly the past and
present, or rise and fall, of British working class. The following chapters will explore
the films representations, study the changing identity of British working class on
screen in different periods of time, and analyze ideology and resistance in cinematic
portrayal of working class fate.
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CHAPTER IV
WORKING CLASS IDENTITY IN NEW WAVE FILMS

British working-class screen identity before the Second World War was far from
fair. Paul Rotha pointed out in 1936 that working-class people were often depicted
"either as creatures of fun, Cockney types or rustic half-wits, or as dishonest rogues,
tramps and pick pockets" (as cited in Rowbotham & Beynon, 2001, p. 2). The
Grierson Documentary Film Movement in the 1930s, which started the British social
realism tradition, offered some counter-balance. For Rotha, it "represented the first
attempt to portray the working class in Britain as a human, vital factor in present day
existence" (as cited in Higson, 1995, p. 197). The Second World War further
cemented social realism as the preferred mode for British films. In critics' calling for
realism of setting, content and character, the working class, within limits, was ''treated
seriously for the first time in the mainstream cinema" (Richards, 1988, p. 59). Then
the Free Cinema Movement between 1956 and 1959 helped to train some young
directors who soon became famous directors of the British New Wave films.
The New Wave films are landmark social realist films, directed by young
talents like Tony Richardson, Lindsay Anderson, Karel Reisz, along with Jack
Clayton and John Schlesinger. They are usually seen as typically represented by Room
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at the Top (Jack Clayton, 1959), Look Back in Anger (Tony Richardson, 1959),
Saturday Night and Sunday Morning (Karel Reisz, 1960), A Taste of Honey (Tony
Richardson, 1961), A Kind of Loving (John Schlesinger, 1962), The Loneliness of the

Long Distance Runner (Tony Richardson, 1962), This Sporting Life (Lindsay
Anderson, 1963). With industrial working-class characters placed at the center of their
narratives, the films portray the working class at a key moment of economic and
social change, displaying working class identity to full extent.
This chapter aims to look at working-class identity in British New Wave films.
It will firstly briefly survey the working-class representation in the Grierson

Documentary Movement, the Second World War films, the Free Cinema Movement
for social realism tradition, and then focus on two New Wave films-Room at the Top
and Saturday Night and Sunday Morning, which are all popular, influential and
representative of the New Wave, as case studies. It argues that the New Wave films
successfully presented the lifestyle and aspirations of an emerging new working class,
displaying to full extent their masculine energy and sexuality, class pride, youthful
discontents and rebellion, greater individuality, desire for social mobility, confidence
in change for the better, and resistance as well as conformity to consumerism. The
protagonists are alienated working class male who aspires to find a role for himself in
a fast changing affluent and materialistic world, yet often trapped by the high cost or
compromise he has to bear.

From the Grierson Documentary Movement to the New Wave
The documentary tradition.
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The Grierson Documentary Film Movement 9 is taken as Britain's "most
important contribution to cinema as a whole" (Dodd & Dodd, 1996, p. 38). The
Movement envisioned film as being "a serious, committed, engaged cinema," with
primarily a social responsibility, unlike Hollywood movies, which functioned
essentially as escapist entertainment (Higson, 1986, p. 74). In Grierson's own phrase,
the documentary film is for "national education" (as cited in Murphy, 2000b, p. 125)
and must "put the working man on the screen" (as cited in Aitken, 2009, p. 179). For
the movement's young directors such as Anstey, "the working man can only be a
heroic figure" (as cited in Hood, 1983, p. 107), as they believed that providing
positive images of working-class individuals and communities could playa role in the
betterment of society and national cohesion. This attitude reflected the interest in and
idealization of the working class, common among middle-class intellectuals in the
1930s and Grierson's team were overwhelmingly middle-class and mostly Oxbridge
graduates. Hence, the documentary vision was seen as a vision from above and
outside, mainly based on second-hand stereotypes rather than on first hand
observation.
The film-makers of the Movement were all kind of "sociologists." Taking
documentary as a sociological device, they made many films on issues such as

9 "BrItlsh Documentary Movement" refers to a group of film-makers and the body of films and writings they crafted during the late 19205 and the
mid-1940s John Gnerson (1898-1972)

IS

regarded as the founder as well as the central figure of the movement for he was first to envisage that the

cruCIal socml role for cinema was to provide effective medium of communication between the state and the public, and to put his idea of
documentary IOta practIce with the film Drifters (1929). Following the success of Dnfters, he established Empire Marketing Board Film Unit
(EM B). When EMB was abolished by the Act of Parliament in 1933, the film unit was re·establlshed as General Post Office (GPO) Film Unit
(1933-1939). During World War Two GPO FIlm Unit was transferred to the Ministry of Information and put to work

In

the war effort as the Crown

Film Unit The movement's unportance diminished after the war and the Crown Film Unit was abolished in the early 19505.
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poverty, pollution, housing policy, nutrition, education, unemployment, and dealt with
the desires of the multitude of working people instead of an individual
hero-protagonist. The documentaries dealt with working-class life in all aspects,
presenting the dignity and heroism of labor.

Drifters (1929) is a film about the work of herring fishermen in the North Sea.
Hard, honest labor is exalted with many sequences displaying the skills and
techniques of fishing. Through the portrayal of heroic work on the boats and in the
harbor, traditional working class masculinity, dignity and community are celebrated.

Industrial Britain (1933) deals with the socially useful labor of Britain's craftsmen
and the proud tradition of craftsmanship, showing the ardor and bravery of common
labor. Night Mail (1936) is concerned with one aspect of the work ofthe General Post
Office (a public institution) --the night mail from London to Scotland. Coalface (1935)
furnishes general information about coal production, while dwelling in more detail on
harsh working conditions within the mine and on the individual experience of miners.

Today We Live (1937) touches on the social hardship caused by unemployment in a
Welsh mining community. Housing Problems (1935) deals with slum housing and
presents the form of model council estate as an alternative. The film, for the first time
in British cinema, made working-class people actually speak on screen as opposed to
being spoken over. Enough to Eat (1936) deals with poor nutrition. Spare Time (1939)
maps the leisure of the working class.
The Grierson documentaries tend to deal with the work of a particular "public"
institution that can be broadly perceived as social (such as the General Post Office)
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and concentrate on a multitude of workers instead of the desires of just one individual
hero-protagonist. In order to construct the idea of a common public sphere, labor is
taken out of the context of capitalist economic class relations; the interests of the
capitalist class are transformed into the public interest. Similarly, the party political
government becomes "subsumed into the idea of the benevolent state, above divisive
politics" and the audience is addressed as "a citizen of the nation, not as a subject of
one or another antagonistic class, race or sex" (Higson, 1986, p. 77). Thus Housing
Problems, sponsored by the British Commercial Gas Association and the London

County Council (LCC), was made to publicize the role of the gas companies in aiding
slum clearances and the effectiveness of LCC in dealing with the problem of slum
poverty. However, the detailed stories of poor health and child mortality that were told
by people living in slums instead of being told by voice-over were still powerful
enough to reduce the working class as social victims who could not help themselves
and needed aid from the state and sympathy from society. Enough to Eat recognizes it
as the duty of the state to provide the material means for better nutrition and the
citizen's duty to eat better. These social problems are "removed from the arena of
antagonistic power relations and depoliticized, and the films effectively construct the
working class as victims deserving of 'our' (Le., the public's) sympathy" (Higson,
1986, p. 78).

Montage editing is mobilized to strengthen a sense of unity and

harmony rather than of conflict and contradiction. Dodd & Dodd acknowledge the
"victim" portrayal of the working class, but see more of a counter-representation of
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male working "hero" --the fetishising of the working class male body engaged in hard,
honest labor through countless close-ups (1996, p. 43).
The Second World War films.

The war films' attachment to realist methods and a socially progressive outlook
derived from general feeling that it was right and necessary to show people from all
walks of life pulling together for the common good. So the war promoted
"democratization and documentarization" (Richards, 1988, p. 59) of British films.
Many of the Grierson group worked during the war for the Crown Film Unit set up by
the Ministry of Information. Class inequalities and cultural differences that had
preoccupied the documentary movement were somewhat flattened out. As George
Orwell observed, "class feeling slipped into the background, only reappearing when
the immediate danger had passed" (as cited in Richards, 1988, p. 60). And the British
wartime films also evoked specific values -

bravery, loyalty, self-sacrifice, social

harmony, unselfish pulling together for the common good.
The Documentary Movement was continued with the short documentaries such
as London Can Take It (1940) and Listen to Britain (1941). But the Documentary
Movement's influence was more reflected in feature films embracing documentary
elements. A large number of war films became story documentaries-hybrid of
documentary and feature films. The Lion Has Wings (1939), the first feature-length
film of the war, was a propaganda film intended to reassure the public of the might of
the Royal Air Force (RAF). Target/or Tonight (1941) is about a squadron of bombers
on a night bombing raid over Germany which shows the RAF successfully fighting
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back in the heart of Germany. It was commissioned by RAF Bomber Command,
produced by the Crown Film Unit, and played by RAF personnel. In Which We Serve
(1942) was inspired by and based on the true incident of Lord Mountbatten's battle
ship, HMS Kelly. The ship equals to the country, in which all Britons serve. In this
film,

the

working,

middle

and

upper-classes

were

clearly

defined.

The

documentary-style photography presents a convincing picture of the prevailing mood
of all classes pulling together for Britain through quiet heroism and the stiff upper lip.

Fires Were Started (1943), acted by real firemen, was about fire fighting and London
during the Blitz. Millions Like Us (1943) tells the story of a young daughter who is
separated from her family and called up to work in a huge aircraft components factory
and finds love with an RAF pilot. It touches upon the egalitarian concept of people's
war and harmonizes class discord. Women were directly addressed in order to
encourage them to contribute to the war effort. The Way Ahead (1944) again glorifies
the concept of people's war and wartime populism through telling the story of seven
civilians who are called up to the Army and take part in the North African invasion.

Western Approaches (1944), paying tribute to the Merchant Navy, deals with the
effort to defend the essential trade routes between Britain and America through the
convoy system. The players are serving officers and men of Allied Navies and
Merchant Fleets.
Some wartime features are not directly about war effort, but about harsh
working class life and their expectation for new economic and social order after the
war, giving voice to the emerging political consciousness. The best examples include
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Love on the Dole (1941), The Proud Valley (1940), and The Stars Look Down (1940).
There was a feeling that the past had to be acknowledged and a determination that
unemployment, poverty, class conflict, injustice should not be repeated. John Baxter's

Love on the Dole tells the story a young brother and sister in 1930s Salford, both of
whom fall victim to poverty and unemployment and have to make difficult decisions
to survive. The problems it deals with are the Depression, mass unemployment,
poverty, pre-marital pregnancy, riots and prostitution. The sentiments for change into
a new, better and cooperative world are expressed by a postscript caption at the film's
end, signed by A. V. Alexander, the Labor MP and First Lord of the Admiralty, that
read: "Our working men and women have responded magnificently to any and every
call made upon them. Their reward must be a New Britain. Never again must the
unemployed become forgotten men of peace." (Aldgate & Richards, 1986, p. 14). On
the other hand, the film reinforces the view that the British working classes who had
survived such hardships would survive others in defense of the liberal democracy now
under threat. Love on the Dole is praised for constituting an argument that poverty of
the previous decade should be banished, replaced by a new start or a better and
cooperative future. The Proud Valley gives a remarkably authentic portrait of a Welsh
mining village, displaying the truly heroic image of the working class, proud in song
and ready in danger and self-sacrifice. The film not only deals directly with
opposition of the miners to a pit closure but also stars Paul Robeson, a well-known
socialist activist. The Stars Look Down is about injustices in a coal mining community
in Northeast England. It shows people's different choices of escape, facing the
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industrial action's failure in dealing with safety issue: one has gained political
consciousness and supports nationalization; one chooses to be businessman. Yet the
protagonists' attempt to escape always ends tragically. In Love on the Dole, the girl
has to be the bookie's tart to support her family; in The Stars Looks Down, Davy's call
for nationalization or union's official support on saving the miners from working on
the dangerous Scupper Flats seems all in vain. The film ends with the tragedy of
inevitable coalface detonation and gas explosion. The working class figures are more
represented as victims of the existing system, a system which deserves at least moral
critique for producing hardship that the working class can hardly escape, if not a
system that needs radical change or even revolution to alter it. Compared with the
blind optimism of the 1930s, this is an improvement.

The Free Cinema movement.
The Free Cinema Movement is a documentary film movement represented by a
series of six programs of shorts and documentaries presented at the National Film
Theatre between 1956 and 1959, depicting the English working class on specific
aspects of contemporary British social life. The word "Free" implies "an aspiration
towards a cinema whose tone is neither 'commercial' nor 'sponsored'" (Durgnat,
1970, p. 126). Filmmakers were free to choose the subjects that interested them as
artists. The significance of the Movement lay in 2 aspects. Firstly, it helped to train
three young directors-Tony Richardson, Karel Reisz and Lindsay Anderson-who
went on to become famous directors of the British New Wave films. Secondly, the
Free Cinema documentary and New Wave representation was seen to be from the
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inside, as the directors were of working-class background, though grammar school
beneficiaries of Butler's 1944 Education Act and university-educated. The movement
resembled the Grierson team of the 1930s with the same commitment to a realist
aesthetic, the same middle-class romanticization of the working class, the same belief
in location-shooting and rejection of studio artifice, but developed new concerns as
summarized by Alan Lovell: "a sympathetic interest in communities, whether they
were the traditional industrial one ... or the new, improvised one of the jazz club ... ;
fascination with the newly emerging youth culture ... ; unease about the quality of
leisure in an urban society ... ; and respect for the traditional working class ... " (as cited
in Murphy, 1992, p. II).
Anderson's Every Day Except Christmas (1957) is about market life and the
workers at the Covent Garden Market. It follows the loading, transport and delivery of
goods to the Market, the sale of the goods and the aftermath. As Industrial Britain in
the 1930s, the film looks at working-class faces with respect and continues the liberal
humanist tradition of representing working people as dignified and heroic: "rough
diamonds, you know, but jolly good fellows, and damned hard working." And the
emphasis is shifted from work as a process to work as fulfillment or even vocation.
Apart from the general dignity of labor, the film also emphasizes local and national
community. Reisz's We are the Lambeth Boys (1959) tries to deliver sympathetically
a positive portrait of the lives of ordinary teenagers, instead of the widespread violent
youth delinquent images. Shot in a youth club in Kennington, South London, it
follows a group of teenagers at work, at home and in their leisure time, and shows
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much club activities. Young people are given space to express their frustrations and
aspirations. The film lets the camera move around the youth or uses close-ups to
capture their faces. Richard Hoggart praised the film in Sight and Sound that it sets
out to show "not the whole truth, but some aspects of the truth, wholly" and
succeeded in embodying "the strength and variety of these young people's vitality,
their lively, tolerant and complex sense of community" (We are the Lambeth Boys,
BFI screenonline).
Soon the Free Cinema directors began to make New Wave feature films with
working-class heroes based on the materials of working-class northern novelists. Due
to the interest in the emergent youth culture and the respect for an authentic traditional
working-class which was endangered by consumerism, the representations of working
class people were more energetic and vibrant.
The New Wave films.
The British New Wave films, also called "Angry Young Man" films, "kitchen
sink,,10 realistic films, was a further development of the Grierson Documentary
tradition, and drew from 3 contemporary sources. Firstly, it drew on Free Cinema
Movement documentaries, as illustrated above. Secondly, its formal and stylistic
characteristics were heavily indebted to the French New Wave. Thirdly, its literary
sources came substantially from the revolting Angry Young Man literature and theatre

10 "Kitchen smk" was originally used to describe realist painters who chose to paint ordinary objects, but with Look Back in Anger it began to
apply to the depiction of the ordinary, everyday life of the working class on screen
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productions 11, which determined its principal mood as one of discontent and
dissatisfaction.
The New Wave films were born in the late 1950s and early 1960s, a time of full
employment, especially of young people, and relative affluence of social development.
Out of the affluence came the increased importance of the market and consumption
and youth-oriented leisure industry. Mark Abrams in 1959 published his famous
survey The Teenage Consumer, revealing teenage consumption as the most distinctive
product of these changes. Youth became the prime beneficiaries of the new affluence,
as their real earnings had increased by 50% since 1938, which is double the rate of
expansion for adults, and their real "discretionary" spending has probably risen by
100% (Abrams, 1959, p. 9). More and more women went out to work, including many
married women. Affluence, embourgeoisement and political consensus became key
popular terms in political debates of the period which tended to ignore those
unpleasant social and economic class inequalities that continued to exist. Working
class consciousness underwent changes concerning attitudes towards consumerism,
sense of community and solidarity, and etc.
The New Wave films took an honest look at the people who lived in the grimy
industrial communities in the Midlands and North of England. They were marked for
their commitment to address contemporary social realities and, more importantly, to
11 Angry Young Man refers

to

the literary movement of the 19505 involvmg many new novelists and playwrights such as John Wain (Hurry on

Down, 1953), Kmgsley AmlS (/Alck ,11m, 1954), John Osborne (Look Back in Anger, 1956), John Brain (Room at the l()p, 1957), Alan Slliitoe

(Saturday Night and Sunday MornmK, 1958) Their writings expressed their anger and frustration as the postwar reforms failed to meet their
demand for genume social change TheIr anger was toward the ineffectIveness of the government in eliminating poverty and inequality and toward
the dommant political consensus that left the workmg class WIth the "loss of politics '" Their protagonists are often proud and rebellious
workmg-class figures
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"a politically serious representation of working-class experiences" (Hill, 1986, p. I).
They enriched British cinema with "an enhanced and expanded version of
contemporary reality" (Lay, 2002, p. 59) through introducing new themes into the
British cinema. They challenged wartime idealization of consensus and community,
captured the new individualism in British culture, and delivered more energetic and
vibrant representations of working class "authentic" experiences. Focusing on
working class male protagonists, the films displayed to full extent their class
confidence, masculine energy and sexuality, anger and rebellion, and mixed feeling
toward mobility and consumerism.
Stylistically, the films set the stories in provincial, grey northern towns with
natural surroundings of small terraced houses, factories and pubs. They used unknown
regional stage actors mainly from the North in ensemble casts, whose fresh faces,
vernacular accents and rebellious spirit helped immeasurably in strengthening the
realistic mood. Typical example was Albert Finney in Saturday Night and Sunday

Morning. His sudden stardom proved that "it was no longer necessary for passion,
appetite, and enjoyment to be held in check," and "the camera was no longer afraid of
robustness and charisma" (Stead,

1989, p.

198). Besides, black-and-white

photography and location shooting carry a decidedly authentic, documentary-like
quality. So we see shots of cobbled streets, chimneys, factories, canals, pubs, the
fairground, the bus journey, and the visit to the nearby countryside. The industrial
landscapes and townscape shots, especially "That Long Shot of Our Town From That
Hill" (Higson, 1984, p. 17), had an almost exotic lure.

137

New Wave realism was seen by many critics as characterized by "poetic
realism." For Higson, poetic realism involves a more perfect conjunction of surface
realism, which is "the 'authenticity' of place and character" involving "a fetishization
of certain iconographic details," and moral realism, which is a moral commitment to
the representation of "ordinary people," involving "a particular construction of the
social in terms of 'universal human values'" for which "films should show the dignity

of the working man" (Higson, 1984, p. 4).

It is a conjunction "which in fact.

transcends ordinariness, which makes the ordinary strange, beautiful-poetic"
(Higson, 1984, p. 5). Stylistic techniques often used to create this poetic realism
include the use of sequences of establishing shots to give a sense of place, long and
wide-angled urban landscape and townscape shots, particularly "That Long Shot of
Our Town From That Hill" termed and explored in detail by Higson (1984), which
lures the eye across the vast empty space of a townscape. Critic Roger Manvell called
this "industrial romanticism" (as cited in Higson, 1995, p. 192), which seeks a kind of
beautiful ugliness, transforming scarred images of cities and poverty into images of
"comfortable contemplation" or "bringing beauty out of squalor" (Hill, 1986, p. 136).
Poetic realism is intended "to psychologize rather than historicize the space" (Higson,
1984, p. 8) and to elicit sympathy from the morally committed audience for the
working class protagonists as victims of the city.
As the major directors of the New Wave films are scholarship boys--working
class males who benefited from free grammar school and university education and
moved upward, Terry Lovell identifies that poetic realism represents a perspective of
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Hoggart's scholarship boy "looking back with nostalgia at a remembered childhood
landscape" (1990, p. 370). It is only from a class position "outside and above the city"
that the city can appear beautiful (Higson, 1984, p. 18). In essence, it is a combination
of both insider and outsider's view from someone who experienced the life and
moved outside with considerable sense of loss and who identified in the young,
sexually active male protagonist "a fantasy projection of the self he might have
become had he remained" (Lovell, 1990, p. 370).
In a negative way, the aesthetic and the psychological of poetic realism "block
access to the social and the historical" (Higson, 1984, p. II). Often typical shots of a
place or locale are presented without any particular narrative function. Hill criticizes
such poetic shots and montages of the northern industrial landscape as being "visual
abstractions ... emptied of socio-economic content" (Hill, 1986, p. 136) which
undermine the social messages.
The following part will do identity analysis, focusing on two films, which are
all popular, influential and representative of the New Wave. Room at the Top is
considered the first of the British New Wave of realistic and gritty film dramas. It won
American Academy Awards (1960) for Best Actress in a Leading Role (Simone
Signoret) and Best Writing Screenplay Based on Material from Another Medium and
was nominated for 4 other Academy Awards (Best Picture, Best Actor in a Leading
Role, Best Actress in a Supporting Role, Best Director). It also won three British
Academy of Film and Television Arts (BAFTA) Awards. The film also earned an
award at Cannes. Saturday Night and Sunday Morning took British Academy Awards
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for Best Picture and Best Actor and won very good box office.
Room at the Top (Jack Clayton, 1959)

Room at the Top is Jack Clayton's film of John Braine's novel of the same title,
telling the story of a young man who uses his good looks to gain mobility in a
class-bound society.
Joe Lampton (Laurence Harvey) is a working-class lad determined to escape his
working-class background and climb the social ladder through the shortcut of
marrying Susan Brown ((Heather Sears), the daughter of a rich local industrialist. Joe
has high ambitions. He has improved himself through education and has found a
decent job as a clerk in the Treasury Department of the local government of Warnley,
a town which is more prosperous than his grim northern industrial town of Dufton. He
aspires to marrying out of his working-class background and soon sets his target on
Susan Brown, for whom he joins the drama club of which Susan is a member. During
the slow progress towards his goal, he is unexpectedly drawn into a fulfilling love
affair with an older woman, penniless Alice Aisgill (Simone Signoret) who is also a
member of the drama club. She is French and unhappily married. However, when he
feels his relationship with Susan seems impossible and his heart strongly connected to
Alice, Mr Brown presses him into marriage with Susan as Susan has been made
pregnant by him. Joe is promoted to a comfortable position in Brown's company. As a
precondition, Joe must also abandon Alice, which leads to her suicide by
drink-driving her car off the cliff. Joe realizes his goal, but his pursuit of upward
mobility is achieved at high emotional and spiritual costs of suppressing the real
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feeling-he does not really love Susan and his true love Alice dies and the wedding is
shaded with regret.
Numerous critics have commented on the themes of Room at the Top as notable
for "its comparative sexual candor and open acceptance of the go-getting hero's
greedy aspirations" (Brown, 1986, p. 160), for "class and the struggle for material
success" (Leese, 2006, p. 59) or for "class power, class rigidities and the possibility of
social mobility; and sex, frankly presented and still more frankly discussed" (Marwick,
1991, p. 74). For me, the film's explicit and weighty emphasis on class and sex needs
to be firstly acknowledged, at the same time I would like to lay stress on Joe
Lampton's identity as an ambitious and confident working class "scholarship boy"
who claims eligible to the new affluence and classlessness. Joe Lampton simply
signifies the arrival of a new kind of working-class lad targeting big in times of
change.
Class obviously is a key theme, which can be subdivided into class difference,
class mobility and class confidence.
Class difference is firstly an explicit physical existence. When Joe arrives to
report to the Treasury of Town Hall, Mr. Hoylake assures him that he'll "find big
differences" in Warnley, not only work, but also "a different class of people" who
pride themselves on "being civilized here in Warnley.,,12 Although Joe tries to defend
his hometown in front ofMr Hoylake that "Dufton is not much of a place but ... we're
not exactly savages there," deep in his heart, he sees it as a hopeless place as he later

12 Quotations in this chapter WIth no cltatlOns are all taken from the scripts in the relevant films
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mentions it to his colleague: "Nobody ever goes to Dufton, they just pass through it;"
Dufton seems like "a lifetime sentence." To his uncle and aunt he also speaks high of
his new town that "Warn ley is a different kind of a town" with "a different sort of
people." Brown's family property forms a sharp contrast to working class existence.
Their house is like a castle, with a swimming pool. Susan's clothing, car and
boyfriend all display a world of affluence. The two richest families of the town, the
Brown's and the Wales's, are "worth more brass than the rest of Warnley rolls
together. "
Class difference and class barrier is marked deep in people's mind and attitude.
When Joe declares his ambition to have the lot that Mr Brown now has, Charles
simply laughs: "No you're not! Not in local government ... In 20 years time, you
could be sitting in Hoylake's chair, and that is as high as you can go. And that means,
a 1000 a year, a semi-detached downtown, a 2nd _hand Austin, and a wife to match if
you know what I mean." When Joe shows great interest in Susan after knowing she is
the millionaire's daughter, his colleagues keep warning him not to waste his time as
Susan is "way up in the top drawer" and out of his reach. Joe's immediate superior Mr
Hoylake persuades him to give up Susan as Mr Brown "is a powerful man" with the
biggest engineering works in Warnley and Joe had better find a girl of his own class
(he technically uses the word "background"). Joe's uncle also firmly believes that
"Money marries money" and advises him to "Stick to your own people Joe."
The way Mr and Mrs Brown deals with Susan's love relationship with Joe
vividly reveals class antagonism. When Mrs Brown first hears Joe's name mentioned
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by her daughter, her first response is "But we don't know him, do we? Socially I
mean." Knowing that Joe is only a clerk, naturally she doesn't think he's "suitable."
The couple uses every means to break the relationship. Firstly, Mr Brown phones
Joe's superior Mr Hoylake to talk to Joe into giving up Susan with persuasion as well
as threat of "no promotion." Then he purposefully highly recommends Joe to a firm in
his hometown so as to send him away from Susan. He humiliates Joe with his
condescending warning: "You want to improve yourself, you want to get in among the
money. Alright, I don't blame you for that. But you're not getting my brass through
Susan." After Susan is pregnant, Mr Brown presses Joe into marrying her as soon as
possible and settles everything (quitting the Town Hall job, breaking with Alice) for
him without consulting him first.
Talking about the Brown's, Joe is full of envy and hatred: "They've got just
about everything, haven't they?" With Mr Brown trying to arrange everything of his
future before the marriage, he does not hide his resentment: "You can fix just about
anything, can't you?" He is particularly angry about the sense of superiority of Jack
Wales, Susan's suitor who shows contempt for Joe in every way: "That type they
make me mad. The boys with the big mouths and a silver spoon stuck in them. But
they think they can take everything worth having by sort of divine rights."
Alexander Walker complains that "what one feels most strongly in Room At the

Top isn't anger--but envy--the envy of a have-not for what he wants to acquire" (1974,
p. 45). But Murphy thinks this is "misleading" as John Braine is very specific about
Joe's attitude: "I tasted the sourness of envy. Then I rejected it. Not on moral grounds,
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but because I felt then, and still do, that envy's a small and squalid vice ... This didn't
abate the fierceness of my longing. I wanted an Aston-Martin, I wanted a three-guinea
linen shirt, I wanted a girl with a Riviera suntan-these were my rights. I felt, a
signed and sealed legacy." (Murphy, 1992, pp. 13-14) To me, what makes Joe a
typical representative of new working-class lads is his strong sense or class
confidence that he has a right to the good things in life, a feeling that transcends envy.
He never tries to hide his hunger for a better life. When Charles Soames notices his
gaze at Susan and challenges him "Is that what you really want? A clerk's dream; a
girl with a Riviera tan and a Lagonda?" Joe directly responds: "That's what I'm going
to have." When he sees Mr Brown's huge "castle" mansion, he reasserts that "I'll
have one of those. I'm going to have the lot." When Charles Soames points out to him
the limit of his promotion in 20 years time, he once again insists "That's why I'm
going to have the lot."
Joe's desire for upward mobility or "escape" is strong and unambiguous. Of
working class origin, he has already improved to a white-collar job through his
intelligence and grammar school education and is ambitious to go further. The film
begins with a journey that defines Joe's working-class status from the start and his
eagerness to move up. Joe is leaving his grim industrial hometown to take his job in
Warnley. He sits in a railway carriage, smoking and reading a Nottingham local
newspaper with his shoe less feet high on the table. He is dressed in decent suit. Upon
arrival, he changes into a pair of new leather shoes, a symbolic gesture to show his
need for respect from others, and takes a taxi to the town hall. As he expects, he
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attracts the attention of every secretary in the outer office of the Treasury Department
and then meets privately with his boss, who teaches him on class difference. Coming
out of the boss's office, he sets his eye outside an office window on the wealthy Susan
Brown in luxurious dress and car in the street. His colleague, Charles Soames (Donald
Houston), follows his gaze and warns "That's not for you, lad," to which Joe retorts:
"That's what I'm going to have."
Joe understands that an easy way to move up quickly is through marriage with a
rich girl, who is a kind of quarry he is highly motivated to hunt for. He quickly sets
his target on Susan after he knows that Susan's father is a millionaire and owns most
of Warn ley. According to very practical criteria of grading women-- "partly money,
partly background and partly J. Lampton's instinct" -- Susan is grade one on every
account and is "so wholesome." So Joe joins the drama club so as to be close to Susan
and tells Susan directly that "J only joined the club because of you." He does not
"beat about the bush" in praising her beauty in great detail. As Charles Soames
observes clearly, Joe's feeling for Susan is "lust after her" for her family wealth. "I'm
going to marry to Susan" is priority of priority for Joe. Talking to his uncle and aunt
about Susan, he is not ashamed of stressing Susan's family wealth and status: "Her
father owns a factory. He's on the council, Warn ley council. .. He's rolling in money."
He takes uncle's warning of sticking to his own people as "old fashioned" class stuff
and believes that things have changed since the war. So he feels nothing wrong in
wanting both the girl and the money since he is "entitled to be in love with any girl."
So, he confidently claims that "If I want her, I'll have her." His final success in
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marrying Susan is sincerely congratulated upon by his colleagues, which shows wide
public approval for working-class entitlement for betterment.
However, Joe's rise from working-class origin to lower middle-class clerk and to
foreseeable eventual career success largely builds on an unloving marriage to a rich
man's daughter and the dumping of and the death of a woman who truly understands
him and whom he actually loves. The story implies vividly that working class can
only rise at high costs, in Joe's case, the cost being the sacrifice of personal happiness
as well as honesty and integrity; or in Stead's word, "the emasculation of personality"
(Stead, 1989, p. 189M), and in Shafer's words, spiritual death and the loss of his
"own values and independence" (Shafer, 2001, p. 6).
As a representative of the rising working class, Joe is aggressive and very
sensitive in defending his class dignity and pride. When he is rehearsing in the theatre
and pronounces the word "Brazier" wrongly, which is heartily laughed at by
everybody watching and commented by Alice as "Erotic vise among the working
class," he feels deeply hurt and loudly proclaims that "Let me tell you, I am working
class .... Working class and proud of it!" When Alice asks him if he can drive, he
retorts "My father didn't know engineering works or a mill. He never even owned his
own house. But that doesn't mean that I can't drive a car or pronounce brazier."
However, while he has full courage and confidence in claiming the eligibility of the
best things for him, his sense of pride is somewhat shaded with diffidence. Though
Joe refuses to admit, Alice sharply points out that "Your trouble is you don't believe
enough in yourself." And it is ironic that he only feels to be "the proudest man in the
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world" when he is with Alice, a penniless lover. So Alice honestly advises that
"You've got so much Joe ... Everything. You don't ever have to pretend. Just have to
be yourself." But Joe is extraordinarily brave and dignified in turning down Mr
Brown when the latter tries to buy him off with alluring terms for him to leave Susan
forever.

Room at the Top is also about sex and love and the story develops along two
lines, that with Susan and that with Alice. Joe's value concerning love and marriage is
perplexed yet practical, which worries his colleague Charles Soames, who timely
warns him, "you can't do it, you know you can't woo two women. Not in a town this
size." Joe is attracted by Susan's wealth and beauty and at the same time by Alice's
understanding and serenity. As the relationships develop, he is drawn closer and closer
to Alice. With Alice, he is relaxed and can be himself. Alice's love and sexual passion
makes him feel he is "the proudest man in the world." Alice's alertness and
understanding for his moods and feelings and subsequent consolation relieves his
stress and aggressiveness. Emotionally, he wants to stay with her and they even
discuss about Alice's divorce so as to be together. Yet the following external
circumstances press him to break off the relationship. Alice's husband refuses to
divorce her and threatens to rid Joe of his precious job and even sue him for
enticement. Susan is made pregnant by him and her father makes a generous offer he
cannot refuse. So out of selfish calculation, Alice is sacrificed for Joe's upward
mobility. Her resulting horrible death fills Joe with deep regret: "I've murdered her... I
killed her... Everybody knows I killed her. I wasn't planning but I killed her." Joe's
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relationship with Susan is much simpler. He is simply taking advantage of her to
realize his greedy ambition and to compensate for his frustrations in the hierarchical
society.
In Room at the Top, women are treated seriously with the only exception of Mrs
Brown, whose disgusting snobbishness invites our loath and contempt. Alice can be
herself in whatever situations. When scolded by Joe for being frivolous in having
been a nude model once, she does not abandon her independence in exchange for
Joe's favor, as she declares, "Now listen, I own my own body and I'm not ashamed of
it. And I'm not ashamed of anything I've ever done." Unlike Joe, she does not envy
the wealth of the Brown's as she tells Joe "Who cares?" She is honest and passionate
about love and sex. Joe praises her heartily that "You're such an honest person. Why
the hell do you have to be so honest? Darling I'm glad you're honest. I love you for
it." More significantly, Alice functions as "the moral force of the film" (Street, 1997,
p. 82) and a spiritual guide to Joe. In two scenes she teaches Joe philosophically to be
himself and to be proud of himself, one during their love-making outing (scene 1), the
other during their final break-up talk (scene 2), both of which are crucial for our
deeper understand of Joe's identity:
Scene I:
Alice: You're stronger now. More sure of yourself. I was so angry with you at first when
you wanted Susan. Seemed to want things for all the wrong reasons. And you didn't see
how you were damaging yourself as a person. You weren't proud to be you, just to be
yourself. But you're proud now, aren't you?
Joe: Oh, yes, now I am the proudest man in the world.
Alice: You've got so much Joe ... Everything. You don't ever have to pretend. Just have to
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be yourself.

Scene 2:
Alice: You've done very well for yourself Joe. Finally, you've got everything you wanted,
haven't you? There's something you have never understood, Joe. These people are the top.
They are the same as anybody else, but you had it inside of you, to be so much bigger
than any of them. You just had to be yourself, that was all. With me you were yourself,
only with me.

Joe: I never loved anyone else. But there just isn't any future for us together.

Susan is rich, but not snobbish. She is warm, lovely, yet a bit too simple, for she feels
Joe's absent-mindedness and strangeness but cannot see through the truth. Both Susan
and Alice seem to have been made use of by Joe; Susan is put into a loveless marriage
and Alice is punished to death. Such a fate reveals a misogynist tendency, although
the two women are treated with sympathy.
Room at the Top was widely acknowledged for its honest treatment of adult

sexuality. The immediate popular reaction was to its sexual content, which was seen
as "savagely frank and brutally truthful" (Lowenstein, 2000, p. 224X1) and for which
the film was advertised as "A Savage Story of Lust and Ambition" (Aldgate, 2005, p.
108). The sex scenes were shot with a frankness, sensuality as well as sincerity never
tried before. The British Board of Film Censors (BBFC) offered the film an "X"
certificate for its "good adult entertainment" (Aldgate, 2005, p. 106) which was
"made with sincerity" (Aldgate, 2005, p. Ill). BBFC Secretary John Trevelyan
viewed the film as "a milestone in the history of British films" as well as "the history
of British film censorship" (as cited in Aldgate, 2005, p. 105). Critic Frank Jackson
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commented in 1959, "At long last a British film which is truly adult. Room at the Top
has an 'X' certificate and deserves it - not for any cheap sensationalism but because it
is an unblushingly frank portrayal of intimate human relationships" (as cited in
Aldgate, 2005, p. 111).

Room at the Top ends with the news of Alice's horrible death and Joe's wedding
with Susan. Joe is congratulated on achieving his ambitions. His tears of deep regret
and self-accusation on his wedding day is mistaken by his wife Susan for tears of
happiness and sentimental personality.
Stylistically, Room at the Top is more conventionally made than later New
Wave films. Its casting is more orthodox, except that it uses a glamorous French
actress, Simone Signoret, to play the sexually experienced Alice. Murphy argues that,
by making Alice a foreigner, the filmmakers "put her outside the English class system
and change her into a symbol of honesty and true love" (1992, p. 14).
In conclusion, Room at the Top inaugurated the New Wave. Its significance lies
in "taking its hero's self-interested aspirations seriously" and in "its emotional and
sexual candour" (McFarlane, 1986, p. 137). Though it is honesty about sex which
attracted more media and censorship attention, it is honesty about class aspirations
which is more thought-provoking. As John Braine, author ofthe original novel, put it:
"The new dimension of the film was in presenting a boy from the working classes not
as a downtrodden victim, but as he really was. It wasn't important that Joe Lampton
was honest about sex, what was important was that Joe was honest about the whole
business of class. Most ambitious working-class boys want to get the hell out of the
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working class. That was a simple truth that had never been stated before." (as cited in
Richards, 1992, p. 221)

Peter Hutchings views the film as "an old-fashioned morality story in which the
desire for material possessions leads inevitably to unhappiness" (2009, p. 305). I take
the film as meaning much more than that. Joe's upward mobility serves as a facilitator
for people to think about the identity of the rising working class and the nature of the
old British class system. Joe's seeming success is in reality a tragedy which expressed
the resentment of the first generation of working-class children who benefited from
the 1944 Education Act but were still trapped in a society far from the classless,
populist utopia the consensus politics had promised. Though Joe's acceptance and
merge into a higher class breaks the class rigidity, indicating some social progress, his
success can only be a tragic one and can hardly be reproduced or popularized to the
vast working class still stifled by socioeconomic restrictions and class barriers.

Saturday Night and Sunday Morning (Karel Reisz, 1960)
Saturday Night and Sunday Morning is a 1960 production directed by Karel
Reisz adapted from the novel of the same name by Alan Sillitoe. It portrays the life of
Arthur Seaton (Albert Finney), an affluent, talented, and rebellious young factory
worker in Nottingham, who spares no effort in seeking pleasure from life until finally
trapped into conformity and marriage on a new housing estate.
Arthur is depicted as "an archetypal angry young man" (Lay, 2002, p. 71)
rebelling instinctively against the society. He hates the tedium and restrictions of his
work and domestic life. At work, he stands all day in a noisy workshop, matching his
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activities to an unrelenting machine tool's movements and reciting his credo, "What
I'm out for is a good time. All the rest is propaganda." After work, he drinks and
brawls hard and has an affair with Brenda (Rachel Roberts), the wife of his older
work-mate, Jack. He also has a young and beautiful girlfriend, Doreen (Shirley Anne
Field), who works in a hairnet factory. When Brenda gets pregnant and Jack discovers
the affair, Jack's brother and brother's friend, two angry soldiers, give Arthur a
vicious beating. After recovering, Arthur returns to work, and the film ends with
Arthur and Doreen discussing marriage and the future new house, suggesting Arthur
being trapped into marriage and a life of consumerism on a new housing estate.
By discovering Arthur, a new folk hero, British cinema made its most powerful
statement about the working class. The Daily Worker's Nina Hibbin complimented on
the film: "Most of us know someone like Arthur;" "it is the best, most accurate and
profoundest film that has yet been made in England-here at last" about working
class lads and it "is a film which, not only in the contemporary fashion, is about the
working class, but also of and for the working class" (as cited in Stead, 1989, pp.
193-194). The film's strengths were those of social realism, with vivid realist
depiction of Arthur as a typical factory worker of the period. Isabel Quigly also spoke
highly of the film as "the first British feature film in which today's working-class
world has appeared ... people today with today's attitudes and outlook and today's
money" (as cited in Laing, 1968, p. 123). Arthur Seaton, with his masculine energy,
confidence and sexual arrogance, signified the emergence in British post-war
affluence of a new breed of British working men, who earned high wages but
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distained for being told what to do, who enjoyed hedonistic freedom and were
irresponsible as long as they could get away with it, yet who were still pressed to
confirm. The title Saturday Night refers to the hedonistic enjoyment of Arthur
(drinking, fighting, womanizing) and Sunday Morning refers to his settling down
through acceptance of marriage and conformity to conventions. The film portrayed a
working-class rebel with sympathy.
A close text analysis distinguishes Arthur's character in the following aspects.
First of all, Arthur is an efficient, yet alienated worker. He works as a
lathe-operator and is conscious and proud of his efficiency and good piece-work wage
(instructed by his foreman not to leak how much he's earning to others). He is first
located in and identified in relation to his work place. The film opens with an
authentic presentation of a busy and noisy industrial community of the Raleigh
bicycle factory and with Arthur toiling at his lathe expressing in voice-over details of
his job, its piece-work payment system, as well as his attitude toward his work and his
workmates. He is fed up with the job in which men are treated like a part of the
machine: "Nine hundred and fifty four, nine hundred and fifty bloody five. Another
few more and that's the lot for a Friday." Yet he flaunts his pride in his own ability to
be an efficient worker and a high earner: "I could get through it in half the time if 1
worked like a bull, but they'd only slash my wages so they can get stuffed!" When
Doreen notices his generous spending on clothes, he explains "I get good wages." He
sees no hope for factory work as it is boring hard labor and causing physical pain (bad
back): "work next week. I'll be hard at it, sweating me guts out at that lathe. It's a
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hard life if you don't weaken." "Work next week" or "work tomorrow" is murmured
several times with knitted brows and in bewilderment. So Arthur does not look
forward to his work, and he is not going to work hard: "I'll have a fag in a bit, no use
working every minute God sends." He does not want to get on. He views Jack with
sheer contempt for his wish to get on and for his obedience to the foreman Mr Robboe.
He also despises the workmates of the older generation, who "got ground down before
the war and never got over it." As the film title suggests, the film is more about leisure
than work. Clarke et a\. see leisure as a significant life-area for the class, as Marx
observed, " ... The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his
work feels outside himself. .. His labor is therefore not voluntary but coerced; it is
forced labor. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely the means to
satisfy needs external to it." (as cited in Clarke et a\., 1976, p. 50) So the workplace is
only briefly shown for four times and merely acts as the source of income to pay for
Arthur's relatively affluent, hedonistic lifestyle, helping to keep male dignity.
Secondly, Arthur is a "playboy." He is tied to a factory lathe throughout the
week, but tries hard to make up for it at the weekends. On Saturday night, he selects
his flash suit, carefully does his hair style, and goes out for an evening in the pub,
which is a popular working class culture. He enjoys boozing match and once has more
than eight pints, obviously "having a good time" as commented by an old lady
watching, after which he falls downstairs smiling. He enjoys betting, which for
Doreen, is a waste of money. He does not want to be bound by marriage. For Arthur,
people "must've been drunk to get married" and it "costs too much" to get married.
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As unmarried girls would expect engagement and marriage with kisses and sex, he
plays with Brenda, a married woman. Nothing seems to worry him: "I never worry,
you know that," as he told Aunt Ada. When having sex with Brenda, he never takes
care, just doesn't bother about the result, which results in Brenda's craziness about
pregnancy by him and they have to consult Aunt Ada for abortion. For Aunt Ada,
"That's a daft thing to do" and Arthur is a "brainless loon" and "ought to have more
bloody sense." Even then he is worried for only a short period. Arthur's attitude
toward Brenda suggests that he somewhat sees woman as objects, to be possessed,
enjoyed and then cast aside for a better choice. He is a "fast worker" in his relation
with Doreen, inviting her to a date in the cinema after knowing her for just a few
minutes. He seeks to enjoy life every minute and doesn't want to settle down: "You
see people settle down and before they know where they are they've kicked the
bucket." Both Brenda and his cousin Bert feel that Arthur needs to "better come down
to earth" or "keep [his] feet on the ground." But Arthur's hedonism is finally
constrained. He is punished with Brenda's pregnancy and the beating by the soldiers
and contained by the marriage to Doreen.
Thirdly, Arthur is rebellious. His philosophy is best summed up in the phrase
"Don't let the bastards grind you down!" and he warns "I'd like to see anybody grind
me down." He exercises rebellious individualism in rejecting tight social moral codes
in his macho search for pleasure. As he explores his inner heart, "I'm not barmy, I'm
a fighting pit prop that wants a pint of beer, that's me. But if any knowing bastard
says that's me I'll tell them I'm a dynamite dealer waiting to blow the factory to
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Kingdom Come. I'm me and nobody else. Whatever people say I am, that's what I'm
not because they don't know a bloody thing about me! God knows what T am." This
rugged individualism leads Arthur to have contempt for his newly-found affluence,
which is mostly spent on alcohol, women, and fishing.
On the whole he rebels blindly against social restrictions and conventions
instead of having any clear political aims. He fights to seek freedom from or
independence of society, employer, and marriage. For him, laws are things "to be
broken by blokes like us." So we see Arthur in the film fighting in all directions. He
voted for Communist Party in the last election using father's ballot ticket as he was
not old enough. He is against the tedium and conventions of life and work, for which
he keeps alienated from his working-class neighborhood community, and is different
from his fellow workers, whom he thinks have "got ground down." He hates the
foreman in the factory, and plays an annoying trick on a female worker by placing a
mouse on the work desk and enjoys the subsequent screaming, for which he is called
"a bit of a Red" by the foreman for his trouble-making tendency. To revenge on the
"nosy parker" Mrs Bull for spreading news about his affair with married woman and
for her lack of sympathy for the unfortunate, he shoots her from his home window
with an air gun, hitting her backside. He is stubborn even after being seriously beaten
by the soldiers: "They'd busted me ... Still, I'd had my bit of fun. It ain't the first time
I've been in a losing fight. It won't be the last, either. . .I' d have flattened them if it
had been one at a time." When his relationship with Doreen is found out by Brenda,
who accuses him of not knowing "the difference between right and wrong" and will
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never know, he retorts that "Maybe I won't, but I don't want anybody to teach me,
either." And when scolded by Jack for causing too much trouble between him and his
wife, he reaffirms that "You don't have to tell me what's right and what's not." To
sum up, Arthur is an energetic fighter, taking great pride in still having got some fight
left in him, not like most people. When Bert challenges him "where does all this
fighting get you?" he simply retorts, "ever seen what not fighting's got you?" In
Jack's view, Arthur is "too much of a troublemaker" and "should take things as they
come and enjoy life." His aggressive attitude alienates him from people around him.
In the film, we see different sectors of the working class in confrontation
largely due to different attitudes toward affluence and consumerism.
Arthur in the film is set as alienated from the rest of the working class. Firstly,
the parents' generation has been beaten down into total acceptance of consumerism.
When Bert asks him: "What do you have got to be so angry?" Arthur then talks about
his own parents. They have got TV, but are "both dead from the neck up" and unable
to think. Society pushes them like "a lot of sheep." He scorns his parents' gratitude for
a few, small material advances and believes that he's got "a lot more life" in him than
his mum and dad, the older generation who got "ground down" before the war and
never recovered. Arthur's contempt and anger for his father's indulgence in TV
program is clearly shown in an early scene of the film in which Arthur comes home
and find his father in front of the TV set, not wishing to participate in a conversation
with him. The father even fails to respond to Arthur's bitter joke about a man who lost
the eye sight of one eye through "watching telly day after day." The scene has a series
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of close-up shots revealing Arthur's scornful eye sight when he tells the joke. Under
such situation, Arthur stops only long enough to have his tea and change his clothes.
Secondly, the elder workmate, Jack, is ground down and "wants to get on." Arthur
warns that the firm's tea might lead to stomach trouble, but Jack wouldn't mind
drinking it, as "if it's good enough for the others it's good enough for me." Jack
chooses to work on nights in order to earn more to afford a television, while Arthur
feels night shift is "a dog's life." Although Arthur finally admits that Jack is "not a
bad bloke really," he is still "a bit of a dope," who is steady but dull, unable to satisfy
his wife sexually and emotionally. For Arthur, Jack will "squeal like a stuck pig" until
he "get[s] bashed in the face." Thirdly, women as represented by Doreen and her
mother are materialistic and snobbish. Arthur and Bert are coldly greeted in Doreen's
house, which is a new one on the edge of the city, by Doreen's more better-off mother,
who thinks of Arthur as too rough for her daughter. In frustration and anger, Arthur
invites Doreen to visit his family: "You can always drop into our house, you'll be
welcome there" as happens subsequently. At the end of the film, this contrast is
reemphasized by Doreen's aspiration to save money and buy a new house "with a
bathroom and everything" while Arthur wouldn't mind living in old houses.
Compared with the above attitudes, Arthur's casual attitude toward spending money
can be seen as sort of non-materialistic. Arthur's contempt for his workmates and his
father is all clearly shown in close-up of facial expressions at the beginning of the
film in the workshop scene and later the home scene.
About working-class consciousness, unlike Look Back in Anger, class
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difference and class hatred is not the main theme of this film. Arthur embraces no
political beliefs or ideology and is shown simply as alienated from people around him.
The class anger is blindly targeted toward society as a whole and toward other
members of the working class. Only at one place does Arthur deliver his political
protest vaguely: "They rob you right, left and center. After they've skinned you dry,
you get called up to the army and get shot to death." In contrast, Bert can take this
peacefully as "That's how things are" and one can only hope that some day something
good will tum up. Lay holds that in terms of class consciousness, the film offers
"neither solutions nor enlightenment" as its focus on a rugged individual Angry
Young Man figure, Arthur, "excludes the possibilities of unified class action" (Lay,
2002, p. 73). Andrew Higson notes that Arthur's anger works to obscure class
tensions, displacing them onto generational differences (Lay, 2002, p. 73). Much of
Arthur's attack and disrespect is directed towards his parents' generation and older
co-workers. Though lacking distinct expressions of class consciousness, the film
displays convincingly that there is little real possibility of escape for the working class.
Being born into the working class is "a life sentence," even if the sentence is served
out "in fine suits and at pubs and discos" (Marwick, 1990, p. 299).
Upward mobility is beyond expectation and working-class boys can only marry
working-class girls. For a bright and good-looking lad as Arthur, he sees no
meaningful future. So throughout, Arthur is an angry man, angry with society, work,
neighbor, parents, mates, and even himself. On the whole, he doesn't find it easy to
live with himself. Elements of working-class community solidarity and friendship are

159

also revealed in certain scenes, e.g. Arthur's father helps the son to cheat the police,
and Arthur and Bert (the coal miner, a safe person) often kill time together, going
fishing, drinking in pubs and walking through the city at night. The film doesn't
glamorize working class. When Aunt Ada talks about the difficulty in bringing up
children before the war when "it was rotten days," Arthur is confident that "It won't
happen again."
The ending of the film is very thought-provoking and has attracted a good deal
of critical comment. In spite of his voice-over's insistence that he won't be ground
down by the bosses or women, Arthur seems trapped to give in to the system. His
affair with Brenda is messily concluded and his working class marriage with Doreen
is quickly settled. The final scene sets on a hillside behind a new housing estate on the
outskirts of Nottingham. Arthur stands on the hill with Doreen looking down towards
the new houses being built. In frustration, he throws a stone at the building site, while
Doreen mildly chi Ides him "You shouldn't throw things like that," and reminds him
that one of them might well be their future home. Arthur responds "It won't be the
last one I throw." This final act of Arthur indicates "an unresolved ending" which has
been variously interpreted as "deliberate ambiguity, unintended confusion and the
product of a conflict of view between author and director" (Laing, 1968, p. 120). Lay
summarizes that this can be read in a number of ways: "as a sign of Arthur's
continuing struggle against settling down and mediocrity (Sillitoe's preferred
interpretation), as a sign of his frustration at the futility of his struggle against work
and domesticity (Reisz's view), or as the act of a boy resisting manhood who needs to
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be told off for throwing stones by his mother/fiancee" (Murphy's view) (Lay, 2002, p.
71). For McFarlane, the remark "epitomizes the note of real resilience Karel Reisz has
found in Arthur's proletarian assertiveness" (1986, p. 138). Has Arthur been tamed?
Lay is sure that he has for that's the way of life. Conformity is certain, but it may not
be "passive acceptance of his fate" (Lay, 2002, p. 73). It is true that near the end of the
story, Arthur is already a bit tired of fighting as he tells Doreen after being beaten by
the soldiers: "You're a nice girl Dorren, I like you a lot. I reckon you oughta stay with
me for good so's that I don't get knocked down by any more horses. Trouble with me
is I'm always bumping into things, it's not much of a paying game." For me, the
hurling of a defiant stone epitomizes his frustration and puzzlement of his temporary
lost battle in keeping his difference. Yet although he is pressed by the system to accept
certain things which he has derided, Arthur's rebellious spirit will continue to function
and he will continue his independent lifestyle as that is his nature.
To sum up, Saturday Night and Sunday Morning provided uninhibited display
of masculine energy and sexuality. Arthur Seaton is individualistic, anti-authoritarian,
hedonistic, sexually active and misogynistic. He is aggressive, crudely courageous
and heroic in the face of a suppressive system, remaining defiant of social restrictions.
He represents the group of working class emphatically refuting the assumption that
affluence had led to social conformity and embourgeoisement. The social significance
of such a hero is that he is widely acknowledged as a typical representative of the
ordinary hardworking young workers of the time, confident, dignified, and full of
bravado. As Stead comments, "We accept him as a genuine worker" and "can
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appreciate fully why he was so much better than the rest of his mates and why
inevitably he must move away from them" (1989, p. 194).

Working-class Identity in New Wave Films: Theme Analysis
With full employment, general affluence and embourgeoisement of the 1950s
and 1960s, hardship, misery, poverty were no longer dominant themes of working
class films, though still existing. Upward mobility, masculine pride and sexuality, and
youthful rebellion came in their place. The New Wave films centered almost
exclusively on the pride and discontents of the young urban working-class male in the
Northern industrial towns of England, tackling the lifestyle and aspirations in a fresh
un patronizing way. The protagonists seek freedom and rebel against restriction and
repression imposed by the combination of the class system, traditional Victorian
morality and social convention.

Affluence, upward mobility and working-class dignity.
In New Wave films, the protagonists are generally benefiting from the affluence
of the time. They all have a job or can easily have one but choose not to take. Arthur
Seaton in Saturday Night and Sunday Morning earns a decent income, buys loads of
decent suits and spends much on drinks. Colin Smith in The Loneliness of the Long

Distance Runner refuses the job offered to him by his father's firm so as not to be
exploited by capitalists. The coalminer Frank in This Sporting Life wins simultaneous
temporary prosperity once signed with a professional rugby team. The exaggeratedly
fast speed and the dazzling white color of the new large car he buys mark it as a
deliberate statement of personal success.
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Upward social mobility is explicitly shown and for good reasons. Both Joe in

Room at the Top and Vic Brown (Alan Bates) in This Kind of Loving have climbed out
of rough working class background and now hold decent white collar jobs. Frank in

This Sporting Life has won fame and money through his athletic talent and
aggressiveness. Because working class formed the majority of the cinema-goers,
filmmakers tried to appeal them with daydream and wish fulfillment which are more
easily satisfied by "identification upwards." As Paul Swann observes, "Films were
regarded, in the words of Leavis and Thompson, as 'substitute living,' a seductive
form of shallow but unsatisfying escape which they felt had come to dominate
industrial culture ... " (as cited in Gillett, 2003, p. 188). However, this wish fulfillment
is weakened by the fact that though Joe's change for a better job as a clerk contributes
to his climbing up the social ladder, a central facilitator for his mobility is the
seduction of and marriage to Susan from a higher social class. In films where the hero
remains within his class (e.g. Saturday Night and Sunday Morning, A Kind of Loving),
we see a difference between the "rough" and "respectable" working class with the
man marrying the woman who represents "a social refinement or 'classiness' desired
by the male hero" (Hill, 1983, p. 305). It is also a common feature for New Wave
films to make the desire for escape to prove "impossible" (e.g. Colin), or to be
demanded at "too high a cost" (e.g. Joe passively marries Susan and Frank loses his
lover, who dies). As a result, the protagonists have to "accommodate themselves to
compromise and an eschewal of fantasy" (Hill, 1999, p. 179) despite his yearnings to
transcend the confinement of their class position. Besides, escape as collective class
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action is impossible, only as individual is feasible. While escape from class is hardly
an option, temporary outing to a nearby rural or coastal resort briefly as an escape
away from the urban drudgery and restraints to relax and enjoy sex is a routine
happening (for detail, see Higson, 1984, pp. 12-16).
Representing the rising postwar new working class, the New Wave protagonists
are confident about the social change for betterment and proud or dignified about their
class background despite the frustrations they experience. Joe in Room at the Top
claims "1 am working class ... and proud of it!" Jimmy Porter in Look Back in Anger is
a university graduate but chooses to run a market stall to show solidarity with the
working class.
Youthful energy, sexuality and masculine pride.
The New Wave films are overwhelmingly preoccupied with working class
males, obviously providing an "uninhibited display of masculine energy" (Stead, 1989,
p. 190) and sexuality, represented perhaps most prominently in Arthur Seaton's
forceful, muscular physique in Saturday Night and Sunday Morning. Arthur is strong,
confident, arrogant and rebellious. Joe is actively manipulating his life rather than
living passively. Colin is talented in running, stubborn and rebellious. Frank is
extraordinarily aggressive in order to distinguish himself in a violent sport and spend
much money to impress others. They can earn good money, have good time once
work ends, engage in irresponsible sex, or cheat system in some respects. Nothing
seems to worry them much.
The New Wave film

IS

noted for its honest treatment of adult sexuality or
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"sexual frankness" (Richards, 1992, p. 226) with the willingness to acknowledge and
depict sexuality in a brave way never tried before, for which Hill named his book Sex,

Class and Realism. Lovell sees New Wave realism as defined in terms of "its
working-class subject, and a more open treatment of sexuality, as well as its aesthetic
form" (1990, p. 367). Room at the Top and Saturday Night and Sunday Morning all
tell people that sex can be enjoyed for its own sake. Important here, Hill draws our
attention that the image of active sexuality which provided "a resistance to refinement
and repression" is primarily a masculine sexuality, suggesting "the triumph of male
'virility'" and "the reaffirmation of sexual hierarchy" (1986, p. 163). In a sense, the
lower social status of working-class or "rough" working-class heroes is compensated
by their strength of masculine sexuality for enjoying a "good time." Female sexuality
is treated as more complicated-bold, passive and conservative. Some heroines
answer the sexual desire of the heroes with "an equal and equally raunchy desire"
(Lovell, 1990, p. 370) and enjoyment of their own (e.g. Brenda and Alice). Audrey in

The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner responds shyly. More others draw the
hero into marriage and conformity after sexual relationship and especially pregnancy
(e.g. Doreen and Ingrid), thus repressing the more radical emancipatory sexual
impulses of the hero. However, despite their reputation at the time for sexual content,
the films' handling of sexuality is only relatively progressive, termed by Hill as a
"pseudo-liberation"-"ostensibly liberating but actually repressive" as the films tend
to favor conservative resolutions which reproduce an ideology of marital and
procreative sexuality (1983, pp. 309-310). Extra-marital sex very probably leads to
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pregnancy and pregnancy always leads to marriage and conformity as in Room at the

Top and A Kind of Loving.
Youthful anger and rebelliousness.

The New Wave films reveal the protagonists' "frustrated or compromised
search for freedom from interfering authorities ... , for material success, for a better
life" (Leese, 2006. p. 98). A principal mood was one of discontent and anger. Most
protagonists are Angry Young Men and rebellious. Their anger is political as well as
cultural.
Politically, the anger is directed towards authority or establishments, generated
by a sense of loss of politics and continuing social injustice. In Look Back in Anger,
Jimmy Porter complains about the absence of "good, brave cause," as "when we shop
around for an outlet, we find there is nothing on stock, no Spain, no Fascism, no mass
unemployment." Being leftist in politics and strongly tied to his working class
background, he greatly resents the ruling class for the unfairness and poverty they
produce, and resents the society for not having changed enough for the better as
promised. He is more representative of the scholarship boys who were disappointed
with the society in which deep-rooted class barrier prevented the true meritocracy
from becoming fully actualized. And he is frustrated about finding the right way to
fight. All he can do is just to stay with his class and refuse to seek acceptance by the
middle class though university-educated.
In Saturday Night and Sunday Morning, the film opens with Arthur toiling at
his lathe in a busy, noisy factory expressing in voice-over his rebellious attitude to

166

work and the world at large: "No use working every minute God sends, that's my
motto. Don't let the bastards grind you down. That's one thing I've learned .. .I'd like
to see anybody try to grind me down. That'd be the day. What Twant is a good time.
All the rest is propaganda." He revolts individually against all authorities through
breaking the rules of election, despising his work mates who defer to the management
and is sensitive to capitalist exploitation. Yet there is little for him to do to change the
reality.
Colin in The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner exerts more profound
anger and rebels more intensely against the system. Identifying with his father who is
an active strike leader, he is conscious of working-class suffering and capitalist
exploitation which is seen as the cause of his father's early death after years of toil in
a local factory, as he says: "I'm beginning to see that it should be altered." Hence, his
attitude toward job is that there would be no point in getting a job simply to increase
the bosses' profits. He tells his girl friend, "It's not that I don't like work, it's that I
don't like the idea of slaving my good self so the bosses can get all the profit. It seems
all wrong to me. Myoid man used to say that the workers should get the
profits .... Thing is, I don't know where to start, though." So Colin rebels by declining
the job opportunity offered to him by his father's factory after the father's death. The
politician's TV speech about people now "all enjoying greater luxury than ever
before" is met with derisive snorts and sarcasm from Colin and his mate as it is a
manifestation of everything their lives are not. Finally, when the borstal authority
places high hope on Colin for winning a five-mile long distance race for the borstal
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against a local public school, Colin tricks the governor into believing that he is willing
to comply, but in the end rebels by deliberately losing a certain victory in the race to
show his contempt for the authority, even though he knows he is giving up an
opportunity to improve his circumstances.
However, the revolt of New Wave protagonists is somewhat blind and aimless.
Colin Smith wants to line up the Establishment and shoot them; Arthur Seaton
denounces capitalists, foreman and the system. But what the New Wave heroes want
in its place is really vague, as Jimmy Porter says "Everything ... nothing."
Anger and revolt stimulated from cultural aspects is more emphasized in New
Wave films, involving the concern over working-class corruption by the new mass
culture of consumption and materialism and the resulting spiritual "dry-out," which I
have analyzed in great detail in the previous 2 case studies. In The Loneliness of the

Long Distance Runner, like Arthur, Colin is hostile to consumerism as well. He
watches with disdain as his mother spends the five hundred pounds of insurance
money (the company compensation money for the father's death) on clothes, a
television set and new furniture.

The anxiety about the decline of traditional working class.
Richards holds that respect for the traditional pattern and texture of
working-class life as it was lived - "the seaside holiday, the pub, the football match,
the dance, the family party" is the positive side as well as integral part of the New
Wave films (Richards, 1992, p. 226) and part of the Hoggartian nostalgia for a warm
old working-class culture of communality. But it was a world that was vanishing even
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as it was being filmed. With television, private cars, and enthusiasm for all kinds of
leisure activities, society was becoming steadily more privatized, eclipsing and
fragmenting the working class communal traditions.
The post-war explosion of material and cultural goods, while representing
social progress (affluence), led to the erosion of traditional values and therefore
aroused concern about the decline or demise of the traditional working class
associated with work, community and an attachment to place and anxiety about the
growing "corruption" of the working class by consumerism, mass culture and
suburbanization. While the political right were concerned with the perceived social
and sexual amorality of the working class (especially youth), the political left were
more worried about what they perceived to be a threat to traditional working class
culture.
In New Wave films, traditional working class morality, community and
masculinity are all threatened by the mass consumption culture, only to be respected
in a sense of nostalgia. For example, the older workers in Saturday Night and Sunday

Morning recall the "good old days;" Colin's father, a socialist union fighter, is facing
death in The Loneliness o/the Long Distance Runner. In Look Back in Anger, Jimmy
Porter denounces the Americanization of culture and celebrates the dying indigenous
art of the music hall. In A Kind

0/ Loving, the traditional working-class culture of the

brass band is contrasted with and seen lost to the new, superficial mass culture
represented by television. Vic's wish to attend the brass band concert (at which his
father is playing) is rejected by his wife Ingrid and her mother for being "a bit
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old-fashioned." Hill sees the sequence of shots from the concert to the three of them
all at home watching TV quiz as crucial in the film's construction of gender positions,
with older working-class world (the brass band) male dominated and the new world of
affluence (TV) associated with women (1983, p. 308). John Kirk described the whole
concern as the New Wave films' "affiuence-as-culture-deficit paradigm" (2003, p. 69).
Only in Room at the Top, the traditional working class is not seen to be eclipsed by
consumerism. It is Joe's uncle and aunt who challenge his desire for "brass" as the
aunt states: "I asked you about the girl and all you tell me is about her father and his
brass. Joe you wouldn't sell yourself for a handful of silver."
In all these films, as I have explored in great detail in the three case studies, the
male protagonists are all against consumption; consumerism is always associated with
women, who are perceived as threats to masculinity in pressing their conformity. The
films reveal a degree of sympathy towards the virile, working-class male who seeks to
resist the pressures towards mass consumerism and social conformity.
The demise of traditional working class is also displayed through "the absence
or weakness of fathers" (Hill, 1983, p. 305) or a "decline in the status of the father"
(Hill, 1986, p. 162). The New Wave films is marked by a lack of masculine head of
household pointed out by John Hill. For example, Joe Lampton's parents are dead in

Room at the Top; Colin Smith sees his father dying in The Loneliness of the Long
Distance Runner; Doreen in Saturday Night and Sunday Morning and Ingrid in A
Kind of Loving have no father. Arthur's father, the representative of the traditional
working class male, has been "lulled into a television-induced coma" (Lay, 2002, p.
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72). He is not seen at work, but only at home, sitting in front of the TV set.
The de-politicization of the working class and the shift from the public to
the personal.

The traditional working class as an occupational community separated
themselves by production activity through which they grew their "proletarian
consciousness" and established their cultural identity. This is obvious in films of the
1930s and 1940s. But the New Wave films shifted the emphasis from work and
production to leisure and consumption in order to better define the new affluent
working class. The individualism of the New Wave films was also in sharp contrast
with the communality of the Documentary and war films. As Hill comments, in the
face of affluence and mass culture, the focus on cultural aspects tended to preclude
work and the "focus on the discontented male hero involved a downplaying of
collective conditions and actions" (2000b, p. 251).
This tendency demonstrated the depoliticization of the working class, with
work, industrial conflicts and collective action all missing in the representation. New
Wave films seldom showed their characters at work, although it is work and the
workplace which define the working class as a class. Instead, the focus was on the
characters' personal lives, enjoyed during leisure. Saturday Night and Sunday

Morning prioritizes Arthur's consumption on fancy suits, drinking and womanizing
rather than production, with only 4 short workshop scenes of Arthur working at the
lathe in factory. Work is almost invisible in Room at the Top. Capitalist exploitation is
only slightly touched upon in Saturday Night and Sunday Morning through Arthur's
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determination not to work "every minutes God sends" as the capitalists would "only
slash my wages so they can get stuffed!" and in The Loneliness a/the Long Distance

Runner through Colin's attitude toward work--"I don't like the idea of slaving me
good self so the bosses can get all the profit." The prospect of workers' strike looks
dim as Colin's father, a hard-line trade unionist and strike-leader, is dead, and Arthur
simply does not favor such a solution so as we know from his talk in the traditional
working man's club. I'm All Right Jack, a right-wing film not taken as core New
Wave representative, even makes vicious political satire on a card-playing
"pig-headed, work-shy working class" (Marwick, 1990, p. 294) regularly taken out on
strike by their union, and mocks the communist trade union shop steward Kite.
Working-class collective fighting spirit is made fun of when Colin shouts "Share and
share alike" and "All for one and one for all, united we stand, divided we fall" to ask
Mike to divide the money they steal from a gambling machine.
The revolts of protagonists are on the whole blind in essence with no clear
political or social ideology. The conflicts represented in Saturday Night and Sunday

Morning are not between the trade union and the factory owners (the "haves" and the
"have nots") but between old and new generations of working class. And the film
does not provide sufficient account of why the elder generation, who have been
"ground down," "have been so reduced (e.g. predatory capitalism, alienating labor)"
(Hill, 1986, p. 139). In this way, class inequalities and industrial conflicts were placed
down. Class was presented as "primarily an individual, rather than collective,
experience, a moral, rather than socially and economically structured, condition" (Hill,
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1986, p. 57).
The working class was figured in terms of the politics of the personal. Higson
notes that the documentary's "distanced public gaze at 'universalized' social process
and people" was soon replaced by "the individuated private looks of the fictional
protagonists" of the New Wave (1986, p. 83). The narratives were organized around
the exploration of the individual desires and fate of a single central protagonist, and
no longer required a mUltiplicity of plot lines.
By centering on male individual protagonist's own experience and struggles,
"[s]ocial issues are reduced to the micro level of character, rather than explored at the
macro level of the social" (Lay, 2002, p. 65). Thus, in The Loneliness of the Long

Distance Runner, it is the unfavorable environment in which Colin lives (e.g. the
absent father, disinterested mother) and Colin's own stubborn character that are
explored to explain his downfall, not social stratification and its subsequent social
inequalities (Lay, 2002, p. 65). This tendency encourages the spectator to see people
as individual beings rather than as members of distinct class. As Alan Sillitoe, who
wrote the screenplay Saturday Night and Sunday Morning based on his own novel,
suggested: "Those who see Arthur Seaton as a symbol of the working man and not an
individual are mistaken. I wrote about him as a person, and not as a typical man who
works a lathe. I try to see every person as an individual and not as a class symbol,
which is the only condition in which I can write as a worker" (Daily Worker, 28 Jan.,
1961). Such an approach promotes only individual consciousness and solutions at a
film's end, with the central character either escaping out of society or adapting and
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adjusting to its demands, rather than collective consciousness and actions leading to
social and political change. As John Hill points out, this emphasis of individual
fulfillment rather than social change tends to make the films more conservative than
radical (1986, p. 174).
Marginalization of women and misogynist tendency.

Women in New Wave films are put in subordinate and marginal position. With
A Taste ofHoney (Tony Richardson, 1961) being the only exceptional female-centered
film, the protagonists are always young men. But narratives largely develop in terms
of their relations with the other sex.
Hill holds that New Wave films produce a representation of women and female
sexuality which "works against and ultimately undercuts their claims to be
'progressive'" (1983, p. 304). He condemns the New Wave for its misogynist attitude
towards women: "misogyny is not only 'simmering under the surface', but is
embedded in the very structures of the films themselves" (1983, 304). He criticizes
the British New Wave for being too often "content to abandon their female characters
to the confinement of familiar domestic and marital roles and even inflict a
'punishment' on those to stray beyond" (1986, p. 174). He even goes a bit to extreme
in claiming that the real subject of Look Back in Anger "was neither social injustice
nor hypocrisy but the debasement and degradation of women" (1986, p. 25). While
acknowledging Hill's certain stance, Murphy argues that this last statement of Hill is
too "bold" a judgment, which "ignores the historical context" (1992, p. 29), and in
general, what Hill misses, is the fact that the women portrayed in New Wave films
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have "a seriousness, an emotional weight, altogether lacking in the pathetically trivial
roles women had to play in most 1950s British films" (1992, p. 33).
On the whole, women's screen image has been pretty negative. The status and
progress of working-class male protagonists in narrative is dependent upon using
and/or abusing women. Women often function as elusive objects of male sexual desire
(e.g. Brenda, Alice, Ingrid), targets for the vitriolic attacks (e.g. Alison), or a threat to
authentic working-class masculinity-"through their obsession with marriage,
motherhood and 'settling down '-or else as agents of consumption" (Lay, 2002, p. 16)
(e.g. Susan, Doreen, Ingrid). So we assume Joe Lampton will "forfei[t] his potential
for manhood" and "knuckle under" after marrying the magnate's daughter (McFarlane,
1986, p. 138). Consumerism is mostly associated with women, who are partially to
blame for the demise of traditional working class culture. Colin's mother is depicted
as a senseless consumerist and immoral woman of perpetual infidelity. Narratives are
centered on the "devaluation and punishment" of women (Hill, 1983, p. 305). Female
independence is curtailed by pregnancy. The adulterous Alice and Brenda are rejected,
while the heroes enter into marriage. Brenda becomes pregnant by Arthur, suffers the
anxiety, has an unsuccessful back-street abortion (required by the film censor) and is
"punished" by having to return to a loveless marriage. So, women in the New Wave
films suffer long-lastingly.
In addition, as Terry Lovell notes, there are clear gender divisions in the way
place, space and setting are used in the films (1990, p. 374). Women are strongly
associated with domestic space while men command public space and actively resist
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confinement to the domestic sphere, reinforcing the patriarchal system. But we can
also see more women at work due to full employment. In A Kind of Loving, the
contradiction between Vic and Ingrid's mother is solved through the young couple
moving out of the mother's house to less comfortable conditions. Hill reads this as a
reassertion of the "normality and naturalness of the patriarchal family" (1983, p. 309)
and Laing sees it as symbolizing the victory of the husband's rights over the mother's
and a rejection of the shallowness of the new affluence (1968, p. 132).
However, some positive depiction can also be found. Brenda is positively seen
as having the courage to shoulder the awkwardness and difficulty of pregnancy: "I've
decided to have it and face whatever comes of it." The key figures in persuading Vic
to compromise with Ingrid through mutual understanding and tolerance again are his
sister and mother. And we don't see much misogyny in The Loneliness of the Long

Distance Runner. As Claydon observes, "Colin and Mike do not use Audrey and
Gladys in the same way Arthur and Jimmy clearly use the women in their lives"
(2005, p. 137). Audrey is almost a minder to Colin, depicted with seriousness and
warmth. She appears as an attentive listener to whom Colin is willing to tell about his
thoughts, frustrations and hopes. She seems to be able to share Colin's concerns
though she is less rebellious and unsure how to act upon her own discontent. Colin's
seriousness and authenticity are further consolidated by Audrey's "But why?"
questions. Audrey seems to represent "that basic level of human fulfillment denied to
Colin by his environment" (Laing, 1968, p. 129).
In this chapter, I have explored and analyzed British working class identity in

176

the New Wave films, especially represented by Room at the Top and Saturday Night

and Sunday Morning. The young working-class protagonists display vigorously
working-class confidence, masculine pride, youthful rebelliousness, and high
individualism in consciousness and behavior, an identity which continues the
documentary and war film respect for the dignity of labor and masculinity and
challenges the older, wartime idealization of consensus and community. In the
following chapter, I am going to look at British working-class identity in the serious
social criticism films of Mike Leigh, Stephen Frears and Ken Loach.
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CHAPTER V
WORKING-CLASS IDENTITY IN FILMS OF LOACH, LEIGH AND FREARS

British working class in the 1980s and 1990s underwent severe fragmentation.
A few top skilled became new Tories and the vast majority were in general decline,
with the collapse of traditional heavy industries and larger division of the rich and the
poor. The harsh reality facilitated a return to social realism in artistic expressions.
Working-class

films

of the

decades

can

be

easily

defined

by

its

anti-Thatcherism, with the focus on the exploration of the damage brought by
de-industrialization, mass unemployment and poverty, severe cuts in welfare benefits
and services typical of the Thatcher years (1979-90), leading to the statement that
"some of the most potent political opposition to the Thatcher government, therefore,
appeared in the movie theatres rather than in the House of Commons" (Friedman,
1993, p. xix).
This chapter only discusses works of three independent filmmakers--Mike
Leigh, Ken Loach, and Stephen Frears, whose works resist the temptation of
commercialization and offer serious social criticism, showing life as a difficult
struggle in a society dominated by social injustice, greed and racism. In the words of
Peter Wollen, "independent filmmakers of the eighties reacted strongly against the
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effects of Thatcherism" (1993, p. 35). They work within the orbit of leftist critical
theory. Leigh and Loach identify themselves as a socialist and have managed to
remain within the realist tradition for four decades (1970s-2000s). Their works have
been well received in Europe. "Leigh is funny; Loach is angry; but neither offers us
any illusions," as Mount comments (2004, p. 98). Leigh is interested in family life
whereas Loach is more concerned about social and political issues articulated through
characters.
The 1980s witnessed the polarizations along lines of gender, ethnicity, and
sexual orientation, apart from class. More working-class women, gays, blacks, and
Asians began to occupy central focus in films. Britain in the 1990s witnessed the
development of an embittered, visible "underclass," which for Claire Monk, denotes a
subordinate social class, "a post-working class" in a post-industrial context that "owes
its existence to the economic and social damage wrought by globalization, local
industrial decline, the restructuring of the labor market and other legacies of the
Thatcher era" (2000b, p. 274). So, the 1990s sowed a renewed interest in portraying
working-class life, with a group of films about underclass aiming at minority or
mainstream audiences. Similar to the New Wave but different from the 80s, the 1990s
films were more characteristically "men's films" with an obsessive focus on white,
non-working masculinity, projecting images of alienation and masculine anxiety. The
issue of unemployment and its effects is, however, treated very differently from film
to film.
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Three films are chosen for analysis in this chapter: High Hopes (Mike Leigh,
1988) is chosen for its anti-Thatcherism, My Beautiful Laundrette (Stephen Frears,
1985) for race and class, and Sweet Sixteen (Ken Loach, 2002) for its concern on
underclass youth. The films represented a cultural model of film-making targeting
minority audience and were generally exhibited in an art-house context. The 1990s
commercial comedies of working class representation will be dealt with in the
following chapter.
Thatcherism and the Working Class

The 1980s were very much the Thatcher years. With her radical reform to solve
the problems of 1970s, such as low growth rate, high inflation, deterioration in
industrial relations, Mrs Thatcher completely broke with the post-WWII social
democratic consensus. Thatcher's administration was characterized by laissez-faire
economic strategy plus repressive, backward-looking social policies. Peter Wollen
sums up Thatcherism as comprised of three distinct elements: an economic
neo-liberalism with minimum state intervention, a political neo-conservative
authoritarianism, and a social "two nations" project dividing the nation between the
poorer, industrial North, and the affluent, metropolitan South (1993, p. 35).
Thatcherism was marked by tight control of monetary supply, privatization of
nationalized public corporations (e.g. telephone, gas, electricity, water, rail transport),
reduction of taxation, the curbing of trades unions through legislative restrictions and
mass unemployment at record high (4 million at its peak by 1984). For many, this
mass unemployment was "the deliberate creation" of the Conservative government to

180

break working class solidarity.
In the Thatcher era, economic growth was smooth and faster. Hugo Young notes
that economy in 1988 was "still growing at 4 percent after seven years' continuous
expansion" (as cited in Quart, 1993, p. 21), although the trend stopped in the 1990-91
economic recession. Inflation was curbed, from 18 per cent in 1980 to 3.4 per cent in
1986, though it rose again afterwards to 10.9 per cent in her year of departure (Hill,
1999, p. 5). Business enterprises were pressed to seek efficiency in more fierce
competitions. Favorable environments were cultivated and attracted more foreign
investment. Yet the results were very much mixed, the growth in productivity was at
the expense of dramatic rise in unemployment, a decline in British manufacturing and
hence bigger division of the rich and the pOof. More significantly, there was evidence
that unemployment was "being inherited."
The Conservative tax reform also led to the widening gap between the rich and
the poor. Cuts in direct taxation contributed greatly to their repeated electoral
successes. "The basic rate of income tax was dropped, in stages, from 33 per cent to
25 per cent and the top rates from 83 per cent to 40 per cent" (Hill, 1999, p. 6). Yet
this was accompanied by increases in indirect taxation (e.g. national insurance, VAT,
poll tax). So the rich benefited more, contributing to greater inequality.
Politically, the Conservative government took the unionism as its major enemy
and spared no effort in reducing its power. After the greatest confrontation with the
unions - the 1984-85 National Miners Strike, in which the union eventually had to
concede to

the

well-prepared government, the working class was fatally
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de-politicized.
Ideologically,

In

promoting consumption, competitive individualism and

traditional family values, Thatcherism initiated a moral and legal crusade to punish
the "workshy" and to "outlaw" those lifestyles and pursuits which contradicted
Thatcherite conservatism (homosexuals, single mothers, ravers and demonstrators).
Aggressive self-interest also thrived as a result.
In brief, tax reductions, cuts in public spending, privatization of social services
led to the growth of a visible, embittered underclass-"20 percent of the people living
under the poverty line." Britain was turned into "a more morally callous, crude, and
desperate society where a falling quality of life was covered over by a rising standard
of living" and where "the ethic of social responsibility began to unravel." (Quart,
1994, p. 241) While the majority of skilled workers voted Conservative, the majority
of the semi-skilled and unskilled working class continued to support Labor in the
1983 and 1987 elections (Hill, 1999, p. 14). Support for Thatcher came mainly from
the south of England.
Thatcherism has stirred considerable resentment, but during her reign, the
English Left was both divided and self-destructive. The Labor Party leadership was
split, the unions were crushed and a large section of the skilled working class was
bought over into the Tory camp. Liberals and Social Democrats were neutralized. The
Labor Party, in order to win election after consecutive defeats, was forced to
transform itself into "a centrist, European-style Social Democratic party" (Quart, 1993,
p. 21). It became a "catch-all" party appealing to the middle, faced with a diminishing
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industrial working class. Under the leadership of Tony Blair, it became the New Labor,
which largely followed Thatcherite neo-liberalism, for which it was criticized as "in
Conservative clothes." This compromise to the market principles of neo-liberal
capitalism has been seen to be the most enduring achievement of Thatcherism.
However, the New Labor and its Third Way politics tried hard to balance between
efficiency and fairness. The Blair government lowered enterprise tax, especially for
middle and small enterprises, to boost their development. The "unemployment
benefit" was changed into 'job-seeker's allowance" to emphasize re-employment
training and the active seeking for jobs. Blair introduced national minimum wage
system to protect the basic interests of low-incomers; promoted reforms in social
welfare and education leading to considerable increase in health service fund and
education budget. Yet the measures were criticized as half-hearted and lacking
strength.
In film, three famous independent directors, Stephen Frears, Mike Leigh, and
Ken Loach, all responded to Thatcherism with films of angry criticism and savage
satire of the Thatcherite ideology of self-interest and materialism.
Mike Leigh and High Hopes (1988)
Leigh and his films.
Mike Leigh is a prolific as well as award-honored director. From 1971 to the
present, he has made nineteen full-length films, eight of which are for television, of
which High Hopes (1988), Life is Sweet (1990), Naked (1993), Secrets and Lies (1996)

183

and Vera Drake (2004) bring him awards and honor.13 Mike Leigh worked

In

television through the 1970s and later revived his career as a cinema director.
Leigh was born in 1943 into a middle-class family; his father was a doctor. But
he grew up in a very working-class area of North Salford, Lancashire. He went to
local working-class schools and has actually lived in working-class territories
throughout his entire life. Therefore, as a middle-class kid growing up in a
working-class environment, Leigh claims himself "an insider and an outsider, all at
once" with "an awareness of and sensitivity to both those worlds" (as cited in Watson,
2004, p. 50).
On thematic concerns, Watson holds that Leigh's work is obviously driven by
"a pursuit of the real" and "[t]here cannot be many artists who have taken such pains
to capture 'the texture of real life'" (2004, p. 27). Leigh's pursuit of the real centers on
ordinary people, or the day-to-day experience of ordinary people. As he explains
himself: "For most people in the world ... life is hard work; it's tough ... It's about
coping. Most movies are about extraordinary or charmed lifestyles. For me what's
exciting is finding ... the extraordinary in the ordinary -

what happens to ordinary

people ... " (as cited in Carney, 2000, p. 14). Leigh's protagonists are all ordinary with
diverse jobs, e.g. chef and shop assistant in Life is Sweet, motorbike messenger in
High Hopes, a self-employed photographer, an optometrist and a street cleaner in
Secrets and Lies, two taxi-drivers, a cashier, a cleaner, a waitress in All or Nothing.

13 Naked (1993) and Secrets and Ues (1996) are the two films for which he is best-known internationally. At Cannes, Naked won both the Best
DIrector and (with David Thewlis) the Best Actor awards in 1993 and Secrets and

LieS

both the Palme d'Or (Best PIcture) and (with Brenda

Blethyn) the Best Actress awards in 1996 Vera Drake (2004) won the Golden Lion for Best Film at the Venice International Film Festival.
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To be more specific, Leigh further explains that his films "are actually about
things like work, surviving, having an aged parent or whether it's a good idea to have
kids, the problems that everybody cares about" (as cited in Watson, 2004, p. 18). In
this list, it is work that leads. Hence, naturally, class is a central focus in Leigh's films.
The class-related real Leigh explores is often "the traumatic real" of broader scope
(Watson, 2004, p. 12). As he affirms, "My sympathy for people transcends matters of
class. I usually show people who are vulnerable, flawed, and imperfect, but ... I have
made films where class identity is clearly important." (Quart, 2004, p. 37)
E.P. Thompson did not see class as a "structure," nor even as a "category," but
as "something which in fact happens ... in human relationships" (1963, p. 9). Leigh
has distinguished himself in this aspect. Family is a key area of concern for Leigh.
Focusing on "the domestic enclosures of class realities" (Dave, 2006, p. 162), Leigh's
films generally deal with the successes and failures of communication and connection
within families. High Hopes (1988) and Life is Sweet (1990), etc. can all be seen as
works that celebrate marriage, family and the pursuit of happiness despite all the
difficulties. What Leigh values in his films are "faith, trust, a positive spirit and
'getting on with living and working'" (Watson, 2004, p. 104). In Leigh's films "the
willingness to carryon" is a key virtue (Watson, 2004, p. 87). High Hopes (1988) and
All or Nothing (2001), glorify working-class mutuality and endurance despite the

deformations on society, culture and self wrought by neo-liberal governments. All or
Nothing is about three families with all kinds of problems in making a living and are

deeply unhappy. Expressions of care are made all the more touching by the ways in
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which the film has deepened our awareness of essential human vulnerability and
loneliness. Naked (1993) approaches more heavy social topics: the unemployed, the
drifting homeless, the drugged, the sharpened social divide left by Thatcher's Britain.
Politics in Leigh's films are mostly shaded in the background. High Hopes is more
obviously political than most of Leigh's other films. The couple Cyril and Shirley
may be politically confused, but are more conscious of what is going on in the world
than the couple Wendy and Andy in Life is Sweet, who show little political awareness.
Stylistically, in seeking to reflect the ordinary, Leigh's films are relatively
"undramatic." They tend to focus on an extended range of characters. The plots are
leisurely paced and concentrate much more on character and situation than action and
event. Many of his films contain comic elements, e.g. Life is Sweet, Happy Go Lucky
(2008). Andy Medhurst sees that the humor of Leigh's films is the only thing that
keeps them "from being too wounding to bear" (as cited in Watson, 2004, p. 11). High
Hopes has a satirical element especially in the portrayal of the upper-middle-class

characters, which is rare in Leigh's films, as Leigh claims "Satire is not my natural
tendency" (Watson, 2004, p. ix). His films are shot on location and his shots are often
static and lengthy, permitting situations or conversations to evolve. Leigh's films are
all low-budgeted due to tight funding.
High Hopes (1988).

The film is set in the King's Cross area of London and centers on the domestic
life of three very different kinds of couples-Cyril and Shirley (Philip Davis and Ruth
Sheen), Martin and Valerie Burke (Philip Jackson and Heather Tobias), and Laetitia
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and Rupert Boothe-Braine (David Bamber and Lesley Manville), plus an old lady,
Mrs Bender (Edna Dore), who is Cyril and Valerie's mother and Rupert and Laetitia's
next-door neighbor. In line with Leigh's emphasis upon the domestic, their very different lifestyles are seen to be the most revealing aspect of class distinctions and class
consciousness, through which the film attempts to "map out the contours of
'Thatcher's Britain'" (Hill, 1999, p. 193).
Cyril and Shirley are a sweet working-class couple in London and the most
decent characters in the film. Cyril works as a motorbike dispatch rider (or messenger)
and Shirley is seen planting trees (for the local council). They are "gauche, left-wing
relics of an earlier era" (Murphy, 2009b, p. 422). Cyril reads Marx and wants the
whole world to be perfect. Valerie and Martin are Cyril's hysterical sister and her
husband. Pretentious and philandering, they represent the ''vulgar nouveau riche" who
"epitomize the new 'enterprise culture'" (Hill, 1999, p. 193). Martin is a self-made
man who owns a second-hand car business and a Burger Bar. He despises Cyril's
stubbornness in sticking to his high "principles" and advises him to form "a little
company" so that "all the other wallies do the dirty work.,,14 Valerie impresses us
with her snobbishness and low taste in clothes and house decoration. They are
familiar Leigh stereotypes: "vulgar, boorish, offensively loud and have more money
than sense" (Murphy, 2009b, p. 422). Laetitia and Rupert are Thatcherite yuppies of
upper-middle-class. Rupert works "in wine" and Laetitia is a rather "brainless
socialite" (Hill, 1999, p. 193). They live in a well-decorated and well-furnished town

14 QuotatIons

In

thIS chapter WIth no citations are all taken from the scripts in the relevant films.

187

house, spend weekend in the country, and go to the opera (despite Rupert's lack of
understanding of it). They are also selfish and unkind, treating Mrs Bender coldly and
condescendingly when she locks herself out of her house. Mrs Bender is the last
council tenant in a newly gentrified street. Living alone in isolation, she is aging
quickly and becoming forgetful. In High Hopes, Leigh seems to promote audience's
emotional close identification with Cyril and Shirley and hostility to Laetitia and
Rupert.
The story starts with Cyril and Shirley treating Wayne, a stranger who cannot
find his way to his sister's home, with great hospitality. It then develops around Cyril
and Shirley, and Valerie visiting the mother separately, from which we know their
difference in attitude and manner towards the mother. In the middle of the story,
Cyril's mum, Mrs Bender, locks herself out and has to ask her neighbor for help.
While she waits for her son/daughter to arrive with a spare key in the neighbor's
kitchen, she is treated with reluctant hospitality from Laetitia and Rupert. Their
impolite remarks towards Cyril, who comes to fetch his mother, almost ignite a
quarrel. The climax comes when Cyril and Shirley visit Marx's tomb and on coming
back invite Suzi to stay for the night, during which time they have a heated discussion
about working class solidarity and struggle. Near the end, Valerie stages a surprise
party for her mum's 70 th birthday, which turns out to be a disaster for everybody. So
finally Shirley holds things together. She takes Mrs Bender home. At the end of the
story, Cyril gives up his opposition to Shirley's wish of having a baby, and in the
morning Mrs Bender seems to have recovered from her misery. Standing on the roof
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of their building and looking down on the railway station where her husband used to
work, Mrs Bender exclaims: "It's the top of the world."
In Leigh's films, the working class and the middle class are always put into
binary opposition for sharp contrast; their different worlds are "forever colliding"
(Watson, 2004, p. 52). In High Hopes, through exploring the 3 couples of different
class background, this class divide and class consciousness are displayed to even an
extreme extent, from which we can definitely say that the film is a political one. With
working class identity represented by Cyril and Shirley, working-class consciousness,
critique of Thatcherite politics, human kindness and positive spirit, plus the
importance of family are key themes of representation.

Working-class Consciousness.
Cyril is left-wing and idealistic. Filled with emotions of class resentment, he
hopes for a world in which everyone has "enough to eat." He reads Lenin for

Beginners and shows admiration for Marx and his vision of society by visiting his
tomb. Although he yearns for social change, he admits that he sits on his ass in
despair because he just isn't sure what to do politically. He feels cut off. Cyril clearly
knows that the society won't suddenly be transformed in accordance with the high
political hopes he still holds in his head; so for him, pursuing Marx's vision of a
classless society is now merely like "pissing in the wind."
In the film, three scenes reflect his political consciousness: visiting the tomb,
discussing with Suzi and exchange with Shirley in the end. On their visit to Highgate
cemetery, in front of Marx's head sculpture, Cyril expresses his Marxist class
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resentment about Industrial Revolution having forced people into the factories to be
exploited. He then praises Marx for "[w]ithout Marx, there'd have been nothing ... no
unions, no welfare state, no nationalized industries." Shirley reads out that "The
philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways. The point, however, is
to change it." To this, Cyril seems puzzled: "The thing is, change what? It's a different
world now, innit?" His frustration about the possibility and feasibility to change leads
to his such disillusioned conclusion that pursuing the road is like "Pissing in the
wind." In this event, Shirley is casually looking around, speaking to herself. This is
the only conversation that the couple do not seem to match, leading Cyril's challenge
"You ain't interested, are you?" to which Shirley answers "Yes, I am. I care a lot."
In discussing with Suzi (Cyril and Shirley's female friend), Cyril's
revolutionary mind is degraded by Suzi's more radical and passionate belief in
revolutionary socialism, seen as follows:
Su: ... 1 mean, we're fighting, right, to hold onto rights we fought for years ago. She's
already crippled the welfare state. And now she's gonna kill it off because the power isn't
with the workers. 1 wanna go to Nicaragua in October, to help them pick the coffee beans.
That's what we need here, see-a revolution.
C: Here we go.
Su: That'll put it back the power with the people. Where it belongs.
C: What do you know about revolution? There won't be none here.
Su: You can't say that. The situation's ripe for it. What, with the unemployment and poverty
and that. We're heading towards a totalitarian state. But the people won't have it. They're
gonna fight. She's taken away the basic right of the working class. I mean, you look at what
she's doing to the unions.
C: Yeah, Yeah, Yeah, I know about unions.
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Su: You're not in a union, though, are you?
C: Well, we ain't got no union.
Su: Right, that's what you've got to

do~rganise

yourselves---Otherwise you won't have a

voice.

Su: It'd do you good to get out and do something, instead of sitting on you arse talking
about it.

In this conversation, Suzi's sensibleness is undermined by her passion to go to
Nicaragua to help them pick the coffee beans, and further weakened by her plan to
start a jewelry stall in the market to relieve from unemployment, an act mocked by
Cyril as "going into business" to be "small time capitalist." When Cyril challenges
about what she actually does at those political meetings, she answers that she and her
comrades "discuss things" and "talk about things," which, for her, is "working
towards the revolution." But for Cyril, "You are wasting your time" and he would "Sit
on my arse." The high-sounding big talk, instead of inspiring Cyril, leads to his harsh
sarcasm that Suzi talks "a load ofbollocks," to which Shirley completely agrees: "She
always does." Suzi is deeply hurt by this. The conversation exchanges are all shot in
close-ups. Suzi's enthusiasm forms a sharp contrast with Cyril's scornful face. In this
scene, Leigh displays little use for leftist slogans or sentimentality. The scene
impresses us that Marxist revolutionary cause is not practical and there is nothing that
can be done except "sitting on the arse." A mood of pessimism is conveyed. Suzi's
revolutionary ideas and her confidence in people fighting against unemployment and
poverty are simply dismissed as naive. Her leftist rhetoric about changing the world
and going to help the peasants in Nicaragua looks like someone whose politics
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"function more as a psychological lifeline than as a thought-out commitment" (Quart,
1993, p. 30). In this conversation, we get to know that Cyril is not even a member of
the trade union.
After that, Cyril and Shirley have a heart-to-heart talk. Cyril criticizes Shirley
desire's for a baby as just another "bourgeois game:" "Get yourself into a nice house,
couple of kids, dog ... garden with a greenhouse." When asked what he really wants,
after thinking seriously, he says "T want everyone to have enough to eat, places to live,
jobs." This is "a noble reaffirmation of socialist priorities in an age of postmodemism,
post-Fordism, neo-Marxism, all of them seductively revisionist strategies devised to
make liberals forget that" (Adair, 1989, p. 65). Cyril then expresses his frustration that
he feels "cut off:" "I'm a dead loss. Don't do nothing. Just sit here moaning." Shirley
consoles him that "The world ain't ever gonna be perfect." So Cyril's explicit
working-class consciousness is constrained by his confusion about what to do
politically, a confusion deepened by Mrs Thatcher's political actions.
The working class are split. Mrs Bender is a working-class widow, yet from
Cyril and Shirley's talk we know that she voted for the Conservative Party last year,
an act taken by Cyril as "Working-class Tories stabbing themselves in the back." The
working-class community is an absence. Hill noticed three evidences for lack of
community in the film: firstly, Cyril "isn't actually a member of a trade union;"
secondly, "while the film chides the lack of neighborliness shown by the
Booth-Braines towards Mrs Bender, there is no evidence of any 'community' in the
block of flats in which Cyril and Shirley live (where no neighbors are seen, or
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identified, at all);" and thirdly, "Cyril and Shirley would appear to lack any clear
sense of connection or involvement with a more broadly based social or political
community and tradition" (Hill, 1999, pp. 196-197). Based on such observation, he
argues that "it is a portrait of 'practical socialism' that only goes so far" (1999, p.
196).
Critique of Thatcherite politics.
In the film, the three couples represent different classes and display different
responses in attitude and behavior toward Thatcherite politics.
Valerie and Martin represent the "new rich." They live in an overstuffed
suburban detached house. They seem to have succeeded along Thatcherite lines of
making money and acquiring material goods. Martin, a second-hand car-dealer and a
burger bar owner, is "crassly entrepreneurial" (Adair, 1989, p. 64) and sensitive to
market opportunities of Thatcherite Britain. He sees that business is booming and
delivery boys are needed, so he seriously wants to give Cyril "a piece of professional
advice" to form "a little company" of his own so that "the other wallies do the dirty
work" and Cyril can "sit in Happy Valley collecting the dosh." Valerie is succumbed
to shallow materialism. With the family wealth, she is seen spending loads of time
exercising, consuming, and hungering for affection from her abusive husband. More
than anything else, she is such a big social snob! She painfully tries to imitate
Laetitia's yuppie dress and manner, e.g. the leopard-skin coat and the hat. She holds a
birthday party in her house for her mother's 70 th birthday to show off her detached
house and decorations (the fireplace, chess). As Hill sharply observes, Valerie's
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character is precisely "comic" because "she lacks 'good' dress sense, has suburban
tastes (e.g. an imitation log-fire, ornamental brass fruit, a two-tier tea trolley) and is
generally pretentious (proudly displaying a glass chess set in which the pieces are laid
out wrongly)" (Hill, 1999, p. 195).
Laetitia and Rupert represent the upper-middle class. Laetitia is extremely
satisfied with her life and tells her husband that she thanks God every day that she has
been blessed with such beautiful skin and no saggy neck. Leigh uses the snobbish
Tory couple "as venomous comic caricatures to send up gentrification and Thatcherite
social callousness" (Quart, 1993, p. 30). Laetitia conveys the brittle, harsh inhumanity
ofThatcherism in her talk with Mrs Bender about the house while serving tea:
L: But you can hardly justify having three bedrooms, though, can you?

M: It's my home.
L: It is at the moment, I grant you that.

L: I'm not sure it wouldn't be better appreciated by a professional couple or even a family.

M: I have always lived here.
L: Yes, that's as may be, but times change.

L: I think you'd be the first to agree you'd be far better off buying yourself a nice little
modem granny flat.
M: Where would I get the money from?
L: If you were to put your house on the market, you'll find you've been sitting on a gold
mine.

M: It's not my house .... It belongs to the Council.
L: Oh ... Well, mercifully, you people have the opportunity to purchase your council

property nowadays. I'd snap it up, it I were you. Then, of course, one resells.
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Apart from the sense on property-owning which is very Thatcherite, the
conversation also suggests that, for Laetitia, Mrs Bender is only an embarrassing
neighbor whose presence only lowers their street's property value. When Cyril takes
his mother away, Rupert warns that "what made this country great is a place for
everyone and everyone in his place. And this is my place."
Conversely, Cyril and Shirley are like aliens in Thatcher's Britain. Cyril has no
interest in money or status. He declines Martin's suggestion of setting up a small
company based on his "principle," saying that "It ain't everybody's purpose in life to
accumulate money." Cyril is also against his sister's wish to buy her mother's house
so as to "sell it off later on" and "make a huge profit." Shirley grows a cactus plant
and names it "Thatcher" because "it's pain in the arse. Prongs you every time you
walk past it." The couple view with contempt that the street where Cyril's mum lives
has been almost taken over by the middle class who buy for "capital investment" to
sell for a fortune instead of simply as a home. While Laetitia's house is well furnished,
Shirley pities that Cyril's mum's house gets no central heating.
The film, through showing scorn to the other two couples, who adapt, in
different ways, to the Thatcherite ethos, exerts critique to Thatcherism and all
inhumanness it embodies.

Human kindness and positive spirit.
Leigh acknowledges that any "notion that there's a bias on [his] part in High
Hopes and that, in some way, Cyril and Shirley are the goodies and Rupert and

Laetitia and Valerie and Martin are the baddies is absolutely true" (Fuller, as cited in
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Watson, 2004, p. 90). In High Hopes, it is Cyril and Shirley's "ordinary sense of
goodness and concern" which stands in opposition to "the selfish temper of the times"
and "gives a positive embodiment to traditional socialist values" (Hill, 1999, p. 196).
This unmarried left-wing working-class couple are taken to stand for a more decent
set of caring attitude and socially responsible values that Thatcherism is seen as
attacking. Adair praises them as "one of the most poignantly loving couples ... that our
national cinema has produced" and that "[t]heir responses to the needs of others recall
those of Londoners in the Blitz" (1989, p. 65). In Hill's words, Cyril and Shirley shine
by their "intuitive humanism" (1999, p. 197). Shirley's radiance and warmth make her
seem beautiful at times, and she is connected to the world in a more concrete and
knowing and less ideological way than Cyril (Quart, 1993, p. 30).
At the film's beginning, the couple selflessly help Wayne (Jason Watkins), a
stranger who asks the way. Cyril takes him home for a cup of tea and when Wayne
fails to find his sister, they let him stay in their home for the night. Shirley treats him
like mother, giving him the towel to dry hands and makes the bedding. Later they
accompany Wayne to his sister's flat to check if she is back. When all efforts have
failed, they send him back home on a coach. Near the end of the film, they are happy
to give Suzi (Judith Scott) a bed for the night. Throughout the film, Shirley is shown
to be kind to her mother-in-law, willing to stay longer to talk to her. At the birthday
party at the end of the film, when she notices the old lady's troubled mentality due to
loneliness, she takes her home to stay with them. When Cyril says "I'll have to go
round there more often," Shirley states "She needs more than that. She needs looking
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after." Cyril and Shirley show genuine concern towards the mother and can be trusted
when they say they will give her more help in the future.
In contrast, Valerie does not visit mum often, giving her a Christmas gift when it
is already February. She holds the birthday party for her mother not out of kindness,
but to show off her house. At the birthday party, she is rude to her mother, dragging
her to move faster and forces her to drink soft drink instead of tea. The most notorious
aspect is that, in order to call Cyril to take the mother home with the house key, she
lies to Cyril that the old mum has had a serious accident. Valerie's beneficence
towards her mother seems to have more to do with her own wants than those of Mrs
Bender.
Laetitia and Rupert, the upper-middle-class couple, are depicted as unkind and
unwilling to help, treating Mrs Bender with "pained forbearance" (Adair, 1989, p. 64)
and contemptuous cruelty. When Mrs Bender is locked outside her house and asks for
help, Laetitia suggests seeing a policeman, a neighbor or phone children from a public
booth before finally reluctantly invites her to come in '1ust for a moment." When Mrs
Bender wants to go to the toilet with some urgency, Laetitia answers "Ah, the lavatory.
I will show you where it is in a minute."
While Mrs Bender was waiting for her children to take her home with the house
key, Laetitia and Rupert "make her pay for the privilege of sitting in their kitchen by
subjecting her to a barrage of questions about the run-down state of her house and
garden" (Murphy, 2009b, p. 422), all selfish questions showing no concern about Mrs
Bender's economic situation. After knowing that she doesn't own the house to sell,
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Rupert suggests: "how about getting outside with a brush and giving the front of your
house a lick of paint? Smarten it up a little bit, eh?" The couple is half-hearted with
charity, donating wine to "mentally-handicapped something-or-other." Murphy notes
that in British films the rich tend to be shown "as cuddly eccentrics with hearts of
gold" and sees that Laetitia and Rupert's callousness comes "as a shock" (2009b, p.
422). Waston sees Leigh's representation as "a kind of political cartoon, one in which
it is OK not just to dislike but even to hate the villain (or 'baddies:' the
Booth-Braines)" (2004, p. 90 ).
Leigh places high hopes on the positive spirit in his characters (especially
women) who have faith, hope and trust, and who inculcate that in other people. In Life

is Sweet, the husband Andy is depicted as a dreamer with a passion for the caravan he
buys for his cooking business. The wife Wendy can fully understand his passion and
delivers a long speech at the end of the film in which she scolds her daughter Nicola
for having "given up," while she and her husband are "still out there, fighting." In

High Hopes, the most striking evidence of "the willingness to carryon" is to be found
in the reluctant Cyril's last-minute acceptance of Shirley's hope for having a child. In
each case, we are made to understand that carrying on is not something that should be
taken for granted--it takes faith and courage.

Family and women.
Family provides a key theme in High Hopes. In Leigh's many films, the social
community is usually missing, placing family the only harbor to stick to. Cyril and
Shirley are living together in partnership. Shirley wants to have a baby, but Cyril is
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reluctant. His understanding of the family is only as far as "Two's company," not
including children. He knows that Shirley must think of him as "being selfish," but
does not want to compromise. The reason he offers is "Families fuck you up. That's
the truth. They're out of date, families. They ain't no use any more" and "no one gives
a shit what sort of world ... kids are ... born into." Cyril's view seems to be supported
by the example of his own troubled family. In the touching scene of Mrs Bender's
birthday party, we see the close-up shot of the forlorn face of Mrs Bender while
hearing Cyril and Valerie quarrelling off-screen in the background, accusing each
other of having "breakdowns." However, Hill has a

point in suggesting that "if

families are flawed, they seem, none the less, to be all that the characters have to hold
on to, given that other forms of communality, extending beyond the family, are either
inadequate or non-existent" (1999, p. 196). Watson takes this remark of Hill to be a
criticism "not of the film but ofthe state of affairs that the film investigates" (2004, p.
91).
By the end of the film, Cyril agrees with Shirley and is prepared to have a baby.
This decision is seen by Hill as investing the end of the film with "a degree of
optimism (or 'high hopes ') about the future" (1999, p. 198). Yet Hill holds that "while
the film may, in this way, succeed in expressing values of care and responsibility
which cut across the prevailing ethos of Thatcherism, it only does so by partly
reproducing conservative (and, indeed, Thatcherite) values regarding the family and
women" (1999, p. 198). On this remark, Watson accuses Hill of "hav[ing] fallen
victim to right-wing propaganda, which famously claims that it alone speaks for/is
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concerned about 'family values.' Versions of the family long preceded 'Thatcherism'
and, in a11 likelihood, they will long survive its demise" (2004, p. 94). Here I would
agree with Watson's criticism since family cannot become Thatcher's patent simply
because she stressed its importance. Hi11 also comments that "in celebrating the
virtues of the privatized family as a kind of escape route from political impotence and
passivity, the film, for all its apparent 'socialism,' appears to end up reinforcing the
very scepticism about more co11ective (or 'socialist') forms of political action that was
already such a feature of this era" (1999, p. 198). On this, Watson feels that Hill is
mistaken here to assume that "the film is celebrating the family as a 'way out' or an
'escape route. '" He reasonably views the celebration as surely more in the spirit of
"At least this possibility still exists, at least there is still this to hold on to, or to try to
make something of." He believes that "It seems unlikely to be able to satisfy Cyril's
yearning for greater connection and purpose but it is something." (2004, p. 91)
Women's representation is rather mixed in the film. On the one hand, Shirley is
almost perfect with her warmth, kindness and positive spirit; on the other, misogynist
tendency can be detected in negative depictions of a11 other women. Valerie is
hysterious and not much respected by her husband Martin, who once even throws her
onto the ground. Her drunken collapse is disgusting but pitiable. Martin's lover is
divorced and is miserable in not being able to see her children. Shirley is teased by
Martin, who claims that "Women! All the bleedin' same. Fucking losers." Laetitia is
despised for lack of sympathy and concern. Hill notes a significant fact that all of the
couples are childless in the film. He sees the case of the Gore-Booths and Burkes as
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being "associated with the 'sterility' of the values they represent" and the case of Suzi,
who has had an abortion, as "underscore[ing] the fruitlessness (and lack of 'humanity')
of her politics" (1999, p. 198). In the film, women are not only despised for
consumerism and social climbing, but also made "unwholesome" and "unfulfilled" by
the "flawed" femininity of having no children (for whatever reasons). Suzi's
mentioning that "you have a room, you can have a baby" is heart-breaking for people
to hear.
High Hopes provides us with a happy ending. The happy mood runs along three

lines. Cyril isn't defeated; yet he feels "more serene" and "more willing" to come to
terms with life's injustice and have a child with Shirley (Quart, 1993, p. 32). The
decision of Cyril and Shirley to have a child, for Hill, "invests the end of the film with
a degree of optimism (or 'high hopes') about the future" (1999, p. 198). Mrs Bender
has a nice sleep and becomes less miserable the next morning. And above all,
working-class culture is highlighted for appreciation. The film's final scene shows
Cyril and Shirley taking Mrs Bender up on the roof of the building and looking down
on the railway station where Cyril's father used to work, a nostalgic solute to the
traditional working-class culture rooted in manual labor and a sense of place. Mrs
Bender's final exclamation that "it is the top of the world," while illustrating the
physical height, should also carry the metaphorical meaning of the superiority of
working-class culture.
High Hopes provides no political alternative to Thatcherism. Those grander

high hopes of radical political change appear impractical, but the film suggests ways
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to live more humanly despite social inequality. Cyril compensates his political
disillusionment with the more modest hope of building a humane and caring life with
Shirley. This is not very high on the scale of human happiness, but it is enough to
imbue the film with optimism rather than despair. Adair holds that "Cyril and Shirley
both have and are the high hopes of Leigh's title, which is absolutely not ironic; and
theirs is a story of grace under pressure" (1989, p. 65).
Leigh depicts Cyril and Shirley in a more naturalistic fashion. They are played
without the exaggerated mannerisms that typify the playing of the Burkes and
Gore-Booths. Their intimate behavior-talking, fighting, having sex-"feels utterly
genuine" (Quart, 1993, p. 32).

Class and Race in Stephen Frears' My Beautiful Laundrette (1985)
Stephen Frears chose the feature film to attack Thatcherism, claiming that his
film Sammy and Rosie Get Laid was "an attempt to bring Margaret Thatcher down"
(Friedman & Stewart, 1994, p. 233). Both My Beautiful Laundrette (1985) and Sammy
and Rosie Get Laid (1987) depict Thatcher's England as dominated by racism, greed,

and social injustice. His attraction to the working and underclasses is consistent with
his interest in the Pakistani community. According to Frears, My Beautiful Laundrette
was his and screenwriter Hanif Kureishi's "ironic salutation to the entrepreneurial
spirit in the eighties that Margaret Thatcher championed" (Barber, 1993, p. 221).
Frears saw that Mrs Thatcher had divided the country" ... between the people who've
got and the people who haven't" (Barber, 1993, p. 222) and her government
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"transformed the postwar socialist state into a 'nation' courting and supported by
private capitalistic enterprise" (Barber, 1993, p. 221).
My Beautiful Laundrette was shot in 1985 and was an instant success. At its

American debut in 1986, the New York Times acclaimed it as one of the 10 best films
of 1986. The film is a highly innovative exploration of marginalized cultures in
Thatcher-era London. Kirk summarized that the film "succeeded by knitting together
the themes of race and class within a much wider concern with national identity, and
the dynamics of history which constitute us all" (2003, p. 177).
Set in a Pakistani community of South London in the 1980s, the film centers on
a young Anglo-Pakistani, Omar (Gordon Warnecke), his white working class friend
and lover, Johnny (Daniel Day Lewis), and Omar's family of successful, rapacious
entrepreneurs. Omar is living with his leftist alcoholic father and is "on dole like
everyone else in England." Then he is directed to work for his wealthy, entrepreneur
uncle, Nasser (Saeed Jaffrey), who gives Omar a rundown launderette to run. Defying
his father's wish that he should enter college, Omar wants to grab a share of Britain's
wealth by "squeezing the tits of the system." He hires his school friend Johnny, a poor
white working class youth and a former racist, and succeeds in renovating the
launderette into a beautifully decorated and profitable business. Omar and Johnny also
become homosexual lovers. Johnny's white working class fellows, Genghis (Richard
Graham) and Moose (Stephen Marcus), belong to the National Front. They try hard to
draw him back by warning him not to "cut yourself from your own people," but fail.
Racial tension is serious. After Salim (Derrick Branche), also a wealthy Pakistani,
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injures Moose with his car, they fight back by viciously beating Salim and even
Johnny, who comes to Salim's help. The film ends with Omar helping Johnny clean
up his wounds and the two splashing each other with water while topless.
The film is definitely about race. As Kirk puts it, it is "concerned in important
ways with the dialectic of race and class ... politics ofdifference ... post-colonial theory
of hybridity" (2003, p. 170). Omar, his father and his uncle's family are of Pakistani
origin making a scene in the multi-racial and multi-cultural metropolitan London.
Racial prejudice and racial hatred are frequent happenings they have to come across.
Yet the film is unique in that it is more about race, moving beyond the pitiable racial
discrimination psyche. Both race and class are equally central and part of the
construction of hybridity in the film and both get partly blurred in the New Right
ideology. Kirk argues that, despite the emphasis on British Asian experience in the
film, "race is a subordinate issue to a more subtle exploration of the workings of class
inequalities and the power relations within them" (2003, p. 171). For me, the film, in
its unique way of dealing with race through class, is more valuable to the analysis of
class as a more determining factor of human existence.
My Beautiful Laundrette addresses the class issue by contrasting the haves with

the have-nots: professional businessman Nassar, rich Salim, ambitious Omar on the
one hand, and jobless, homeless Johnny, Genghis and Moose on the other hand. The
Pakistanis now form part of the privileged class in the 1980s. The once colonial
Pakistanis now own big business and live well in large suburban homes and luxury
flats. In contrast, their tormentors, lumpen white punks and skinheads are "confined
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and constricted" to streets, own nothing and "have only the dole and gratuitous street
violence to console themselves with" (Quart, 1994, p. 243). So, the whites are seen as
the real victims of Thatcherism. The Pakistani nouveau riche reverses the traditional
imperial and colonial hierarchy. This is demonstrated at the beginning of the film
when Salim and some Jamaicans he employs throw out "squatters" Johnny and
Genghis from a run-down building Salim has purchased, depriving them of their only
home in a sort of "symbolic 'taking over' of the white characters' 'home'" (Hill, 1999,
p. 211). A similar inversion of roles is also evident in the fact that Omar is treating
Johnny "like a servant." It is also evident when Nassar's white working-class mistress
responds to Nassar's daughter's accusation of living off her father by saying: "And
you must understand, we're of different generations, different classes. Everything is
waiting for you. The only thing that has ever waited for me is your father."
Dispossession stands as the key state of the white underclass. Living on the
streets with petty crimes (such as stealing) and sleeping anywhere possible, Johnny,
Genghis and Moose (Stephen Marcus) belong to the expanding underclass--economic
dropouts--ofthe society in the 1980s. And the scene is not a rarity, with the extremely
high unemployment rate of the time taken into consideration. Kirk sees them as "quite
pitiful characters" (despite their menacing racist activities), because despite their
fervor to "belong" there is "something quite rootless" about them. Genghis pleads
with Johnny, "Don't cut yourself off from your own people, everyone's got to
belong." But it is ironic here that Genghis is "invoking a national identity which
seems to have no place for him." (Kirk, 2003, p. 174)
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Johnny is a complex and sympathetic figure in the film. He was Omar's friend
at school, but joined the racist march. He is now "lower class" and "won't come in
without being asked, unless he's doing a burglary." He sees working with Omar as a
lifeline to escape from squatting and aimless wondering in the streets and to get
self-respect. Responding to his white friends' warning of him not to cut off from his
own people, he says "J want to do some work, instead of always hanging around." He
still maintains some loyalty to the group of racist punks he once belonged to, but also
helps Salim when he is beaten viciously.
In short, working class has declined as a historical force. In the film, they are
mostly negatively depicted as aggressive little-Englanders, right-wing and reactionary,
"to be pitied at best, despised at worst" (Kirk, 2003, p. 178). For the Old Left like
Omar's father (Roshan Seth), a former socialist journalist, he sees the "death" of
socialism with his lamenting remark that "The working class is such a great
disappointment to me," representing the declining confidence in the agency of the
working class (Hill, 1999, p. 205). For the Pakistani new rich, they also show strong
contempt for the white underclass, as Salim says to Omar, "Look at them. What a
waste of life. They're filthy, ignorant. They don't respect people, especially our
people." So, there seems to be no place for Johnny and Genghis in the Thatcherite
entrepreneurial society. As Salim shouts in the film: "What the hell else is there left
for you in this country now?"
Then it becomes paradoxical that the successful and the favored are
Asian-origin businessmen. Omar and his people are clearly benefiting from Mrs
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Thatcher's enterprise culture of self effort. "The Pakistani ... but they are not put off,
despite the racism, by Thatcher's England" (Quart, 1994, p. 243). Thatcher had
applauded the Asian and Indian shopkeepers "as the nation's new 'meritocrats'" (Kirk,
2003, p. 174). They know there is money in the Thatcherite market: "In this damn
country, which we hate and love, you can get anything you want. It's all spread out
and available ... Only you have to know how to squeeze the tits of the system." So,
they embrace Thatcherism and regard enterprise culture as offering them
opportunities for their success. As at a party, Nassar proposes to Omar, "We'll drink to
Thatcher and your beautiful laundrette ... " In seeking success, they take whatever
measures necessary, legal or illega\.
Nassar has definitely benefited most from the entrepreneur culture promoted by
Mrs. Thatcher. Committed to making big money, he has acquired a business empire
by all means, evidently including exploiting others, white or black, and thus could
afford to say that "I'm the law. I create the world" and "no one works without my
permission." He owns garage, laundrette, slum housing for rent, and deals with
porn-video cassettes, drugs, and a list of other businesses.
Omar is quick to learn and is not adverse to illegal dealings. He sees Salim's
drug game and immediately knows that's how he is going to finance the start of his
laundrette. So, he soon funds the opening of the laundrette with money he gets from
selling drugs he steals from Salim. He is also professionally ambitious. When Nassar
hands over the laundrette to him, what he expects is to have the place cleaned by
Omar and improved a little. But Omar declares that "I don't only want to sweep up ...
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I want to be manager of this place. I think I can do it." The next thing we know is that
Omar hires Johnny--"a bloke of astounding competence and strength of body and
mind" in Omar's words--to do all the tough work. So one of Nassar's friends makes
such comment: "Typically English, if I can say that." Omar's efficiency and
leadership skill is appreciated and near the end he is given more laundrette to manage
by his uncle's friend.
When Omar's father asks: "How is it that scrubbing cars could make a son of
mine look so ecstatic?" Omar simply responds that "It gets me out of the house,"
which projects a strong implication that enterprise culture is much enjoyed and
approved by the young adults.
In addition, the state of their living-Nasser's family home, Salim's and
Cherry's luxurious flat, the apartment building which they own and rent out-all
suggest that they have strived hard to "squeeze the tits of the system."
Apart from Salim evicting Johnny and Genghis at the beginning of the film,
Nassar later hires Johnny to evict a black poet from a property he wants to re-let.
When challenged by Johnny that throwing out his own kind of people-the
colored-"Doesn't look too good, does it?" Nassar simply answers, "I'm a
professional businessman, not a professional Pakistani. And there is no question of
race in the new enterprise culture."
Yet race is forever the pain of the colored in Britain. In the film, though
members of oppressed racial groups--the Pakistani--are capable of and occasionally
even eager to engage in class-based exploitation, the most exploitative members of
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the oppressed racial communities are themselves victims of brutal racist attacks.
Genghis is against Johnny working for the Paki, claiming, "They came over here to
work for us. That's why we brought them over." Salim's car is banged on just because
the gangsters notice that it is the Pakistani who drives the car. Salim is tough to fight
back. When meeting these hoodlums again in the street, he accelerates his car fast and
drives at them and runs down Moose, who is badly injured. In a vicious circle, near
the end of the film, Genghis and his white friends take their revenge on Salim,
destroying his car and nearly beating him to death. Here, racial conflict is being put
on the front stage.
The occupations the Pakistanis carry on are manual or insidious ones. Nasser's
garage, launderette, etc are low-status businesses; Salim takes a risk in drug-dealing;
Omar operates a launderette named "Powder" which hints its source of
financing-the profits from Salim's illegal drug business. They all make money in
areas which do not command high respect. Omar regards the laundry as dirty work
and hires Johnny to do it. Nasser and Salim can earn cash and property through efforts,
but they cannot obtain their social standing in British society. One of the Pakistani
claims: "What chance a racist Englishman has given us that we haven't taken it from
him with our hands?"
On the whole, the Pakistani characters are not depicted as figures of virtue.
Represented as "drug dealers, sodomites and mad landlords" (Hill, 1999, p. 210), they
are seen to be shrewd, greedy and tough. But as Kureishi points out, none of his Asian
characters may be regarded as "victims" (Hill, 1999, p. 210). They are generally
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successful businessmen, at ease with the Thatcherite enterprise culture. So, Hill points
out that "a part of the film's strategy is to use the business success of the Asian
characters to invert old imperial power relations" (1999, p. 210). As Boyd Tonkin
suggests, the film may be viewed as a kind of "revenge film" in which a contrast is set
up between an unemployed white "underclass," who aimlessly wander in the streets,
and an Asian business class who have succeeded in becoming the new "masters" (Hill,
1999,p.211).
So, social hierarchies (based on the subordination of blacks) are overturned in
the film, and "we are reminded of Fanon's argument that the colonized/subaltern
perpetually yearns to take the place of the colonizer" (Kirk, 2003, p. 172). The
Pakistanis passionately embrace the new enterprise culture as a way to "revenge" the
racism they encounter.
By saying "typically English" to refer to Omar's hiring Johnny, this friend is
reminding of a history that Pakistanis used to be hired by the white to do all the
manual work. But here, the stereotypical role is subverted. Though it is a love
relationship between Johnny and Omar, Omar, the Pakistani, is obviously the
dominating "boss man," benefiting from the reversed colonial order and treating
Johnny as someone from the "lower class." As Nassar's daughter sees and tells
Johnny, "Omar just runs you around everywhere, like a servant."
When Johnny observes that Omar is "getting greedy," Omar's response is
fuelled with a sense of "racial victimization and business ambition," or even of racial
revenge: "I want big money. I'm not gonna be beat down by this country. When we
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were at school, you and your lot kicked me all round the place. And what are you
doing now? Washing my floor. That's how I like it." The Pakistanis are clearly aware
"But we're nothing in England without money."
The film is brave and impressive with its depiction of the gay relationship and
love scenes. The relationship is not portrayed as a "problem" and the lovers are not
shown as "victims" of homophobia. Kureishi explains that he wanted the gayness to
be "taken for granted" rather than foregrounded as an issue. For Philip French, the
film celebrates "a gay love affair" that "transcends race, class, upbringing and social
chaos." (Hill, 1999, p. 213) Omar announces to Salim that, in his opinion, "much
good can come from fucking." The inter-racial relationship suggests how sexual
desires may permit the crossing of borders.
The ending is sad for Nasser, a close up of him shows that he is melancholy and
puzzled-"finished," he says-left by both his mistress and daughter; but happy for
Omar and Johnny. At the end of the film, which is set in that little office at the back of
the laundrette, Omar tenderly cleans up Johnny's wounds after his fights against his
white mates to rescue Salim. The last scene shows Johnny and Omar splash water
from the sink onto one another's bare chests. So, racial tension is solved by the
homosexual love between Omar and Johnny, which crosses the barrier of race, class
and gender, a utopian resolution more like a "wish-fulfillment." Frears explains that
the film was given a happy ending because "it would be too depressing without it"
and "It's only at the very end that there is this flicker of happiness." He thinks the film
is "more cheerfully defiant." (Friedman & Stewart, 1994, pp. 227-228)
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In conclusion, My Beautiful Laundrette is critical of Thatcherism and the
materialism and selfishness which it generates in turning the society a cruel one with
many young adults jobless and homeless; however, it also identifies that the enterprise
culture provides opportunities for Asians to get through the barriers, make financial
achievements and even change their social status. At the same time, it is also aware of
how even the possession of money is not necessarily a defense against racism.

Ken Loach and Sweet Sixteen (2002)
Loach and his films.
Ken Loach is a leading exponent of realism. He is born from a working-class
family and is a critically admired director and "an unwavering, outspokenly
committed socialist" (Turner, 1993, p. 50), who uses documentary realist strategies to
explore the inequalities and conflicts in societies, establishing a reputation for
political awareness in his films. He can be said to be the only current British
film-maker using class in an explicit political sense.
His continuous effort from his early television and film career in the 1960s right
through four decades to the films of the 1990s and 2000s made him eligible for the
claim that the continuing history of British social realism is inextricably linked to Ken
Loach. Particularly, he provides something of a bridge between the New Wave films
of the early 1960s and the films of the 1990s, almost "singlehandedly responsible for
sustaining social realist texts" when British cinema was sacrificing social realism due
to financial difficulties. In his 40-year directing career, the dominating aim to make
"art in the service of the people" has remained consistent (Leigh, 2002, p. 178).
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Loach's realism is "realism with a cause, and few other current directors share his
passionate commitment" (Brown, 2009, p. 35).
During the 1960s, he worked extensively in television and was noted for Cathy
Come Home, which is about a homeless mother and was filmed for BBC2. Then he

won high recognition for Kes (1970), a film which is set among a coal-mining
community in Yorkshire, and looks sensitively at how a baby kestrel gives a young
boy's life a sense of meaning. Since the 1980s his films have engaged more closely
with politics and society. Looks and Smiles (1982) considers the desperate choices
open to two young school-leavers at a time when employment opportunities are few.
For greater authenticity Loach used all amateurs from local communities of Sheffield
(the setting for the film) to cast the film. Yet in the 1980s Loach was much silenced
by censorship with his documentaries as a voice of "outraged dissent against
Thatcherism's onslaught on the trade unions and the impoverishment of the working
class" (Fuller, 1998, p. 78). Aware of his own lack of success in the 1980s, Loach was
eager to re-establish himself as a commercially viable filmmaker in the 1990s. He
realized that he needed to adapt to some extent to a newly market-orientated British
cinema or he would not be making films at all. So his later works more followed the
mainstream traditions of narrative cinema. He added comic elements in some of his
films to relieve the cruelty of misery and romance became a common plot seen to
offer redemptive possibilities. His works in the 1990s reestablished Loach as a
European filmmaker with a high international reputation and secured him relatively
easy access to financial support.
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Thematically, Loach's films are all politically charged and anti-capitalist. The
struggle of the disadvantaged against an uninterested society is a theme common to
many of his works, displaying a society split savagely into the "haves" and
"have-nots." For Loach, "The subjects which have drawn me are those which relate
personal and emotional life to a wider background--a class background and economic
background" since "people's personal lives don't exist in a vacuum" (Hearse, as cited
in Leigh, 2002, pp. 146-147). "It just grows ever more apparent," said Loach, "that
there are two classes in society, that their interests are irreconcilable, and that one
survives at the expense of the other" (Hayward, 2004, p. 266). His films in the 1990s
are all much concerned with the underclass- casual workers, drunkard, single
mothers, drug dealers, whose plight are seen as a heavy price unduly paid for the
economic upheavals of the 1980s. Loach's works have always been pessimistic about
the prospects of radical political change in Britain. The sense of political possibility is
widely missing.
In Riff RajJ (1990), Loach humorously depicts a group of building-site laborers
and their work in converting a hospital into a block of luxury flats for the rich. The
fear of unemployment and absence of trade union right have placed these casual
laborers from Liverpool and Scotland in a disadvantaged and even dangerous position.
They are at the mercy of the ruthless, cost-cutting employers who care nothing about
the safety of working environment and simply want the job to be done as quickly and
cheaply as possible. The builders work at their own risk and without insurance. One
of them from Liverpool blames the Thatcher government, complains about work and
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safety conditions and urges the men to organize. He is quickly sacked as a result.
Following the death of a fellow worker who falls from inadequately secured
scaffolding, the protagonist Stevie and another worker take revenge. They eventually
burn down the apartments they are building, which is active resistance against the
employers. The film ends bleakly with the two staring into a flaming abyss. The final
violent direct attack is "less a considered political act than a desperate hitting out at a
system that they lack the power to change" (Hill, 1998, p. 18), an action of "impotent
despair" (Wilson, 1991, p. 61). Much of the humor in RifJ-RafJis "of a bitter and
ironic nature" (Mather, 2006, p. 30).

Raining Stones (1993) is a tragicomic story exploring the effects of
unemployment on a Catholic family in Manchester with anti-Thatcher political
message. The jobless Catholic father Bob runs into debt and danger after taking out a
loan to buy his daughter a communion dress. Bob's obsessive determination to find
money for the dress is shown as foolhardy as he has been warned many times that the
expenditure is unnecessary and will lead him to debt. Yet his stubbornness is seen as
understandable in a way as it symbolizes a desperate attempt of a father to "hold on to
the last remnants of his sense of self-worth" (Hill, 1998, p. 20). Because of the debt
(just a small sum), Bob is pressed and his wife and daughter are viciously threatened.
He is finally driven into a violent attack on one uncaring loan shark, hitting his car
and indirectly leading to the car-crash death of him. The action is taken by Hill as
belonging to "individual acts of anger, rather than organized political activity, that
now constitute resistance" (1998, p. 18). The film reveals the desperation of a
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community whose people's pride and dignity has been ripped away along with their
jobs. The beginning of Bob and Tommy kidnapping a lone sheep from a farmer's
field to sell the meat for money is extremely humorous. The priest's decision to hide
the truth about Bob's attack by destroying the evidences is extraordinarily warm and
funny.

Ladybird, Ladybird (1994) is based on a true story. It examines the plight of a
Liverpudlian woman in London whose four children are all taken into custody by the
social services following a house fire taking place in a women's refuge (where she is
seeking protection with children from her abusive partner) while she is absent and
leads to her eldest son seriously burnt. The heroine, Maggie, has suffered from a
series of abusive relationships (for which she is blamed for not being careful enough
in choosing partners). When Maggie starts a new life with Jorge, a mild political exile
from Paraguay and a responsible man, and gives birth to their first child, the police
and social workers come to investigate in the neighborhood and are told lies about
Jorge beating Maggie. So they intervene and take the baby away. Their second child
is taken away straight after the delivery, a scene extremely traumatic to watch. Quick
to condemn, the social workers have no interest in Maggie's miserable past: she has
an abusive father, violent partners and was sexually abused as a child. The social
workers are depicted as constituting "a malign presence, cruelly interfering in the
lives of others and adding to their misery" (Hill, 2000a, p. 182). Despite the showing
of Maggie's roughness, the film "refuses to indict her as a bad mother and pinpoints
how the obstacles to her achievement of happiness result from her lack of social and
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economic power" (Hill, 2000a, p. 181). She is presented "as victim of her own
emotional state, as much as of the state's interventionist methods" (Francke, 1994, p.

47).
My Name is Joe (1999) is a story of Joe's attempts to escape his alcoholic past
and start a new life through his love affair with Sarah, a health worker. Joe used to be
an alcoholic, but has quitted drinking and is developing a relationship with Sarah. His
friend Liam, a member of the football team of unemployed men that Joe coaches, and
his wife are in horrible debt due to drug taking and are severely threatened. To settle
their debt, Joe agrees to do three drug runs for the local dealer. Sarah is outraged to
discover the truth. Joe tries to explain, but finds their class differences too wide to
unite them: "Ah'm really sorry, but you know I don't live in this nice, tidy, wee world
of yours .... Some of us don't have a choice. I didnae have a fuckin' choice ... Every
fuckin' choice stinks doon here." The film ends with Joe returning to drink after the
breakup and Liam hangs himself and a sad funeral. Williamson sees the message of
the film as "don't listen to middle-class do-gooders." Through Sarah, the film tells us
"the limitations of what even the most well-meaning of social and healthcare
professionals can achieve." (1998, p. 58) The film is dominated throughout by a sense
of pessimism. Joe's decision is seen not simply as a matter of personal morality but
one that has been forced upon him by the socio-economic situation.
Loach continued into the 2000s with Sweet Sixteen (2002), which will be
explored in the next part.
Stylistically, Loach has tried to make films that are "emotionally engaging and
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analytical" (Leigh, 2002, p. 177). For Loach, "the desire to depict reality on screen
overrode almost anything" (Hayward, 2004, p. 4). Loach's cinematic style is
documentary, marked by the strategy of observation rather than involvement. His
films commonly use real-life locations that demonstrate the often grim actualities in
which people live. They also employ a mix of professional and non-professional
actors and actresses and Loach seeks to downplay the sense of an actor's performance
through improvisation and even surprise (an actor is sometimes kept in the dark about
developments in the script). Techniques such as the avoidance of dramatic lighting
and compositional effects or the use of unbroken takes are employed to maintain a
degree of distance from the characters they observe. Quite often, his protagonists
speak with a very strong local accent (e.g. the accent of the Glaswegian teenager in

Sweet Sixteen) that is hard to comprehend, so when shown abroad, his films were
often dubbed or subtitled. Those on screen appeared so real that the truth Loach was
telling through drama was a genuine threat to the established order (Hayward, 2004, p.
3).

On Loach's influence, it is worth noting that his commitment has not made
much of an impact on British cinema audiences. Britain's film culture in the 1990s
"tolerates Loach's spartan humanism, but does not endorse it" (Brown, 2000, p. 34).
His films did not sell well in Britain, but won many top awards from European film
festivals and did a lot better in European box-office.
Loach has been a determined and persistent fighter for social justice and
fairness. He has never lost faith in his belief that film can playa role in changing
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attitudes and that ordinary people deserve fairer treatment. His work has helped to
sustain a critical and committed film culture in Britain despite everything. He quotes
Milan Kundera's phrase to define his fight as "the struggle of memory against
forgetting" (Rowbotham, 2001, p. 87). Loach might seem to be naIve in his
persistence, yet he is highly appreciated and widely admired throughout the world,
which illustrates that maintaining his uncompromising political stand and independent
filmmaking style had been a worthy effort, both for himself as well as for those who
were not usually given a voice on screen.
Winning awards and nominations at Cannes, Sweet Sixteen continues Ken
Loach's devotion to social awareness.
Sweet Sixteen (2002).
Sweet Sixteen is a gritty film written by Paul Laverty and it is the fourth
collaboration between him and Loach. The story is set in Greenock, a gray Scottish
town down the Clyde River from Glasgow, a former shipbuilding center now
depressed by unemployment and hopelessness. The strong political and cultural
working-class community has disappeared. Gone with them was also the confident
youth doing apprenticeships with money and disciple. Now, the jobs available were
"crap"--like McDonald's, call centers or one-day contracts; "drugs are the
currency--more readily available than jobs" (Hayward, 2004, p. 255). Laverty spent
quite some time there talking to drug-selling kids before writing the first draft.
Liam (Martin Compston) is a 15-year-old boy soon approaching his sixteenth
birthday. He is waiting for the release of his drug-addicted mother, Jean (Michelle
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Coulter), from prison where she is completing a prison term for a drug offence that
her drug-dealing boyfriend, Stan (Gary McCormack), actually committed. In visiting
his mother together with Stan and Liam's grandfather Rab (Tommy McKee), Liam is
forced by them to pass drugs (hidden in his mouth) to his mother for sale to the other
women in prison via hugging and kissing her. Liam refuses and is hence beaten by the
two men. When Rab throws him out of the house, Liam goes to live with his sister
Chantelle (Annmarie Fulton), a single mother with her own apartment and a toddler,
Calum. He longs for a normal family life and wants to live together with his mother
and sister, but Chantelle wants nothing to do with her irresponsible mother. On a
joyride with his best friend Pinball (William Ruane), Liam spots a caravan in a field
beside a lake, which he is attracted to buy for himself and his mother. To get quick
money, Liam and Pinball steal Stan's heroin and deliver it around town. With the
profit, Liam pays the first installment on the caravan. Later, when he offends the
territory of a local gangster, Douglas (Jon Morrison), Liam is seriously beaten. But
Douglas spots his enterprising spirit of mixing drug selling with pizza delivery and
later hires him as a drug runner, but excludes Pinball, who feels hurt. Pinball steals
Douglas' car, breaks it against a glass wall and also burns the caravan. When Liam
finds what has happened to his dear caravan, he blames Stan. Douglas buys a pizza
place for Liam to run as a guise for delivering drugs. He also offers him a flat for his
mother. Pinball hurts himself by cutting on the face. Liam calls an ambulance. Jean is
set free, and Liam surprises her with the new flat. He holds a house-warming party at
which Chantelle reluctantly joins. The next morning, Jean returns to Stan. Chantelle

220

tells Liam that Jean doesn't love either of them. Realizing that Jean is controlled by
Stan, Liam stabs him with a knife Douglas had given him. It's his 16 th birthday.
The film touches upon a lot of the problems posing the old industrial cities. I
take the broken families and self-salvation through drug-dealing as two key themes
for analysis, as I see that the film is more about the lack--of love, of care and of a
long list of basic necessities for a child not yet 16.

Brokenfamilies: The desperate needfor mother's love.
Like Leigh, Loach's films since the 1990s has shown more concern about
family, but his families are full of more serious troubles. Liam's family is marked by
poverty, lack of care or love and by brutality. Liam has an abnormal and miserable
childhood marked by neglect and violence. His mother has not shouldered the
responsibility of taking due care of him and his sister. Liam has been put in children's
home and has played truant often. At the start of the story, he's not been inside school
for nine months. He's been selling stuff since he was seven. He now survives by
peddling stolen cigarettes with his best friend and fellow truant, Pinball. Pinball
shares similar background. His father is a junker. Later in the film, when
sub-wrapping drug into small bags, Pinball asks Liam not to worry about his
professionalism, as "I used to watch my dad do this sometimes. He was good at it."
The mother's present boyfriend, Stan, is a villain. Liam's granddad is no better.
When Liam refuses to cooperate in smuggling drugs into the prison and, on coming
out, throws the gear away over the fence, the granddad and Stan even beat him
together and threaten to break his legs next time so that he will "be walking like
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Charlie Chaplin!" Actually, violence has been a long-time nightmare haunting Liam
and Chantelle. As Chantelle cries near the end of the story when Liam intends to beat
her: "Just like Granddad, like our fathers! Like Stan! Like all the other losers!. .. Like
our mam! Be one of them because that's what you are!"
Growing up in such a background, for every kick and punch he endures, Liam
has to be violent to defend himself. While nursing his wounds, Chantelle tries to
persuade him out of violence. She refers to his frequent fights against his tormentors
at the children's home: "You didn't fight them because you were brave; you fought
them because you didn't care what happened to you. That's what broke my
heart .... How can you really care about us if you don't care for yourself, eh? ... All
wee Calum's got in the whole world is me and you. Nobody else."
Matthews argues that the mother's neglect seems to inspire greater emotional
attachment from Liam towards her, so "her benign neglect spurs him on to ever
greater possessiveness and need" (2002, p. 56). In the prison visit, Liam gets to know
that his mother is this time in prison for something set up by Stan. Stan wants her to
be in to pass drug to the prison women so that he can get fortune off their boyfriends.
This is what he can no longer bear: "You took the rap once for that bastard. This isn't
going on anymore. It's finished." Realizing that Stan's influence and control is vicious,
Liam is determined to rescue his mother from having to go back to Stan when she is
released.
Determined to have a normal family life once his mother gets out of prison,
Liam sets out to create a safe haven beyond their reach. But raising cash for his
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caravan is no easy job for a teenager. Obviously the money he earns through selling
stolen cigarettes in pubs with Pinball is far from enough for the down payment on the
caravan, so he resorts to stealing gear (drugs) from Stan to fasten the speed at
predictable risks. He also regularly sends his mum tape to cheer her up, telling her
that he has a surprise for her when she gets out and keeps counting the days left: "Just
61 days, Mam. The day before my birthday." He makes great effort in setting
reconciliation between the alienated Chantelle and their mother. Yet Liam's longing
to reconstitute a family life is seen only as a fantasy. The emphasis is "upon people
striving for some form of agency--above all, struggling to break with a generational
heritage of violence, poverty, and the lack oflove" (Bromley, 2003, para. 5). Pinball's
destruction of the caravan, though too cruel for Liam to bear, is reasonable in the
sense that it presents the painful longing of the powerless to belong (Bromley, 2003,
para. 11), as he cries to Liam: "J would have done anything for you."
The caravan stands as highly symbolic. For Matthews, it is "the street kid's
version of an Arcadian idyll--plentiful fishing and plastic flowers on the doorway" as
well as "the merest glimpse of freedom" (2002, p. 56), whose burnt destruction is to
extinguish all hope. The caravan Liam spotted is with two bedrooms, telly,
microwave, and beautiful lake view. Liam and Pinball picture a dream life here:
"Imagine here at night with a clear sky. Wee fishing rod, couple of cans, couple of
hens as well;" "No cunt telling you what to do;" "Paradise." When he later visits
prison, he is eager to show the photo to his mother and emphasize the property
ownership: "It's our caravan. Not the council's, not the bank's. It's ours, Mam. I've
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bought it ... I've paid a deposit and a first installment ... Nobody to annoy us, no
junkies, no polis. Just me and you. And Chantelle and Calum, if they want. .. It's in
your name, Mam. It's yours."
But paying is no easy job; Liam has to collect £4,500 to be payable by the
30th of November. And he cheats his sister about the source of money, claiming
getting money through selling vanloads of fags: "I'm a businessman." The hardship
with the payment makes Pinball's burning destruction all the more pitiable,
suggesting his crazy desperation.
Liam is also making great effort to unite the whole family. After he is offered a
flat by Douglas, he tries to persuade his sister to move in to live together with him and
their mother and to give the mother one more chance.
Chantell's attitude toward the mother is full of resentment. She hates her so
much that she does not want to have anything to do with her. As she tells Liam: "she
didnae want me. She didnae want you." When Liam tries to find excuse for his
mother's past neglect of his sister, stating "She was only a wee lassie then," she
confirms that "nothing's changed!" Chantelle warns Liam to keep a distance as well.
To this, Liam accuses her: "Because you're not giving her a chance." She is "scared"
at Liam's invitation of living together with mother and later reluctantly moves in for
the housewarming night. When Liam knows the next morning that his mother is gone
and enquires her, she answers with mocking anger: "Gone where she normally goes.
The same 'usual' as always." She asks Liam to give her up: "Liam, let her go. She'll
drive you mad." Then she utters the harshest attack on the mother's inability to care or
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love: "It's not that she doesnae care, she cannae care! She's a fucking crazy lost wee
soul and she's gonnae ruin you too!" But Liam wouldn't listen. He blames his sister
for saying something nasty that drives the mother away. When the sister tries to stop
him from looking for the mother by hiding one of his shoes, he even intends to play
violence on Chantelle.
Liam is simply desperate for parental love from Jean. He goes to Stan's place to
look for Jean and asks her to leave with him so that "just me and you" stay together in
the flat he has just got for "a fresh start." He even begs: "Can't you see that? I need
you, Mam." But Mother refuses to go, saying "Liam, you don't understand." Stan
mocks aside that "You can send one of your fucking tapes" with "Mummy, I love
you" cry. He then rudely orders Liam to "Do as you're told. Leave." This greatly
irritates Liam, who finally loses his sense and stabs Stan angrily. It all happens on
Liam's sixteenth birthday.
The title of the film is sarcastic. Life surely isn't sweet for Liam or his equally
underloved mate Pinball. The mother in this film is even worse than the mother in
Ladybird, Ladybird. Both have suffered from violent father and partners, but in
Ladybird, Ladybird, Maggie's love for her children is never doubted. She is only

deprived of the custody right due to her once serious neglect (causing her son to be
burnt) and all the time she has been trying to win back the children. But here Liam's
mother is simply not capable of loving her children. She is willing to stay in prison for
something she did not do, though there must be some untold reasons behind, as she
tells her son, "Liam, you don't understand." Jean is depicted as a typical loser mother
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image. With the absence of the mother almost throughout the film, "what Liam has
been deprived of is his image of his mother" (Rolinson, 2005, p. 253).
The only sweetness comes from the sister. Chantelle is tender, loving, tough;
"not just the stereotypical teenage, single parent but also the bearer of mothering and
love throughout--a carrier of hope" (Bromley, 2003, para. 9). Time after time, like a
battered boxer who refuses to give up, Liam returns to Chantelle, who "patches up his
wounds and soothes the hurt" (Bromley, 2003, para. 9) She invites Liam to stay, but
under strict pre-conditions of no swearing, no smoking, no farting, because "It's bad
for Calum." Her sense of responsibility towards her son is clearly illustrated in her
determination to protect him from what she has suffered: "What happened to us isn't
going to happen to him [Calum]. Never. Over my dead body, and I swear it. I want
peace in this house." It is also shown from the fact that she is enthusiastic to do
anything available to feed his son. Her dream to secure a part-time job in a call center
is warm but bitter to audience. She treats the night class for the 0800 call center work
seriously and proudly declares that "I came first in my test" and is "dead chuffed" that
"I've got myself a job in a call center." She even invites Liam to join the training. She
shows deep worry and concern about Liam, "Liam, look at the state of you. Look at
yourself. You gonna get yourself sorted out? .. Promise me." The sister is a kind of
"substitute mother" (Rolinson, 2005, p. 253) to Liam, always there to care about him.
But nothing can remedy Liam's desperate need for love from his mother.
Self-salvation: drug-selling.

Drug crime is a theme throughout the film. Yet what's unique here is that the
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focus is more on what drug dealing/selling means for the dispossessed youth.
Bromley argues that we seem to be told that, in a situation of deeply-structured
inequality, "the only access to images of wealth and privilege for the 'underclass' is
through theft or drug dealing--crime as the only career move possible" (2003, para. 4).
When child poverty is a big issue, especially in Scotland, crime is seen as the only
available option. Besides crime for profit, it can also be just for fun as resistance, e.g.
Liam directs a driver into crushing a policeman's motorcycle and steals the helmet.
And sarcastically, one needs to treasure the chance, as Douglas tells Liam, "Listen, an
opportunity like this for someone like you only comes once." In Sweet Sixteen,
Liam's drug-selling is taken as a kind of self-salvation.
Desperate to try to build a proper family home, Liam needs money. In trying to
acquire it, he displays wittiness and entrepreneurial skill that has little other outlet for
him.
After he is kicked out by Granddad, Liam and Pinball spot with a telescope that
Stan hides drug under some boards in the yard protected by dogs. Liam reckons that
cutting in on Stan's heroin business is the only feasible way for fast money. So he
breaks into Stan's yard at night to get the gear despite the obvious risk. Pinball joins
him on the condition of sharing the profits by "50-50," which is very business-like.
When they get the stuff, Liam and Pimple tum themselves into drug sellers and they
are quick to learn. Again with the telescope, they monitor that in one afternoon, 42
people have come to Stan, and Liam decides to go short cut by cutting them off so
that "we could do more business in an afternoon than we do in a week." Pinball is
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afraid of the high danger, so Liam does it himself. But soon he is beaten to the ground
by three guys with his gear snatched away. Then we see Liam rise up, chase, being
beaten again, rise up again ... This repeats several times until Liam gets back his gear
when Pinball comes to his help. His tough spirit tells us his determination of not
losing a penny for the caravan.
Their unregulated selling catches the attention of the local professional drug
gangster Douglas and Tony (Martin McCardie). They catch them, check Liam's arm
and find he's clean. "You may be a breath of fresh air, kid," said Douglas, hinting that
he can be a reliable seller (can't be using and not selling). Pressed by the remaining
mortgage, Liam now targets big and wants to win Douglas as a steady supplier. "If we
prove we can do this-that's a big fucking if-he's going to get us a regular supply.
The more we sell, the bigger our cut." Liam ignores Pinball's warning; all he concerns
is how to do bigger and better: "We've got to prove ourselves. Sell more than
anybody else without getting caught. We've got to move fast. That's the secret." Liam
then smartly hits upon the idea of making use of pizza delivery-fast speed and good
guise. He wins the cooperation of the local pizza delivery mates and they start to
deliver drugs by hitching a ride on their mopeds. Liam compensates the late delivery
losses of pizza boys with generosity.
Liam's enterprising, inventive mind and his toughness soon impress and win
appreciation of Douglas. When Liam is thinking of doing big together with Pinball in
partnership, Liam is told to do alone. And he is put to serious trial: he is told to kill a
man in a toilet with a lethal knife. With great nervousness and struggle, he passes the
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trial. Douglas offers to supply drugs to him and buys the pizza place in Tony's name
for him to run in disguise. He asks him to buy new bikes, pick some good boys and
run the business. He even offers him an apartment to shelter his mother. But he wants
Liam to punish Pinball for destroying his car and club first before collecting the key.
"An opportunity like this for someone like you comes only once," Liam is told. So
Liam has no choice but to go and report back that it is done.
As Liam climbs to higher levels of the local underworld, we can sense the irony
here on the Thatcherite ethos of entrepreneurial self-help. If Liam and Pinball's
collecting 25 pence from kids in order to look at the stars through their telescope is
clever self-help "business," their later drug business is clearly not. It is revenge.
Matthews argues, "When the highest legitimate goal we hear about is a part-time job
at a call center, it isn't remarkable that he should be embarking on a career as a petty
gangster" (2002, p. 56). The solid advantages of crime for the culturally dispossessed
are not just material, but also spiritual--security, status, companionship and even
self-esteem.
The film also shows the reversal of generational roles. Children have to take on
the role of adults, such as Liam and Chantelle. And in a bizarre way, it is Douglas
who offers Liam a kind of "fatherly care," providing him with a luxury apartment and
designing him a promising future: "And if it works out and I think it will, Liam, you
can buy it over a period of time." And the reason is simple: "You work for me, T take
care of you. As easy as that." Bromley points out that, in a world lacking father's love,
"it is a profound irony that Liam's only 'fathering' bond is with the man whose gifts
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will help to destroy him" (2003, para. 8).
The story ends with Liam on the riverside, alone, fighting back tears. His sister
phones him and asks where he is, he answers "I don't know." Then the sister tells him
that everybody is looking for him and the police have been round. She regrets for him,
"Oh, Liam. What a waste. What a waste. It's your birthday, you're 16. Did you know
that? What are we going to do? Eh?" With the sad sigh, Liam ends the call:
"Chantelle, my batteries are running down." In the final scene, Liam, with his back
facing the audience, gazes out over the river and faces his future. In the last crucial
moment, it is the sweet sister, who earlier has told him that their mother is incapable
of loving them, phones him to say "I love you, Liam." The absence of his mother
affirms Chantelle's verdict and totally breaks Liam's dream. We can easily imagine
the immense sadness and despair in this 16-year-old boy. Liam's desire to use his
"head" instead of knife simply won't work.
Stylistically, Loach used a mostly non-professional cast of young actors coming
mostly from the deprived areas of Western Scotland where the film is set. They really
gave the film a documentary-like feeling.
Sweet Sixteen was given an "18" certificate by the British Board of Film

Classification mostly for its strong language, e.g. the frequent use of the word "cunt,"
an act which was bitterly attacked. "It was ridiculous," said the producer. "My son,
who was eleven at the time, saw the film and said there was nothing that he had not
heard in the school playground when he was eight" (Hayward, 2004, pp. 258-259).
The classification was overturned to "15" by the local authority in Inverclyde Council
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where the story is set, so that those who were most prominently represented on screen
could see the film in cinemas. Bristol made the same reclassification.
Films of Loach, Frears, Leigh's 1990s film Naked, Gary Oldman's Nil By
Mouth all share a profound pessimism. The characteristic pessimism makes this group

of films in sharp contrast with films of the optimistic "feel-good" films which will be
dealt with in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER VI
WORKING-CLASS IDENTITY IN 1990s SOCIAL REALIST COMEDIES

Working class representation was carried more strongly into the 1990s when the
economic and social damage brought by globalization, local industrial decline and the
restructuring of the labor market led to the redefining of British traditional working
class as non-working "underclass" in a post-industrial context. Similar to the New
Wave but different from the 1980s, the 1990s' films were more characteristically
"men's films" with an obsessive focus on white, "male no-longer-working class"
(Monk, 2000a, p. 156), projecting pessimistic images of alienation and masculine
anxiety and a world of disintegration. Apart from the somber critical films by
independent directors and the youth problem films, a group of feelgood comedies
emerged, represented by The Full Monty (Peter Cattaneo, 1997), Brassed Off (Mark
Herman, 1996) and Billy Elliot (Stephen Daldry, 2000). They created humorous and
comically absurd moments within the serious context of unemployment and its effect
on male characters. The Full Monty describes the job-seeking Sheffield steel workers
regaining self-respect through collective stripping; Brassed Off depicts Grimethorpe
miners in the process of pit closure regaining self-pride through their brass band
championship in national competition. Billy Elliot centers on a young boy Billy, who
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struggles to win the support of his widowed father and elder brother, both are on
strike in the context of the 1984-5 miners' strike, for his talent as a ballet dancer and
ends up playing the leading role in Swan Lake. This chapter will deal with these more
commercialized comedies, or tragi-comics, that have found huge worldwide success,
with focus on two films-- Brassed Off and The Full Monty. 15
Exploring the heavy issue of unemployment and industrial decay in a comic
way runs the risk of appearing not serious enough or uncaring. Yet in the
representation of working class, British cinema has had Ealing comedy of the 1950s
as an important tradition, producing laughter through playing with notions of "English
eccentricity." The 1990s feel-good comedies have been widely seen as both a
continuation as well as an extension of certain traditions of Ealing comedy (Mather,
2006, p. 29), for which they were also termed '''neo-Ealing' comedy-dramas" (Mather,
2006, p. 18).
But the tendency was more determined by the market-oriented nature of British
film culture of the 1990s. In more fierce competition and broader cooperation with
Hollywood, low-budget British films bore the pressures of commercialization and
employed feel good comic style for market success. Simon Beaufoy, screenwriter of

The Full Monty, revealed in an interview that the humorous elements pervading The
Full Monty were part of a calculated attempt to make the film more appealing to a

15 Hill regards these two films as "delayed" 1980s' films due to the setting of de industrialization and unemployment, yet he feels

"It 15

wUlkely" that the films "could have worked so effectIvely as comedy" If they "had actually been made during the early 1980s" (Hill, 1999, p.
168) when the struggle to prevent the closure of heavy mdustries was still ongoing. Monk suggests that in their consistent expression of the
problems of the post-mdustnal male as problems of gender, the two fIlms are "very much films of the I 990s" (Monk, 2000b, p 279).
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wider audience: "we did sit down and say, 'Let's see if we can make a film about
working-class people which working-class people will actually want to watch.'
Uberto Pasolini. .. saw that the way to do this was to make it funny. Ken Loach's work
has got funnier and funnier over the years, because I think he's realized that comedy
is a way of pulling in audiences .. .It's a way of sugaring the pill- and sadly you now
have to use more and more sugar." (as cited in Mather, 2006, p. 6) Beaufoy also
complained that in so doing, "political messages have to be so hidden in films these
days that they are almost invisible" and he saw Ken Loach's Riff Raff (1990) as
playing a "braver game" (as cited in Wayne, 2006, p. 290).

The Full Monty won the most successful box-office in mid 1990s. Funded and
distributed by Fox Searchlight, it cost only £2.2 million in production, yet spent
around £25 million in distribution and marketing, and took $211 million worldwide in
box office (Dyja, 2010, p. 99). Anne Dudley won Academy Award for Best Music,
Original Musical or Comedy Score, and the film won nominations for Best Director,
Best Picture and Best Original Screenplay. It also won BAFTAs for Best Film, Best
Performance by an Actor in a Leading Role (Robert Carlyle) and Supporting Role
(Tom Wilkinson). Brassed Offwas a less commercially successful film, but was quite
popular at home and won much critical praise. Funded and distributed by Channel
Four, the film cost about £2,53m and earned £3,388,319 in UK box office and $2.5
million in US box office (Dyja, 2010, p. 109). The film won awards in France,
Germany and Japan, and some British awards of lower level than the BAFTA. The
soundtrack album of the Grimethorpe Colliery Band sold 60,000 copies and was
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nominated for aBAFT A. To boost sale, regional cultures of north England were
packaged for visibility in American market. Location shooting was taken and
relatively unknown actors were used for realism effect.
The two films share similar themes like unemployment, anti-Thatcherism, a
northern community under threat, poverty and marital breakdown, suicide attempts,
brass bands, collective support and a climax ending. Despite the feel-good mood, both
films are in essence "elegies" for working-class (Dave, 2006, p. 61), and in this
respect, Brassed Offis a far angrier film.
Brassed OJJ(Mark Herman, 1996)
The film was set in the small Yorkshire mining town of Grimley ten years after
the 1984 miners' strike and tells the story of how the Grimley Colliery bass band, in
existence for a hundred years as old as the mine and the only remaining source of
community pride, competes for championship in the national brass band competition
when the colliery community faces the threat of pits closure and unemployment. The
Tory government is reviving a new round of pit closures and 7 pits have already been
closed. The miners are now deciding whether to fight to keep the pit open or vote for
redundancy. A few members are thinking of quitting the band as they cannot afford
the weekly "kitty" payment, but are temporarily persuaded to carry on by their
passionate band leader Danny (Pete Postlethwaite), a retired miner, and attracted by a
newcomer to the band, Gloria (Tara Fitzgerald), the beautiful granddaughter of a
former band leader. Gloria is returning to her home town to conduct a viability study
of the pit for the British Coal Board. But she soon realizes that her report will not be
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read as the decision to close the pit has been made two years ago. The brass band wins
the national semi-finals, only to find that most miners have voted for redundancy so
as to get the generous immediate redundancy payment. Danny, having worked all his
life in the pit, collapses with pneumoconiosis and is rushed to the hospital. His son,
Phil (Stephen Tomkinson), is in debt and loan sharks strip his house empty and his
wife leaves him with the children. In great despair, Phil breaks down at a Harvest
Festival clown performance, in which he attacks God for creating the heartless Tory
Party, and he soon hangs himself at the colliery, but is saved. The band cannot afford
to take part in the final in the Albert Hall in London. But Gloria contributes her
unemployment pay-off money of £3000 to help. The band travels to London and won
the competition. But now Danny realizes that it is a hollow triumph. The film ends
with Danny making a powerful emotional winning speech on stage about how the
miners have been betrayed and disposed by the Tory government and shocks the
audience by refusing to take the trophy, though the trophy is reclaimed by other
members.
The film develops clearly along two lines, the political, around the pit closure,
and the cultural, around the colliery band. The former is heart-breaking whereas the
latter is heart-warming. The film's first 12 minutes economically introduces the major
characters and with balanced weight provides us with the context of the imminent
closure of Grimley Colliery, one of the few Yorkshire pits to survive the 1980s, and
the community bond of brass band which is cherished by its leader above anything
else. Then, to fit in with the comedy format, there is a gradual shift in scale and focus
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which makes the band the central issue, trivializing the closure issue as a side line or a
back drop. The world of the colliery brass band and its conductor is explored with
comic and romantic sentiment, added with inspiring music. But beneath this surface
line, the film takes basically a serious look at a British mining community and focuses
on the stress and despair faced by the miners and their families as their source for
making a living, the mine, faces closure. In so doing, it exposes the political and
management strategy of choosing efficiency and profit over the welfare of the miners.
Working-class identity is fully displayed in their response to the political and cultural
changes.
The film begins in darkness, with a series of glittering spots gradually moving
closer to us in a dark background, accompanied by the beautiful music of brass band.
These images soon become identifiable as lamps worn by miners on their cap to lead
their way out from the depth of the earth to daylight. The coal-digging together, the
communal showers and fun-making are soon followed in contrast by women in the
street protesting against the anticipated pit closure, to whom the miners wave to show
respect on their way returning home from work. Gloria moves into the town, settling
in a small inn. Then Vera (Sue Johnston) and Rita (Lili Roughley), both miner's wife,
were chatting over a backyard fence, stating their sympathy and support for the band
to close if the pit shuts down, since there is no point in carrying on the one without the
other. Between them a grey-haired man reading his popular paper speaks one sentence
"You get used to it,,,16 which seems to indicate the dilemma of miners in the face of

16

Quotations in this chapter with no citations are all taken from the scripts in the relevant films.
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social changes wrought by unemployment. Then we have Jim (Philip Jackson) and
Ernie (Peter Martin) discussing about quitting the band to avoid weekly payment,
since they can only spend on "essential items." Next, we hear a more comprehensive
coverage of the context through TV reporting: "We visit Grimley Colliery, which
despite being one of the oldest and largest mines in Yorkshire coalfield has
nevertheless become the most recent candidate for closure. Although the Grimley
miners, and their wives, seem very determined to fight on and keep their pit open, a
redundancy offer to the workforce is believed to be imminent. Other redundancy
offers at neighboring pits recently have been too attractive to ignore. In the last few
weeks, 7 pay-off packages have been offered to 7 pits. All accepted, leading to 7
closures." An urgency is established as "Representatives of union and management
meet tonight to discuss the Grimley redundancy offer to be put to the Grimley
miners." Between the reporting, we see women in the street chanting "The miners,
united, will never be defeated." We also see Phil pressed by his wife to take
redundancy payment. At the rehearsal, the band leader Danny tries to boost morale
with his passion for music. With all contradictions displayed in the film's first 12
minutes, pace slows down for deeper exploration and representation.

The political.
With the political line, capitalist hypocrisy and Thatcherism are all under severe
attack; working-class poverty and despair and working class consciousness are
explicitly displayed.
The management, represented by Mckenzie (Stephen Moore), the managing
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director of the Coal Board, is marked by shameless hypocrisy. The Coal Board hires
Gloria to conduct a survey on the future viability of the pit, and Gloria naively
believes that with her report showing Grimley as "a profitable pit," she can "help it
stay open." Mckenzie's proclaim on television that "Nobody wants Grimley to close"
is viewed by Gloria in her room. When she gradually senses the half-heartedness of
the management, Floria goes to Mckenzie and is assured that her report is "vital" and
"absolutely paramount." He tells her, "If this pit goes to review, and we hope it will,
we have crucial decisions to make and we can't make them without detailed accurate
reports from highly qualified people such as yourself," although he hints that the
business is "tricky." When Gloria finishes the report and hands it in, nobody seems to
show any concern about it. Gloria is immediately awakened to realize that she has
been cheated and made use of. Reports "have to be seen to be written," but "are not
written to be seen;" "no one will ever read." When Gloria challenges Mckenzie that
the decision to close the pit "wasn't made today-it was made weeks ago," to her
surprise, she is told the cruel truth that the decision was made "two years ago" and
"Coal, is history, Miss Mullins."
Mckenzie is "the smiling, insincere, manipulative symbol of the government"
who does his job "with the minimum of emotional involvement and the maximum of
efficiency" (Dyja, 2010, p. 112). He "oozes fake charm" (Dyja, 2010, p. 112) in
duping Gloria and cheating the public and suffers no moral guilt about making 1000
men redundant. He has full confidence in his vicious strategy of bribery at union
consultation and the outcome of miners' decision turns out to be as he foresees. Shots
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of his smiling face after being informed of the result of the ballot on his mobile phone
indicate how false he has always been when he claims earlier that "No one wants
Grimley to close."
Capitalist management tries to disintegrate working-class solidarity with
blackmail. So, miners are offered two options. The first one is favored by the trade
union leaders; they can "vote to take pit to Review Procedure" so that they can get "a
decent chance" of keeping the pit open. The second, they can "vote to take pay-off"
and get stuffed. To lure the miners into voting for money, the management raises the
redundancy offer to a further £3000, "from a twenty grand maximum to twenty three
with a five grand sweetener" and makes it only a temporary offer. As explained by a
union leader, "If you say no, they're pulling any future offer down to a flat fifteen,"
which is "tantamount to bribery." Obviously the miners are "held to ransom" as the
generous offer put on the table "comes with strings attached" (Dyja, 20 10, p. 112).
The redundancy payment is really "dirty money," representing a ruling class seeking
to divide and buy off the miners so that they will not vote for a review of the
economic status of their pit.
So the miners face dilemma. On the one hand, they have a clear class
consciousness of the cold-bloodedness of the management, which is clearly illustrated
through the mouth of a union leader at the union meeting hearing about the offer: "It's
a profitable pit, this. There's hundreds of years of coal down there, but it doesn't seem
to matter to them, bastards. We're making money for'em, hand over fist, we are. And
still they want to shut us down." The union proposal asking miners to "Say no to
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bloody blackmail and yes to keeping this pit alive" in ballot is warmly cheered. But
on the other hand, they are pressed to take the money offer by the poverty-stricken
economic condition. Phil is urged by his wife Sandra (Melanie Hill) to "Take money
while it is still on offer," before they are "out on bloody street." The Thatcher attack
on strikers and trade unions has removed their confidence and weakened their will.
The shadow of the 1984 strike hangs over the film as a miserable memory, as Phil
says "We didn't do what they wanted in '84 ... That's eighteen months on bloody
strike pay. With a wife, bloody kids, mortgage." Phil was imprisoned for his union
activities and dismissed by the pit in that strike. It took a year and half to get him
reinstated, leaving him with debt he is "still frigging paying for." Now the miners
can't see a sense of hope that they'll succeed against the authority. So the miners
represented by Phil are tom between the will to fight for principles and the will to
survive. In the end, a majority of miners, 798--"four to one"--vote for redundancy in
the ballot, much to the expectation and satisfaction of Mckenzie. Phil votes for money,
but is full of frustration and anger towards capitalists and the Tory government. So,
money "distorts the vote by making it an unreliable representation" (Dave, 2006, p.
63).
Andy (Ewan McGregor) is sadly heroic in declaring to Gloria that he will vote
to keep the pit alive: "No hope, just principles," a promise he keeps. He appears to be
sharper than others in seeing through McKenzie's trick on Gloria that the decision to
close the pit has been made long ago-- "probably when you were at college," and in
accurately anticipating the ballot result--"Four to one it'll go for pay-off."
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Working-class poverty and despair is also prioritized by the film, particularly
represented by the suffering of Phil, indicating masculinity in crisis. The threat of pit
closure undermines the men's self-confidence and hardship in daily life throws them
into despair. Phil's difficulty is as his wife Sandra (Melanie Hill) lists when shouting
to ask him to vote for the redundancy payment: "You have a wife and 4 bloody kids
here, a house nobody'll bloody buy, mortgaged up to the bloody hilt, loan-sharks on
our backs, no bloody money, no bloody job, and what are you going to do?" In a local
shop, Sandra is seen greatly embarrassed by her shortage of £1.5 to pay for the very
essential groceries. After returning one item, she is still short of sixty pence, which
Vera kindly allows her to give back next week. Sandra sighs: "Me and money, total
frigging strangers." In giving the receipt, Vera secretly passes a five-pound note to
Sandra in sympathy. To earn some money, Phil works occasionally as a children's
entertainer and dresses up as Mr Chuckles in clown outfit. At one such occasion, he is
observed by a mother paying him that being a clown isn't his main job. Phil answers
that he is a miner, and adds that "You remember them, love? Dinosaurs, dodos,
miners." His home is twice looted by moneylenders. The first time, Phil is just back
from a clown performance and he rushes to stop them clumsily in huge clown's feet.
His made-up smiling clown face and funny movement is contrasted with those of the
menacing loan sharks, creating a sense of a tragi-farcical situation. Phil is knocked to
the ground by a punch in the face. The sequence ends with their threat that they'll be
back with truck for all his things unless he pays up. The second time the loan sharks
simply efficiently take away everything in the home with the wife in tears and the
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kids in terror, when Phil is playing in the semi-final.
His predicament is a result of the 1984 strike. The pass of ten years has
accumulated his debt to the unbelievable amount of £12,000 due to "that interest" of
loan sharks. His situation is further worsened when he purchases a new trombone in
credit payment in order to please his dying father. The looting of his home by loan
sharks leads to his wife's departure with all the kids. Under the double pressure of
family break-up and his father's imminent death, Phil is on the verge of a mental
breakdown, as is revealed by his absent-mindedness at job-finding club (ironically
named the "Rescue Room") built on the former pit-site and by his sitting miserably by
a canal. There is no work of any substance on offer for the redundant men. He suffers
enormous humiliation as a breadwinner, when he finally loses his "wife, kids, home,
job, self-respect, hope." So he hangs himself from the top of the pithead, but is saved.
The scene from long shot of him hanging high up there in clown clothes to immediate
close-up of him struggling with the noose around his neck calling "Help" is
melodramatic, but chilling; "the joke isn't funny anymore" (Dyja, 2010, p. 114).
Capitalist exploitation is cruel and cold-blooded. The mining job is dangerous
and harmful. Danny appears to be dying from black lung which he has caught by his
life-long work down the mine before retirement. And he is not alone in suffering from
that. Gloria's grandfather, Arthur Mullins, "bravest miner" in Danny's words, had
lungs packed in 1979. Danny tells his son when he is hospitalized: "I was alongside
Arthur Mullins everyday of his working life. They say when they opened up his lung,
there were nowt in there but coal dust. Slack. Slack everywhere. Took them a week to
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get t'slab clean." The final shot in the film is a close-up of Danny's face, "a lifetime
of striving and suffering engrained in his proud features" (Mather, 2006, p. 33)
Thatcherism is forcefully condemned through the discourse of the father and
the son. Phil, after the loan sharks loot his house and his wife and children leave him,
continues his clown performance as Mr Chuckles in church celebration of the Harvest
Festival with children. In a profound state of personal despair, he breaks out with a
fierce attack on the Tory Party and Mrs Thatcher. According to him, God created the
Tory party in an irresponsible and vicious way. When his little assistant reported to
him that "we've got all these bodies left, but we're right out of brains, we're right out
of hearts and we're right out of vocal chords," God simply responded "Sew 'em up
anyway. Smack smiles on their faces and make them talk out their arses." Thus God
created the Tory Party. Then he continues to scold God for taking lives of good people,
such as John Lennon, three young miners and his dad, but let "Margaret bloody
Thatcher" live. Yet Phil's attack is seen by Mather to be weakened by his guise as a
clown, his rather inappropriate audience of a group of six-year-olds, and his state of
nervous breakdown (2006, pp. 39-40). In contrast, Danny's speech at the end of the
film in the glamorous Albert Hall to a decent concert audience is seen to be "the
greatest moral and emotional statement" (Dyja, 2010, p. 113). Danny has kept a
detached stance toward the political and industrial confrontations. But in the end, he is
shocked into reality by Phil's suicide attempt and explodes in condemning the
"bloody" Tory government, which over the last ten years "has systematically
destroyed an entire industry" and mining communities "all in the name of progress."
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He also adds attack on the public's general apathy toward working class fate.
In general, politically, the film is "less interested in mining than in what this
work means to a community predicated on its availability" (Hitchcock, 2000, p. 25).
Only a few seconds in the opening sequences and in the middle of the film are
devoted to real miners at work, emerging blackened by the soot of coal and having
group shower afterwards. The defeat of the 1984/85 national miners' strike has led to
the loss of working-class people's power of political struggle. The political analysis is
"broad brush and gestural" and class is "evacuated from both work and outside of
work as a mobilizing factor in organization" (Bromley, 2000, p. 62, p. 63). More
space is given to community life around the pit closure--the weakened and divided
solidarity, the pain and despair of redundancy, the loss of self-respect and the
destruction of community. In the context of job insecurity, weakened union leadership,
many people resign to their fate, become depoliticized and can only resort to the
cultural as resistance. Harry is an example. As his wife scolds him, "Ten years ago
before the strike you were so full of fight, packed full of passion; now you just do
nowt. All you do is blow your bloody trumpet." To this, Harry's response is: "But at
least people listen to us." The film does show some human costs of closure in a few
powerful and moving scenes, but this is somewhat eroded by the sentimental magical
resolution in fantasy and victory, with the defeated workforce overshadowed by the
victorious band.
The cultural.

The cultural line develops around the brass band and the mining community.
245

Hoggart in Uses of Literacy observed that working-class culture was in terminal
decline. Yet Macnab drew our attention to the fact that Brassed Off "suggests how
prolonged its dying throes have been" (1996, p. 44). The colliery brass band is seen as
the cultural embodiment of the history and traditions of industrial communities,
suggesting local pride and masculinity. In the case of coal miners, it symbolizes a
class-specific form of solidarity in the face of a dangerous and exploitative occupation,
providing an outlet for men in ups and downs. In the film, Danny, the conductor of
the band, delivers several speeches in camera close-up defending devoutly the brass
music.
Danny persists in following his dream of winning a national championship,
even though he is deathly ill with "black lung." For him, the band is "one thing more
than owt else here that symbolizes pride." So the pit under threat is a minor issue
compared with regional and national band competitions and is a "separate" matter.
Acknowledging the reality as "worrying times," he draws members' attention to the
band's long history of "[0 ]ver a hundred years" from 1881, in which the band
experienced "two world wars, three disasters, seven strikes, one bloody big
depression" and "played on every flaming time." The band will be the only one
reminder of what he terms a "hundred bloody years of hard graft." He takes great
pride in seeing the band now entering the national semi finals and is capable of going
through to the Albert Hall in London for the first time in its history. For Danny, "This
is music, and it's music that matters." When his son, also in the band, tells him that "I
love the band. We all do. But there's other things in life, you know, that's more
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important," he simply responds that "Not in mine, there isn't."
Danny's passion for the importance of music and his striving for excellence is
"rooted in a respect for northern working-class traditions of self-education, and of
communities who refuse to be ground down by external pressures" (Mather, 2006, p.
33). As he speaks to his band, "They can shut up the unions, they can shut up the
workers ... they'll never shut us up. We'll play on. Loud as ever."
The competition scenes set in fourteen Yorkshire villages act like carnivals with
numerous trade bands marching and playing proudly, displaying a sense of a thriving
local brass band culture and community spirit. During such performances, may be due
to pints of beer, the Grimley band produces some inharmonious tunes and Phil's old
trumpet falls apart. Danny is horrified by the casual attitude and ashamed that
audiences are "Laughing ... bloody laughing at us." For Danny, the band's
disintegration represents a lack of respect for the beauty of music, and an offence for
working-class predecessors of the band. Bromley infers a deeper implication of this
poor performance as the "emasculations" of the work force (2000, p. 62)
Coming back, Danny wants his debt-ridden son to buy a new trombone: "you're
a bloody good trombonist lad, you need a bloody good trombone." But Phil replies,
"I'm not forking out for a new trombone just for one performance." Yet the father's
deathly ill coughing prompts Phil to buy a new trombone to "make him die happy" as
Phil tells his son, putting a down payment earned from clown performance without
informing his wife.
The band and its "surprisingly rousing and emotional" music (Macnab, 1996, p.
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44) seem to serve as the last straw miners can cling to in a postmodem environment
for community and collectivity. The cultural is highlighted to warm people's heart
whereas the political is overshadowed as a doomed cause. Gloria's audition is intercut
with scenes of the union representatives and the Coal Board officials negotiating
together. The elegiac music performed by the band completely covers men's voices in
the crucial discussion. We only see union representatives angrily waving arms, but
never hear what is actually argued. Alexander Walker in his Evening Standard review
of Brassed Off suggested that "Loach wouldn't have missed this class-confrontation
opportunity" (as cited in Mather, 2006, p. 36). The implication of the sequence
appears to be that "nothing that is said by the union officials can deflect the moves
afoot to close down the mine" (Mather, 2006, p. 36). The music chosen for the
audition is from Cancierta de Aranjuez, written by a Spanish composer during the
Spanish Civil War. It is thought to suggest a desire by the makers of Brassed Off to
"imply a link between the struggles of the Republicans in the Spanish conflict ... and
British miners made redundant since the I 970s" (Mather, 2006, p. 35).
Similarly, the semi-final performance sequence is interwoven with scenes
around the pit ballot results, which happen simultaneously-the announcement of 798
votes for redundancy, the different reactions of the miners, Sandra's despair at
discovering Phil's credit buying note when washing his clothes, Mckenzie's happy
face when informed of the result, and men emptying Phil's home with a truck. Miners
and town-folk are portrayed walking in slow pace and heavy footsteps, in silence and
with heads down, an image of immense sadness. The sublime music and the winning
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of the semi-final with 198 points appear hollow when the band returning home is
greeted by words in red "We fought and lost" written on the Grimley Colliery sign
board and a town in mourning, a bitter irony and contrast to the band which has just
fought and won their semi-final. Shot from behind, Danny walks away alone from the
crowd and suddenly collapses to the ground in front of their eyes. The band, led by
Phil, rush to his aid, their worried faces convey a vivid sense of the urgency and
despair. At this moment, "personal crises and social tragedies are inextricably linked"
(Mather, 2006, p. 38). When Danny is hospitalized, Harry organized a performance of
"Danny Boy" outside the ward building with the lighting by their mining caps, which
is turned off in the end, creating a darkness of sadness.
It is the cultural that offers a utopian solution to an unsolvable problem. The

climax of the film comes when the band is determined to do a good job "for a
thousand redundant miners and one poorly one" at the Royal Albert Hall in London.
William Tell Overture "surprisingly thunders out with rage and power" (Dyja, 2010, p.

114), suggesting "lowly members of the community rising to stake their rightful place
in society" (Mather, 2006, p. 49). Harry (Jim Carter) replaces the sick Danny as
conductor and conducts in a charismatic and impassioned style. In the middle of the
performance, Danny, who escapes from hospital, emerges onto the stage. When the
Grimley Colliery Band is announced the champion of the national brass band
competition, the miners win back their dignity, respect and pride in the applause of
audience. Danny'S lifetime aspiration is seemingly accomplished. So the narrative
"seems to have solved an economic predicament through a humanist gesture to
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community spirit" (Hitchcock, 2000, p. 25). But this is as far as cultural consolation
can go. Here, an ironic turning point appears as Danny goes to the front of the stage
and delivers a bitter speech about his newly developed understanding about the real
meaning and worth of music in the midst of mass unemployment and dashed hopes.
He tells the hall audience (and the film audience in extension) that they are refusing
the trophy: "This band behind me will tell you that trophy means more to me than owt
else in the whole world. But they'd be wrong. Truth is, I thought it mattered. I thought
that music mattered. But does it? Bollocks! Not compared to how people matter. Us
winning this trophy won't mean bugger all to most people. But us refusing it, like
what we're going to do now- well then it becomes news, doesn't it?" After a pause to
attract camera attention, he targets the Tory Party for his fierce attack: " ... over the
last ten years, this bloody government has systematically destroyed an entire industry.
Our industry. And not just our industry. Our communities, our homes, our lives. AlI in
the name of progress and for a few lousy bob." Then he draws audience attention to
the band's pit closure a fortnight ago and criticizes public apathy toward miners'
miserable fate: "Another thousand men lost their jobs. And that's not all they lost.
Most of them lost the will to win a while ago. A few of them even lost the will to fight.
But, when it comes to losing the will to live, to breathe, the point is, if this lot were
seals or whales, you'd be up in bloody arms. But they're not. .. They're just ordinary,
common or garden honest, decent human beings. And not one of them with an ounce
of bloody hope left. They can knock out a bloody good tune. But what the fuck does
that matter?" The speech ends with Danny gasping emotionally and close to tears.
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From music matters to people matter, the public display of anger and dismay from a
meek retired miner makes the message all the more powerful. And the sudden shift of
mood from buoyant, inspirational music to angry discourse condemnation which
denies the film an optimistic or hopeful conclusion makes the surprising ending all the
more shocking.
The band succeeds in winning the competition, but has failed in the effort to
keep the local coal mine in operation. The men thus meet with triumph and disaster
simultaneously, but in essence the triumph is emotional and symbolic whereas the
disaster is economic and fatal.
Working-class solidarity and collectivity is much prioritized in the film. While
political solidarity is disintegrated by the forceful management and weak union
leadership represented through the dirty pay-off money, the traditional working-class
culture of collectivity and community spirit is presented as superior in the film. The
working-class men are frequently seen to visit the pub drinking and playing together,
to have regular band practices and rehearsals in their practice room; their wives chat
at the backyard. After the failed suicide attempt, Phil, when found sitting sadly by a
canal, is pushed for a drink with the team by Jim and the gang, despite his admission
that he has voted for the pit to close. Dave drew our attention to the binary opposition
of the vicious taking by pitiless neo-liberal market and its representative, the pit
manager Mr McKenzie, vs. the working-class collective spirit of humanized giving.
The giving includes: the payment from band members to their collective "kitty;" the
"credit" given to Phil by the music shop; the "collection" to buy a gift for the
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hospitalized, dying Danny; Gloria's donation; and the loan/gift given to Sandra in the
community supermarket. Such kinds of giving are "non- productive expenditure"
aimed to "sustain precious rituals of working class socialization." It represents "a
rejection of the competitive individualism of the market and symbolizes a
working-class moral economy whose values are co-operative and communal" (Dave,
2006, pp. 63-64). The band solidarity is the most inspiring. However, on balance, it is
a bit idealistic and utopian. Gloria's donation repeats many similar endings in English
literature where a legacy or a fortune solves those unsolvable harsh social problems.
The role of women.

Women in Brassed OfJare placed in subordinate and marginal positions, except
Gloria. The community under threat is a men's world. Women are not allowed to play
in the colliery band and are excluded from the working-men's club. A performance
trip is "traditionally ... a male-only excursion." Despite this, the female characters are
represented rather positively.
First of alI, they are firm supporters of the just cause of miners. They run
rallying tents with slogans like "Women Against Pit Closures" and protest in the
colliery streets chanting "The miners, united, will never be defeated." Their
enthusiasm is respected by the men, although their behavior is seen to be naIve by
some wiser male characters, who comment that women are "pissing in the wind, like
the rest of us." Harry's wife is actively involved in such activities and her scolding
Harry of losing the spirit to fight seems to take effect as Harry eventually regains it to
take over Danny's conductor role in the final competition. Two wives dress in purple
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and later even dye their hair purple, the color of the band uniform, as a gesture of
solidarity and support for the band, despite one of them has asked her husband to
resign and not to handing over any kitty money.
Phil is urged by his wife Sandra to vote for money and Sandra later leaves Phil
in hopelessness. But her such behavior can win our sympathy as we see that she
almost has to bring up the kids with no financial support. She is quick in realizing her
misunderstanding of Phil, as her son Shane informs her that the father buys the
trombone not for himself, as she has thought, but to please the granddad to die happy.
The son seems mature beyond his age, seeing through his father's covering of
economic dilemma and persuades his mother "I don't like seeing Dad sad, Mam, but
I'd sooner see

him

sad than

not see him

at all." The question the

eight-and-a-half-year-old Shane asks his mother "How the hell do you die happy?" is
heartbreaking for his mother as well as for the audience. The film finally gives us a
happy resolution to Phil and Sandra's break-up, with Sandra saying "That sounds
tempting" in response to Phil's invitation "I have got a chair now" (in his empty
house).
Gloria represents a modern new woman, educated out of the working class and
economically independent. There is an element of fairy-tale in the way that she is
depicted. Gloria is first "introduced as a love interest and sex object" (Dyja, 2010, p.
115), subjected to male gaze and sexist humor (referred to as "Gloria Stits"). Her
attractiveness is the reason why some band's men decide not to resign. Then, when
she is seen to have a "management logo on her key ring," she is objectified as a class
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enemy of the male working community, despite her claim to them that "I am on your
side; I always was." Andy is mocked by his mates as "sleeping with the enemy."
Gloria appears naive and politically insensitive. When Andy tells her that the decision
to close the pit has been made long ago-- "probably when you were at college," she
retorts "don't be ridiculous" in disbelief. But when she finally discovers that her
report is really a public relations gesture to cloak the management's trick as Andy has
predicted, she immediately resigns. In the end, she becomes a savior, almost a saint.
When the band men are worrying about breaking Danny's heart who "is coughing up
coal" by not competing in London, Gloria hands over what she calls the "dirty
money" of her sack-off payment--a check of £3000, to enable the band to travel to the
Albert Hall to attend the final. By being "a 'magical donor,' a helper and facilitator"
(Mather, 2006, p. 40), Gloria wins the respect and trust of miners and is treated as one
of "us." So, the success of the men is also "dependent upon the involvement of
women" (Hill, 2000a, p. 185).
Gloria's relationship with Andy forms a romantic sub-plot necessary for a
commercial film. She seems to play the upper hand all the way through. At the
beginning, she pretends not to remember the name of Andy-her teenage lover; in the
middle, she easily rekindles the love fire by asking him for a cup of coffee in her
room which she does not really have--"a euphemistic cup of coffee" (Dyja, 2010, p.
115); in the end she hints Andy to kiss her by commenting on Yorkshiremen's
traditional lack of showing emotion. Her resignation makes her a loyal and more
equal partner for Andy, so she wins love through downward mobility.
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Gloria typically represents the postmodern rising women. Her class mobility
gives her a power of choice which is exercised positively; her donation of a good sum
of money to fund the band trip demonstrates her economic power: though
unemployed, she is confident that she will be able to find ajob soon.
The film ends with the band, as ex-miners, journeys home

In

a victory

celebration on an open top bus through the darkness of a London evening. As they
pass the Westminster parliament building, Danny suggests playing what he terms as
"Land of Hope and bloody Glory" to "make them listen for a change," implying the
loss of social justice as a Thatcherite legacy. The emotional rendition of "Pomp and
Circumstance" continues into the closing credits. The captioned postscript undercuts
the comedy-fantasy to a great extent: "Since 1984, there have been 140 pit closures in
Great Britain at the cost of nearly a quarter of a million jobs." The band is finally seen
fading away into the darkness of a London evening towards a gloomy future.
In conclusion, Brassed Off embodies enough necessary ingredients to be a
typical working-class film, though the claim that "it comes close to being socialist"
might be arguable. The film is "a powerful tribute, impossible to watch without tears
at times, to a dying way of life" (Bromley, 2000, p. 63). However, with the
stereotypical and commodified representation, it is seen as more like "a period piece,
almost a costume drama" (Bromley, 2000, p. 63). A heavy subject-matter is dealt with
in feel-good brass music and arousing emotions.

The Full Monty (Peter Cattaneo, 1997)
The film is set in the post-industrial city of Sheffield in West Yorkshire and tells
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the story of a group of unemployed steelworkers who learn to do striptease to earn a
living. Sheffield was once a prosperous steel city, but now it has fallen into ruins with
the steel factories closed and thousands of men losing their jobs. Gary, also called Gaz
(Robert Carlyle), is a former steelworker and about to lose his son because he cannot
pay for the joint custody. His former co-workers are also going through difficulties:
Dave (Mark Addy) is depressed and convinced that his wife is not interested in their
marriage any more; Gerald, their former foreman, has been lying to his wife for six
months about his unemployment; and Lomper (Steve Huison) has to take care of his
elderly mom and is suicidal (attempts to gas himself in a car). When passing by the
local work men's club holding a women's night only for the performance of the
Chippendales, an all-male striptease troupe, and seeing many women paying for it and
hysterically cheering it, Gaz hits upon the idea of copying their fortune. So he
persuades his mates through all kinds of means, including trouble-making at Gerald's
job interview. The four of them come together and recruit Horse (Paul Barber), who is
black and slightly older with good dance moves, and Guy (Hugo Speer), who cannot
dance but is exceptionally "well-endowed." This is an unlikely team because they
have neither good looks nor excellent dance skills, so Gaz realizes that they have to
offer something special to lure a lucrative audience. Hence, the guys are going "the
full monty," which means going totally nude! Gaz proceeds to advertise with posters
and he announces to women on the street that their show will be more worth watching
than the Chippendales because they will go "the fulI monty." The police raid and
arrest for indecent exposure during an "undress" rehearsal brings unexpected publicity
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for these "steel strippers" and boosts tickets sales. The film ends with the men's
performance and the last shot in freezing frame of "the full monty" with their front
facing the club audience but their back towards the cinema audience.
While Brassed Off sets its story in the middle of a cruel industrial dispute and
exerts direct attack on Thatcherism and the management, The Full Monty is a
follow-up story set in a post-industrial context, providing a portrait of the
consequences of Thatcherism in a already much deindustrialized community and
involving the search for new forms of livelihood. In content, direct reflection of
politics is an obvious absence. Stylistically, it is a funny lightweight comedy. But
beneath the surface, like Brassed Off, it explores quite serious issues. There is a more
intense crisis in masculinity centered around shame and loss of self-esteem. And
while Brassed 0fffocuses on Danny, Phil and Gloria, The Full Monty pays attention
to all six members of the stripper team. With regard to themes, Peter Cattaneo,
director of the film, says in the foreword to the published screenplay: "Issues of male
identity, gender roles, body politics and the effects of long-term unemployment are
dealt with ... " (as cited in Bromley, 2000, p. 64). For Hill, the "connection between
unemployment and the erosion of masculinity becomes central" (2000a, p.184). Monk
lists "the unemployed males' desperation for work, loss of self esteem and consequent
relationship difficulties" as key focus of the film (2000a, p. 161).
The film begins with a promotional documentary feature Sheffield-City on the

Move (Coulthard Productions, 1971). The male voice-over narrates the prosperity,
livelihood and joys of Sheffield based on an infrastructure of steel: "Welcome to
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Sheffield! The beating heart of Britain's industrial North! The jewel in Yorkshire's
crown is home to over half a million people, and thousands more flock here daily to
shop and to work. All this is built on Sheffield's primary industry, steel. The city's
rolling mills, forges, and workshops employ some 90,000 men and state-of-the-art
machinery to make the world's finest steel. From high-tensile girders to the stainless
cutlery for your dining table. But it's not all hard work for the people of Steel City.
They can spend the day lounging by the pool, watching one of our top soccer teams,
or browsing in the shops. But when the sun goes down, the fun really starts in the
city's numerous nightclubs and discotheques. Yes, Yorkshire folk know how to have a
good time! And it's good times for the city's housing, too! Sheffield leads the way in
town planning. Victorian slums have been cleared to make way for the homes of the
future. Thanks to steel, Sheffield really is a city on the move!" The film presents a
sunny city with fountains, indoor shopping centers, football, almost tropical parks,
swimming pools, the bright lights and neon signs of Sheffield's nightlife, and more
importantly, shots of steel foundries and men at work.
Then with the big characters "25 years later" on screen, the film cuts
immediately to the contemporary reality of the city in sharp contrast, with shots of a
disused steel factory and idle workers. Gaz and Dave, accompanied by Gaz's son
Nathan (William Snape), are attempting to steal a girder to sell as scrap metal. The
son complains that this isn't what other boys and their fathers do when they are
together. Having once been employed in this very factory "for ten years," the men are
now reduced to petty thieves surviving on its remains. A rehearsing brass band
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associated with the factory (the British Steel Stocksbridge band) is seen passing and
taken by Gaz as "the only thing round here," echoing the band culture in Brassed Off.
This sharp contrast implies how two decades of Conservative policies have eroded the
city's prosperity and its steel industry, leading to an important theme of the film:
anger and despair towards de industrialization which has turned working class into the
underclass. Thematically, the film develops around three lines: crisis in masculinity,
cultural resistance through job innovation of striptease, and reversal of gender roles.
Crisis in masculinity.

While crisis in masculinity in Brassed off is mainly in the aspect of losing
breadwinning power, the issue in The Full Monty is presented as multi-dimensional
centered around shame.
Gaz is ashamed of being unable to look after his son and prove his worth to his
ex-wife Mandy (Emily Woof). He is desperate to maintain his relationship with his
son Nathan. Mandy has settled with a new partner in a more affluent part of town. She
threats to rid Gaz ofthe right for joint custody through legal procedure unless he pays
his maintenance share of £700. Gaz also cannot afford his son to watch the football
match between Sheffield United and Manchester United. So Gaz is mad for cash. As
he explains to his son, he intends to take striptease "so as you and me can keep seeing
each other. They're trying to stop us, you see." Meanwhile, Gaz is embarrassed about
not being able to pay the £ 100 deposit for their performance venue. His desperation
leads him to reluctantly take Nathan's precious bank savings when Nathan insists.
Gaz is mentioned by his son as having stayed some time in prison. Now he continues
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to hold an amoral attitude to petty cnme, secretly picking rusty girder and
encouraging Dave to steal the Flashdance video and later a black suit for Lomper's
mother's funeral from the supermarket where Dave has just worked as security guard,
displaying explicit underclass features. Stealing, for Gaz, is "liberating" as he tells his
son.
Dave seems to have lost his self-esteem and is ashamed of lacking sexual
appeal to his wife. He becomes increasingly self-conscious about his body size and
tries dieting. He feels that with his jobless status plus his weight problem, he cannot
possibly be attractive to his wife. His depression kills his sex drive and his poor
self-image makes him fearful that his wife Jean will leave him. Throughout the film
he is labeled as "a fat bastard," which normally he can easily laugh off when he has a
job. The idea of stripping heightens his anxieties. He wants to earn money and show
his worth but he cannot. He reluctantly takes security guard work, but quite clearly
this does not help his esteem. His problem is as Jean notices: "it's like he's given up.
Work. Me. Everything." But she does not know how to help him. In the private
bedroom, Dave even asks his wife whether she has been out with a black bloke,
implying his feeling of sexual inadequacy. Dave's lack of self-confidence hurts
deeply his wife and their marriage.
Gerald, the former foreman, is ashamed about being unemployed. He has been
out of work for six months, but has not dared to inform his wife. And the longer he
delays, the more difficult it becomes. So he pretends to go out to work each day and
tries every effort in an attempt to maintain his traditional breadwinning role and the
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living standard of his family. Indeed, we see him seriously applying for jobs and
going through an interview. He is annoyed at the disturbance by Gaz and Dave during
the interview. When he feels that his performance has been fatally ruined, he is near
the stage of breakdown. In chasing them for a fight, he calls them "bastard," and tells
his pressure of responsibilities: "I've got a standard of living! Responsibilities! I was
on me way up! I am on me way up! It was my first interview in months!" Finally
some men sent by loan sharks come to loot his home and his wife learns the truth.
Lomper, at the beginning part of the film, attempts to kill himself by inhaling
poisonous fumes in his car, but is rescued by Dave. Ironically, he has a job as a
security guard of the disused steel factory and even plays in the works band. Yet the
job is of low esteem as Gaz sighs: "No wonder he wants to kill himself" after
knowing his work. He appears to be a social misfit and a loner without a single friend.
He lives at home with his elderly mother, who needs being looked after by him. Later
he is shown to have homosexual tendency as he takes the opportunity of escaping
from a police raid to kiss and fondle Guy.
As their innovation is amateur striptease performance, their attention is
naturally diverted to the scrutiny of their own bodies. Dave is extremely nervous and
uneasy that his overweight body cannot live up to feminine ideals. In a dance practice
at Gerald's home, when Gerald consoles him that "Fat is a feminist issue," Dave
replies "What's that supposed to mean?" implying that he takes it as a universal issue
also applicable to men. In another scene when the men are practicing again in
Gerald's house, making use of his wife's sunbed and exercise bike and are looking at
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a copy of the woman's magazine, Cosmopolitan, Lomper's comments on women
having too big tits inspires them to consider how they will be looked at in much the
same way as men have traditionally looked at women. Their masculinity crisis around
the body is more overtly conveyed. Dave expresses deep fear not only about himself,
but also about other team members: "what if next Friday 400 women turn round and
say 'He's too fat, he's too old and he's a pigeon-chested little tosser,' What happens
then, eh?" After that, Dave wraps his stomach in cling film. Horse is worried about
having "a doggy hip" and uses a penis enlarger (a pump) in a vain attempt to "live up
to the bawdy connotations of his name" (Luckett, 2000, p. 95). Among them, Guy has
a perfect body, worthy of male pride. He is muscular and "well-endowed." When he
shows his penis at the audition, the men are speechless at the size and Gaz exclaims,
"Gentlemen, the lunchbox has landed." Yet, ironically, Guy turns out to be gay and
later gets close with the rather pale and weak Lomper.
News about doing the full monty frightens everybody. When Gaz says that
"We've gotta give them more than your average ten-bob stripper," everyone shows
worrying concern about his own "willy," which would be "A laughing stock. Totally!"
Yet Gaz justifies that "folks don't laugh so loud when you've a grand in your pocket."
Three days before the performance, Dave quits the group and takes on a security
guard job in a supermarket. When the men are arrested by the police for indecent
exposure during another rehearsal in the disused steel factory, their project seems
doomed, but is rescued by the newspaper publicity.
At the final stage, Gaz, the initiator of the whole venture, ironically refuses to
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get on stage when he sees men in the audience, not "Women only!" as their poster
defines. His shout--"It's suicide! That's what it is! Suicide!"-reveals his lack of
confidence with his body. Only with his son's encouragement and assurance that his
ex-wife's partner does not come that he finally joins others.
The crisis in masculinity also leads to the infantilization of unemployed males
and the reversal of generational roles (Bromley, 2000, p. 64). In the film, the
unemployed men are childlike, behaving like adolescents. They wander in the streets
and play in children's playground (sitting on swings). They wait for Gerald in a
children's playroom. They act like undisciplined schoolboys in the job club, playing
cards and having fights. To ruin Gerald's interview, they distract him with a
puppet-show battle, which takes place outside the window behind the backs of the
interviewer, using his beloved garden gnomes to attack each other. Gerald finds
himself fatally distracted, especially when one gnome smashes another. So we see an
angry and emotional Gerald condemning their lack of concern: "Bastard! That were
mine, that job! You don't give a toss! You're kids!. .. Why did you do it?" Gaz and
Dave later apologize by sticking it with superglue and buys him a four-wheel toy cart.
The men also hold very funny rehearsals at various places. For Caplan, the fact that
everywhere seems to have become a playground for them serves to highlight that
"they no longer have any place in which to be grown-ups" (1997, p. 43).
Gaz's little son Nathan conversely seems to be the most mature male character
in the film, behaving like an adult. He shows understanding of his father's love for
him by staying with him a lot, disapproves of his father's striptease idea, his petty
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crime of stealing girder and his suggestion of gatecrashing football matches, and is
willing to pay for Gaz's venue deposit. He also "acts as Gaz's conscience" (Dyja,
2010, p. 104). When Gaz hesitates at last minute, it is Nathan who successfully brings
him onto the stage by helping him win back self-confidence with such words: "I'm
gonna get really annoyed with you. They're cheering out there. You did that. Now get
out there and do your stuff."
Bromley's statement best summarizes the state of men: "The male responses
are seen to be, variously, depressive, suicidal, child-like and regressive, self-pitying or
fantasy-adjusted" (2000, p. 65). This crisis in masculinity is deep and fatal. As Gaz
comments to Dave at the job club about a woman's urinating standing up, "when
women start pissing like us, that's it. We're finished, Dave. Extincto .... A few years
and men won't exist, except in a zoo or summat. We're not needed no more, are we?
Obsolete. Dinosaurs. Yesterday's news." "Like skateboards," Dave adds. The
determining role of economic base is recognized. When Gaz challenges Dave for
allowing his wife watch striptease: "where is your pride?" Dave says "It's her
money."
Cultural resistance: job innovation for post-working class.

Unlike Brassed Off, which has direct anti-Thatcherism attack, the political in
The Full Monty seems to be an absence. Work scene only appears for a few seconds in

the 1971 promotional documentary. Although Gary and his friends are out of work
and lead a desperate life, they do not resort to any political actions or voice any
vicious political condemnations. There is no mention of trade unions or other
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organizations for workers; the working men's club is shifted for striptease
entertainment; and the job center where the redundant meet is not treated seriously.
Like Brassed off, community spirit functions not in political struggle, but only in
cultural resistance and self-healing. Bromley has a point in suggesting that the film
"removes class as a dimension of analysis, which means that the interests of capital in
de-skilling, downsizing and privatizing remain an 'absent content'" (2000, p. 65),
though the statement that this is due to fore grounding of gender and identity politics is
highly arguable. According to Bromley, in appropriating the slogan "the personal is
political," "the political has only a muted presence" (2000, p. 65) throughout the
representation.
The political anger in the film is communicated via a more indirect critique
reflected in their attitude toward work and more mocking cultural resistance toward
Thatcherite ideology through doing striptease.
Gaz's attitude toward work is thought-provoking. Though desperate for money,
he constantly challenges the postmodern order by refusing to take on what he regards
as low-esteem poorly-paid menial jobs. His wife pushes him to get any job available
and suggests giving him one in the packing section of her factory at £2.50 per hour,
but it is turned down by Gaz, describing the kind of job as "£2.50 an hour in Black
Hole of Calcutta," disposable and under-paid. Later, in attempting to borrow money
from Mandy for venue deposit, he again rejects her offer of work. In so doing, Gaz
tries to keep his dignity as an experienced skilled steelworker.
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In the film, the job of security guard is frequently taken as a reference example
to convey Gaz's attitude. It has actually been an expanding kind of occupation in
postmodem society. At the beginning after they have saved Lomper's life and known
that Lomper is a security guard in the disused steel factory, Gaz sighs: "No wonder he
wants to kill himself." Then, when Dave quits the team due to lack of confidence with
his body for the full monty, he immediately gets a security guard job at a supermarket.
Gaz tries to take him back, saying "you're worth more than that."
Gaz and his mates are not treating reemployment seriously. Gaz invites his son
to accompany him to the "job club," saying "That'll be a right laugh." The interview
prank is followed by a fight between Gerald and Gaz, "accentuating the impression of
a school classroom situation getting out of control" (Mather, 2006, p. 44). Though this
can be taken by the authority to blame the redundant for their lack of
self-responsibility, we can detect the sense of despair and depression amongst the men
beneath the surface of childish mischief and abrasive banter. The prospect of "decent"
jobs for them looks dim.
Gerald, Gaz's former supervisor, forms a contrast in attitude toward looking for
reemployment. His active and serious approach accords with what the dominant
ideology approves as individual responsibility. What Gaz and Dave see as fun with
their prank to ruin his interview is felt by Gerald as sheer cruelty. With apology from
Gaz and Dave, Gerald agrees to be the choreographer, coach and a dancer of the
group. Finally he discovers that he has got the job despite the prank. This conversely
implies that management work is less rare.
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On the other hand, Gaz demonstrates his elastic mind, keen vision, and smart
leadership qualities. The loss of work deprives men of a public space, "feminizing
them and turning their interests towards their bodies" (Luckett, 2000, p. 95). Having
an excess of free time and an absence of money, the ex-workers are forced to look
more closely at themselves. The case is quite like the punk subculture of the 1970s, in
which jobless youth only had their personal bodies to own and make use of. The
1990s witnessed the thriving of male striptease as a lucrative business, typically
represented by the Chippendales. Gaz is smart to realize that putting on a successful
performance not only can earn quick money but also is an alternative way to reclaim
identity, pride and self-worth. When they see the female crowd watching
Chippendales striptease, Dave figures out the potential profit of ten quid per ticket for
a thousand people, and Gaz instantly comes to the conclusion that "It's worth a
thought." He persuades his mates by luring with profit: "Folks don't laugh so loud
when you've a grand in your pocket." Ironically, Gaz's entrepreneurial zeal and free
market economy success via the male striptease performance shows him "taking on
rather than embracing the core of Thatcherism" (Dyja, 20 10, p. 103). As the writer of
the screenplay points out, "literally and metaphorically men were being told to shape
up, get fit, get smart, and get sexy" (as cited in Bromley, 2000, p. 65). The only way
out seems to be an individual enterprise, finding a niche and increasing your market
chances. But the team does not seem to have discovered an easy way to "lottery"
wealth as they cannot live on a once-only performance. Their popularity is not due to
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self job creation, but the audience's emotional admiration for their courage. What is
unsolved is how long the new self-respect and reflexivity will survive.
The loss of public space leads to more male body-consciousness. The redundant
masculine bodies change into male strippers and by the close have succeeded in what
Herbert Marcuse in Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (1955)
described as the aim of "making the human body an instrument of pleasure rather than
labor" (as cited in Mather, 2006, p. 50). Dyja explores the significance that "Perhaps
their striptease symbolically releases them from having to take on any job, in the
reluctant way Dave worked as security guard, and quite literally liberates them by
shedding the constraints of a uniform and revealing their manhood" (Dyja, 2010, p.
107). The stripping of security guard uniforms in the final scene is further suggested
by Bromley to be "a significant comment" on the low esteem of the job-poorly paid
and ununionized-and also about "stripping off traditional male body insecurities"
(Bromley, 2000, p. 66).
In this job innovation, community collective spirit is much highlighted. But this
collectivity is not political; only the works band is still going, seen several times
playing seriously, carrying on the working-class cultural tradition. The de-unionized
working class members have lost its ability for collective action and even the capacity
to identify their common interests. The film makes great effort in providing collective
solutions to personal problems. Where once the steel works gave men their
livelihoods and a common bond, it is now gone forever. What can unite them now are
the job club, the dole queue and the striptease rehearsals. Lomper gains a new sense
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of meaning and confidence in life from community friendship. At the beginning of the
film, he intends to commit suicide, but is rescued by Dave. His pitiful remark
"Haven't got any mates" leads to Gaz and Dave offering him immediate friendship.
Then through integration into the stripper team, he identifies his homosexual
orientation and eventually finds happiness in his relationship with Guy. Gerald is
another example. Despite his consciousness of his different status from all others as
he claims "1 used to have a proper job," he is increasingly attached to the team and
even allows the mates to practise stripping off in his front room. Their expected
exposure is unexpectedly interrupted by the arrival of loan sharks, who threaten to
take away the house belongings as Gerald owes them £120. At the crucial moment, in
an extremely funny way, a half-naked Dave tells the men to "Put down and piss off,"
and at once all team members stand in a line, the sight of which indicating a
homosexual orgy party encourages the debt collectors to quickly flee away. However,
the reprieve is only temporary as Gerald's possessions are eventually taken away from
him. Gerald only owes them "120 quid," but they are taking his belongings away as
"second-hand. "
Bound by the common mission of fulfilling a successful performance, the group
is seen to be always together in the films. As Caplan observes, The Full Monty is
"about group therapy, in both visual and narrative terms. Conversation, admission of
need and collective action provide the only solutions to these men's situation. Talking,
training, attending funerals or stripping, they are framed and filmed as a cohesive (if
volatile) unit." (1997, p. 43) Yet paralleling this collective solidarity, it is worth
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pointing out that the men take up more responsibilities than the angry young men of
the 1950s, and are even more home-centered than them. Many of the group scenes in
the New Wave tradition of poetic realism with "that long shot of our town from that
hill. "
The final full monty performance ending is amusing and powerful and has been
much commented upon. Dave returns for the big night and Gaz overcomes his last
minute nervousness, encouraged respectively by the wife and son. In front of an
excited crowd, the men go on stage and conduct their performance accompanied by
the beautiful sexy song You Can Leave Your Hat On sung by Tom Jones with great
machismo. The old steelyard works band, in which Lomper is a member, is there
providing the musical accompaniment. The six performers wear a costume similar to
Dave's security guard uniform. Dave introduces their act by stating that they may be
neither pretty, good, nor young, but "We're here. We're live, and for one night only
we're going for the full monty!" For their sheer bravery, the audience cheer with
applauds. The group dance in their amateur steps and step by step take off their ties,
shirts, leather belts, trousers and throw them respectively to the crying crowd. The
ecstatic audience include performers' wives, the police who have arrested the strippers
and a few men. There are reaction shots at key time of audience who are specially
related to performers on stage, e.g. shot of Mandy enthusiastically cheering Gaz's
arrival and close-up shot of Linda hiding her face in Dave's shirt which she catches.
By the time the thongs come off and the hats cover the dancers' private parts, the men
swing their bodies with buttocks facing the audience in a move that brings the men
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into a formation, with smirks on their faces. The crowd is reaching a feverish pitch,
chanting "Off, off, off." Then the men turn to face the audience and as the music stops
they toss their hats into the air and are caught in the famous teasing "full monty"
freeze-frame shot with the image filmed from the rear. Tom Jones sighs off the last
line with an extended cry, playfully instructing "You can leave your hat on" when in
fact the hat is flying.
With the success of the performance, the men seem remasculinized. They are
back where they belong, centre stage, no longer marginalized in their own club as in
the opening scenes. So, having reinvented themselves, class is back and men are in
demand, the focus of attention, with a new kind of self-esteem as women come to
working-men's club "Cos of us. Men." In their first practice, the audience laugh at
them. This time they are not "laughed at, but laughed with" (Bromley, 2000, p. 67).
Different from female stripping, the decision to expose themselves to the full is made
by the men themselves. By showing their manhood in a public space again, the
unemployed "boys" have become "men" again. The reconstruction of masculinity
around men's bodies drives away their shame about it and resumes the tradition of
celebrating of the male body for working-class pride. As Dave tells the audience, "we
may not be young, we may not be pretty, we may not be right good, but we're here."
The posters advertisement "Hot Metal--We dare to be bare!" suggests the message
that these men are "not the scrap which they initially feel themselves to be, but hot
and malleable material indeed" (Caplan, 1997, p. 43).
However, such remasculinization "feel-good" ending is naturally ambivalent
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and flawed. Hill notes that the final screen scene avoids the full frontal nude display
as the film's title promised and as a female stripper might have been expected to do.
The effect of this is to "rescue the characters from the degree of indignities which
such shots would have entailed" (Hill, 2000a, pp. 184-185). Despite the freeze frame
that "literally fixes the moment of triumph," the performance can be no more than "a
one-off event and not a permanent solution to the men's economic problems" (Wayne,
2006, p. 295). Monk is more critical of the film's politics and argues that the ending
that the ex-steel workers appear to remould themselves "with only temporary pain"
into paid performers in "the creative and entertainment industries" is "problematic"
and represents a Blairite celebration of neo-liberal entrepreneurial ism. The film
proposes a career "that replaces the sale of labor with the commodification of the
body." (Monk, 2000b, p. 285). In short, in return for their re-masculinization, the
ex-steel workers have commodified themselves and have been commodified.
Being creative and entertaining can be nothing but utopian solution. While it
can be seen to be promoting the ideology that an individual can try all kinds of things
for making a living, beneath this surface we see the inappropriateness of the model.
To completely undress is not something dignified for maSCUlinity pride as the final
rear shots hints. The kind of performance cannot last long as they do not have the
build of professional strippers; so it is not applicable to more working people.
Common sense would teach the general public that the film's identity reconstruction
through the full monty and once-only gimmick lack universality as this is really not
the sort of thing that real working-class can do for salvation. Reg (Bruce Jones), the
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first applicant at the audition and is desperate to try anything for money, simply
cannot overcome the psychological unease and is unable to transform taking his
clothes off into an entertaining performance of stripping. He performs with
unenthusiastic hesitation and soon halts the audition. In a medium close-up shot, the
camera observes his uneasiness with the demands of stripping. He is similar to Phil in

Brassed Off, who also lacks enthusiasm in reinventing himself as Mr Chuckles. As we
are sure that Gaz and his mates cannot overcome their financial difficulty through this
only-once performance, the fantasy solution can be viewed more as black humor,
taking sarcasm as silent political attack and striptease as cultural resistance toward the
ruling class, suggesting the missing of any hope for more sensible and dignified
solutions.

Reversal of gender roles.
The representation of male-female relationship is marked by a reversal of
gender roles as well as the continuing subordination and marginalization of women. It
is widely acknowledged that this post-industrial male trauma was contrasted by the
reversal of gender roles (Hill, 2000a, p. 184; Luckett, 2000, p. 95) with the shift in
employment patterns. Women begin to enter spaces previously occupied by men and
sometimes "at the expense of men" (Bromley, 2000, p. 65), "exacerbate[ing] men's
plight" (Luckett, 2000, p. 95). A blurring of male/female place and space can be
identified.
Women are shown generally to be confident with jobs and have a sense of
pragmatic realism sadly lacking in their male counterparts. While Gaz and Dave steal
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girder from the empty factory where they once worked, their wives all work full
time--Mandy, Gaz's ex-wife, looks like having a senior job in a factory and Jean
works in a decent supermarket. Mandy lives in a modem, detached house with her
new affluent middle-class partner and a new car. She is annoyed by Gaz's lack of
responsibility and general immature attitude to work and persuades him to
realistically take any job available.
Male striptease performance seems to have become a growing industry and
men's traditional territory--the working men's club has been taken over by women as
the venue for watching male strippers. So now men strip for money while women pay
to watch, arousing a reversal of the male gaze. In such a women-only night at the
beginning of the film, women pay for the male striptease show by the famous
Chippendales, and they speak about sex, talk dirty and enter men's toilets in a way as
bawdy as the men they are replacing. They use men's toilet (the only available in a
working men's club) and a woman is illicitly observed by Gas as urinating standing
up, representing "a symbolic appropriation of phallic power" (Hill, 2000a, p. 184).
Though the scene seems quite surreal, the action leads to Gaz lamenting for man's
obsoleteness and passing as dinosaurs, a condition imposed on them by the economic
developments that create a feminized society. The traditional male gaze of women as
sex objects (e.g. Gaz and Dave's points-scoring system of women who pass them by,
Lomper's comment on female body in Cosmopolitan) is transformed in self-reflection
into men scrutinizing their own bodies. At the end of the story, this gaze further
develops into the female gaze of men as sex objects, through which the working men
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have taken the club back, symbolically winning the battle over territory, though not
through work, but through entertaining. We do not learn whether Gaz wins Mandy
back by the end of the film and I see it as unlikely as the dance cannot play magic, but
surely she is pleased that Gaz has finally made an effort and achieved something,
Crisis in masculinity has led to breakdown of communication between men and
women. Dave's inferiority conscience causes his sexual impotence and his timidity in
being open to his wife about happenings around him. His wife Jean is later suspicious
of him having an affair when she sees him coming back late all those nights and finds
a red thong. It is only then that Dave is forced to explain that he is doing stripping
with Gaz and other mates:
Dave: "we'd make a bob or two taking us clothes off.. .We weren't that bad. Only I couldn't,
could I?"
Jean:

"Why not?"

Dave:

"Well, look at me. Jeanie, who wants to see this dance?

Jean:

Me, Dave. I do.

With this exchange of heart, their relationship is resolved. Jean's love immediately
restores

Dave's

confidence,

implying

that

men

need women's

love

and

encouragement in their effort to re-masculinize.
Gerald and Linda represent a traditional couple with Gerald as breadwinner and
Linda as housewife. Linda displays materialistic or consumerist passion. She is shown
as loving luxurious furniture and housing facilities. She continues buying goods and is
even booking skiing holiday on Gerald's Barclay credit card, without knowing that
Gerald has been out of work for six months. When we seem to feel that she is all to
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blame for Gerald's misery, the film ironically tells us that Linda's desire for material
goods and holidays is not as great as her desire to know the truth:
Linda: And this has been going on how long?
Gerald: About six months.
Linda: I can cope with losing the sunbed. Car. Television. I can even cope with the shame of
everyone watching this. But six months! Six bloody months! And you wouldn't say to me, to
your wife.
Gerald: I thought you liked them.
Linda: No, Gerald. I've never liked 'em.

This breakdown in communication seems to lead to an ultimate tragic ending of the
marriage. Gerald is thrown out by Linda. Unlike other mates who are childlike,
Gerald is very patriarchal, clearly knowing his family duties. As he tells Gaz and
Dave, "I've got a standard of living! Responsibilities!" The trouble with him is that he
does not know how to communicate with his wife. He wants to shoulder everything
alone so that his wife would "never have known." Linda at least can be blamed for her
insensitiveness to Gerald's pressure and depression.
The position of women in The Full Monty is more complicated than that in

Brassed Off. Apart from women being depicted as the reason for men's dilemma by
economically squeezing them out of jobs, they are also associated with consumerism,
such as Gerald's wife Linda (Deirdre Costello), or snobbish upward mobility, such as
Gaz's ex-wife, Mandy, which aggravate the problems of men. Linda's lust for
consumer goods seems to prevent Gerald from informing her of his unemployment.
Yet, such misogynist depiction is later counterbalanced. Linda is not that materialistic
as she values honesty and truth more than consumer goods. Mandy is commented as
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"one of the least likeable characters in the film" to change by Hill (Hill, 2000a, p.
185). All through the film, Mandy is portrayed as snobbish, hostile, and
unsympathetic, breaking with Gaz for a middle-class partner and even taking legal
action against Gaz's joint custody. She presses Gaz to take any low-paid job. At the
police office, she mocks that Gaz's "great money-making enterprise" equals to
"pornography" and challenges that "Still think you're a good father?", to which the
son lends his support for the father: "He is trying. " Yet, whatever is said about it, she
finally appears at the club without letting his partner come (excusing that it is
women-only) and becomes a part of the cheering crowd, thus achieving
"proletarianisation" (Hill, 2000a, p. 185) at the film's end. Dave's wife Jean (Lesley
Sharp) is treated more sympathetically as a loving and understanding wife. At the
final performance, Jean catches Dave's shirt and Mandy gets Gaz's belt, things
thrown by them to the audience. Such ending suggests hope for better mutual
communication and understanding. Wayne is right in suggesting that Mandy's final
presence "provide[s] moral support," but he goes too far in suggesting that it "hint[s]
at a family reconciliation" (2006, p. 295). On the whole, women remain peripheral to
the film's main action. There is no female character as important as Gloria in Brassed
Off.
The film is much commodified for wider appeal across country, class, gender
and age. Humor, or comic element, is taken as one effective strategy. In The Full
Monty, serious social issues are tackled in a gentle, warm, yet somewhat aching sense
of humor. The men's vulnerability and dilemma are transformed into "an affirmative
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upbeat story of masculine reinvention" (Wayne, 2006, p. 294).
Scenes around the men's stripping practices are all funny. In the first scene,
Gaz tries stripping alone--in car headlights, cigarette in mouth, to the music of Hot
Chocolate's "You Sexy Thing." When he tries to take his shirt off, he bums himself
with his cigarette, and the shirt gets caught and the dance steps come to a sudden stop.
Meanwhile, we hear the scratching sound of the record needle. In the dole queue
scene, the steel strippers unconsciously begin to practice their moves, lured by the
radio music of Donna Summer's disco classic "Hot Stuff." So the training has taken
effect. In the third scene in Gerald's home where the men strip to their diverse undies
is visually amusing and made more so when the loan sharks are threatened away by
the half-naked men.
The most aching humor is around Lomper's suicide. Dave drags Lomper out of
his carbon-fumed car, but Lomper blames Dave for saving him, so Dave pushes the
ungrateful Lomper back into the car and drags him out again. Afterwards, Dave, Gaz
and Lomper, sitting on a hill, jokingly chat about the best way for Lomper to commit
suicide. Suggestions include shooting himself, finding a big bridge to do "bungee
jumps, only without the bungee bit" and drowning himself, but all seem impractical
because there is nowhere for Lomper to find a gun, he can't stand heights and he can't
swim, to which Gaz responds "You don't have to fucking swim, you divvy." The final
suggestion is for Lomper to "Stand in the middle of t' road and get a mate to drive.
Smack into you right fast", but Lomper answers "Haven't got any mates." Gaz
immediately offers friendship: "We just saved your fucking life, so don't tell us we're
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not your mates!" and Dave offers to run him down soon. As Caplan points out,
"Laughter at pain can be beneficial or harmful here" (1997, p. 43).
Besides humor, the mood of nostalgia is also significant. This nostalgia arouses
audience emotions not so much around industrial jobs as around the lost homo social
communities and the powerful emotional bonds associated with them. It is this
arousing of emotion around the idea of men as a community under threat, Clair Monk
argues, that explains the widespread appeal to a 1990s' international male audience far
broader than just the working class (2000b, p. 280). The nostalgic comic element is
also appealing to a rather stereotyped image of working-class life that was common in
the 1940s, people laughing and joking through hard times. Yet beneath the humor, the
political message is blunted by nostalgia rather than sharpened by satire.
Songs chosen to match men's dancing--Donna Summer's Hot Stuff, Hot
Chocolate's You Sexy Thing, and of course, and Tom Jones' You Can Leave Your Hat
On, all popular songs in the 1970s--have more sex appeal and more youth appeal than

the visual images and also generate a feeling of nostalgia for "the good old days".
They are used somewhat ironically, as the men are far from sexy and do not leave the
hat on in the end.
The film reimagines traditional working-class community with a better
inclusiveness than films of Ken Loach and Brassed Off, in which gay and black
characters are absent. The Full Monty has Horse and the brass band leader as black,
Lomper and Guy as gay. Racial interactions are quite utopian. Horse is completely
assimilated; he and his relatives are positively stereotyped as acquiring natural rhythm
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and keeping a close-knit family. Nevertheless, such depictions can only be
postmodern ornament intended for a unifying image. As Hill points out, the black
characters "are simply accepted as a part of the drama without it becoming an issue or
problem" (Hill, 2000a, p. 186). This multiculturalism "evacuates ethnic difference,
transforming it into taste or style" (Luckett, 2000, p. 97). The film's display of the
two gay characters quickly turning into a hand-holding couple is also utopian and
problematic.
In conclusion, Brassed Off and The Full Monty are two community-centered
feel-good comedies with a more global appeal. While the former offers more a gritty
harsh commentary on the impact of Thatcherism on traditional working class
industries and tells a world we have lost, the latter makes more use of light humor in
place of overt political criticism. What attracts the attention of both films is the
erosion of traditional forms of working class masculinity and male dignity and no
solution is offered except cultural resistance and collective consolation which is seen
as largely utopian. In each film, beneath the cheerful bluster, "a much darker, sadder
story is being told" (Macnab, 1996, p. 44). Both films reflect gender politics and the
empowerment of women after feminist movement and The Full Monty shows better
concern about postmodern hybridity in race and sexuality. Bromley is critical that
"class analysis, rather than class signifiers" is an "absent content" in the films (2000,
p.67).
Continuity and Change in Working-class Identity: Theme Analysis
Crisis of identity: from proud workers to humble "underclass."
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Much has changed in the experiences of working class in the 20th century. The
Documentary Movement in the 1930s produced working class as heroic labors in a
collective sense. With full employment and general affluence, the New Wave films in
the late 1950s and early 1960s presented confident, masculine, though discontented
and rebellious young workers, such as Arthur and Joe. Then faced with the effect of
Thatcherite de industrialization, films of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s focused on the
pitiful redundant and the mounting pressure on them, most typically represented by
Phil who loses his "wife, kids, home, job, self-respect, hope" and by workers
deformed as performers. The works unanimously articulated a "sense of loss" (Kirk,
2003, p. 78). Compared with the sense of loss of politics in the New Wave films, this
time it's the loss of job or income, political power, union support, and the associated
loss of family, traditional community, traditional male role, and etc. So the loss of so
many factors all together has contributed to the loss of old form of working-class
identity. The films are seen, to varying degrees, "elegies for an older, industrial,
northern working class" (Dave, 2006, p. xiii).
Huw Beynon described the world of neo-Iiberalism which started with
Thatcher's policies and continued in Blair's Britain as a world in which a "growing
complex of jobs and labor contracts" have combined with "gender and ethnic
difference" to produce a "mosaic" of fragmented labor that is not easy to represent in
"simple images" (Beynon, 2001, p. 38). So, some films since the end of 1990s have
explored the new image of workers on the fragmented neo-liberal labor market.
Human Traffic (1999) and Late Night Shopping (2001) present youth with "McJobs,"
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a kind of casualized and "flexible" working practice of low prestige, low pay, and
more intense exploitation. The characters in the two films try a variety of jobs such as
seller in store, staff at fast-food restaurant, supermarket shelf-stacker, hospital cleaner,
worker in micro-electronics factory, and operator at call center. They do not identify
with their jobs. Nina even celebrated unemployment in Human Traffic. In Late Night

Shopping, all the young people take monotonous work in the night, which is
unpleasant and greatly affect their life, e.g. Sean and his girlfriend are never in their
shared flat at the same time because of their work. Illegal immigrants are most likely
to undertake such works, as shown in Dirty Pretty Things (2002). In Sweet Sixteen
(2002), the job of operator in a calling center is the most Chantelle can dream about.
With no solutions available, the films always carry a sense of pessimism. An
irreversible trend is that the working class dignity and pride are gone for ever with the
wind. Because of the various kinds of losses, the working class is imaged as victims
in the films.

Crisis in masculinity: the gradual loss of confident aggressiveness and
sexuality.
The New Wave films provided uninhibited display of masculine energy and
sexuality, represented most prominently in Arthur Seaton's forceful, muscular
physique in Saturday Night and Sunday Morning. But in the 1980s and 1990s,
industrial decay and mass unemployment undermined the traditional working class
masculinity linked with pride in hard, physical labor, family feeding and trade union
power. Thus, in focusing on working class in the north of England, films of the 1990s,
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"to an almost unprecedented extent ... seemed preoccupied with men and masculinity
in crisis" (Monk, 2000a, p. 156). They show a deep concern about male
disempowerment--the loss of economic power, gender privilege and working class
male community, providing sympathetic portrayals of working-class men as
"physically redundant in the workplace and emotionally retarded in the home"
(Hallam, 2000, p. 266). Albert Finney's Arthur with "vivid masculine force of the
body" is physically undermined, transmuted into "the scrawniness of Robert Carlyle
as Gary in The Full Monty or Stevie in Riff-Ra.fJ(Ken Loach 1990) (Luckett, 2000, p.
95) or the nasty women-basher of Ray in Nil by Mouth. There are more images of
men who are sexually inadequate, fat, gay, not working but entertaining. Family
violence, drug and alcohol abuse are seen as symptomatic of a crisis in masculinity.
The profound "gender anxiety" resulting from economic re-structuring
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widely reflected in the images of "gender reversal" with strong female characters
often counter-posed with weak, socially impotent men. Clair Monk criticizes that The
Full Monty and Brassed O.fJfocus so much on masculinity in crisis that they reduce

"the economic oppressions of unemployment" to "gender oppression by women"
(2000b, p. 282), which greatly weakened the sharpness of the social message.
The role of women.
Women have generally been in subordinate position in working class films and
their screen image has been more negative or more positive to different extent. In
New Waves films, there are such positive minder image of Alice in Room at the Top
and Audrey in The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner, but more often women
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function either as elusive objects of desire or as a threat to masculinity-through their
obsession with marriage, motherhood and "settling down"---or as agents of
consumption. Narratives were centered on the devaluation and punishment of women
(e.g. for adultery), displaying an obvious misogynist tendency.
This gender gap was somewhat covered in the 1980s by more positive
female-centered films which reflect the growing importance of women in the
workforce and in society as a whole, e.g. Letter to Brezhnev (1985), Rita, Sue and Bob,
Too (1986), Sammy and Rosie Get Laid (1987). Teresa in Letter to Brezhnev is seen as
taking the traditionally "masculine space" for leisure, drinking, talking dirty, looking
for sexual encounters casually. Depiction of women in High Hopes and Life is Sweet
is more balanced, so we see the loving and caring Shirley and Wendy in the two films.
In films of the 1990s and 2000s, old misogyny continued, though weaker, but
with a new hostility toward the reversal of gender roles being added. Women's
inroads into white-collar and service jobs were generally viewed as worsening men's
plight. In The Full Monty, Gaz's wife and Dave's wife all have jobs and are enjoying
life, but the husbands can't. Women were portrayed as passionate consumers,
unsupportive of their husbands in Brassed Off and The Full Monty, as the victims of
domestic violence and sexual abuse in Naked and Nil by Mouth, as lacking motherly
duty in Ladybird, Ladybird and Sweet Sixteen. Women are not capable of resistance or
rebellion faced with family violence in Naked, Nil by Mouth and there is an
"Ambiguity of Critique" in such films (Monk, 2000a, p. 163). The absence of fathers
in New Wave films is replaced by the absence of Billy's mother, who is dead and
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totally unmentioned and we can't see any miner's wives involved in the strike in Billy
Elliot. Unlike Brassed Off, their effort is totally ignored.

The apparent ascendancy of women in the post-industrial workplace heralded a
resurgence of masculinism and misogyny, though this time it was "cloaked in
post-modern irony or humor, or justified in terms of a backlash against the gains of
feminism" (Monk, 2000a, p. 163). In fact, the exercising of power over women by the
working class heroes (both verbally and physically) may be read as a compensation
for their actual social and political impotence.

The de-politicization of the working class.
Andrew Higson argues that the history of British realism is the history of "the
changing conceptualization of the relation between the public and the private,
between the political and the personal" (1986, p. 83). To great extent, British social
realist tradition has been characterized by a movement away, since its very early stage,
from the public and the social (the working class at work, struggles connected to the
wider society or community) to the private and the personal (the focus on family or
personal life and problems with little reference to social, political and economic
conditions). Class consciousness against capitalist exploitation and against Thatcher's
neo-liberalism was clearly revealed, yet on the whole social issues are explored
through familial and personal relations. Generally there has been few representation
of work in working-class films. In the 1960s it is because of consumption; in the
1980s and 1990s, it is because of lack of work. Working-class identity is more
constructed by consumption and entertaining (the performing working class) rather
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than production.
The documentary's distanced public gaze was soon replaced by the individuated
private looks of the New Wave. The narratives were organized around a single central
protagonist, and no longer required a multiplicity of plot lines. In the face of affluence
and mass culture, the "focus on cultural aspects tended to preclude work" and the
"focus on the discontented male involved a downplaying of collective conditions and
actions" (Hill, 2000b, p. 251).
The anti-Thatcherism films of the 1980s and 1990s seemingly rediscovered the
political dimension, e.g. High Hopes and Brassed Off, and especially Ken Loach's
films. The emphasis of Riff-Raff is firmly upon the world of work and class politics
rather than leisure, but most of Loach's films focus on the working class as individual
victims. The miners' strike as working class resistance is mentioned directly in Billy

Elliot, but only indirectly in Brassed Off.
The trend of identifying working class in domestic and familiar terms was more
pronounced in the 1990s. The Full Monty typically acknowledges economic and
political causes only as taken-for-granted background, if at all. The central problem
that both The Full Monty and Brassed Off address is not so much unemployment itself
as its psychic and emotional effects. Gary Oldman's Nil by Mouth is a
semi-autobiographical tale of a working class family in which abuse and violence is
cycling from generation to generation. Thematically, the film is not concerned with
social, political and economic inequalities lying behind alcoholism and domestic
violence, taking alcoholism as a family disease, not a societal one. By focusing too
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tightly on individual's personal or family life, these social problems become personal
problems. For example, the drug abuse in Nil by Mouth and Trainspotting can be
attributed to individual's lack of discipline.
Similarly, Julia Hallam notes that films of the 1990s constructed their images of
the working class through "their relation to consumption rather than production,
purchasing power rather than labor power" (2000, p. 261). This is also true to the
1980s films. In High Hopes, it is the difference in consumption (domestic interiors, or
dressing) that indicates the different social status of the three families.
The focus on the private and the personal has been regarded as weakening the
political and social messages of the texts as they "focus on the individual or family
and their struggles without making connections to wider political, economic and
social factors" (Lay, 2002, p. 121). Poverty, unemployment and social exclusion are
not treated as the driving forces, but merely as contributory factors to family troubles,
so that it is the working class families that have failed, not the state or capitalist
society.
Samantha Lay is critical of the trend towards autobiography and nostalgia. She
believes looking back instead of looking at the contemporary settings from a highly
individualized perspective can be seen as further undermining a sense of the "public"
(Lay, 2002, p.123, 107). However, it is also argued that the lack of party politics in
working class films, in another way, by virtue of the language and the lives they
uncover, "might be seen to have political ramifications. You seldom see these people
or hear this language, and this in itself harbors a political message" (Mcfeely, 1997).
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Community and solidarity.

Collective experience is not a characteristic of British social realism. In general,
class has been mainly presented as an individual and moral, rather than collective or
social/economic experience. In other words, social issues are explored at the micro
level of character, rather than the macro level of the social. The blame is thus more
often on the weak characters of the individuals. Rather than questioning class
inequalities, these films appear to advocate escape from the confinement of working
class position as the only feasible solution.
The Grierson's documentaries aimed to represent the society at large rather than
particular individuals. British films in the Second World War period attempted to
project a sense of collectivity on the screen, multiplying the number of central
characters. In contrast, the New Wave films rested little on the collective experience
of working-class life, seldom showed their characters at work, playing down class
inequalities,

and promoting what John Hill described as an "accentuated

individualism" (Hill, 1986, p. 143). In so doing, the possibility of collective struggle
are excluded. Since the 1980s, with the deindustrialization, the representation of the
older

working-class

communities--especially

northern

ones--has

effectively

disappeared, replaced by the cold and indifferent neighborhood in High Hopes (1988)
and community in decay in Sweet Sixteen (2002).
However, in the late 1990s, male togetherness was given positive values in the
comedy films like Brassed Off and The Full Monty, marking a superficial return to
class-consciousness and collectivity repressed in the 1980s. So, in Brassed Off, the
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brass band is able to go on to claim victory in the national championships despite the
coming closure of the pit. In The Full Monty, the unemployed community gain respect
through doing collective strip show. And it is through involvement in the group that
Dave is able to regain his sexual potency and Gaz wins the respect of his son. In this
wishful solidarity, even middle-class or upwardly mobile characters are shown to
return to working-class communities, reinventing the cross-class union in wartime
films.
These comedies, similar with TV soap operas like Coronation Street, present a
geographically-bounded working-class community in which everyone appears to
know everyone else, reminding us of Hoggart's version of pre-war working-class
community. They celebrate the recovery, in a post-industrial context, of the collective
spirit. Hill holds that the idea of working-class community is mobilized "less in the
service of class politics than as a metaphor for the state ofthe nation" (2000a, p. 183).
He argues that such depiction and emphasis "give voice to a certain yearning for
'national wholeness' in the face of economic and social divisions and the rise of
self-interested individualism that characterized the Tory years" (2000a, p. 184). Monk
comments that both films appeal to emotions that "the male social and emotional
bonds once associated with the workplace and the working-men's club are threatened,
mourned, struggled for -and finally restored." (2000a, p. 161)
The concern for the decline of the traditional working class initiated in the New
Wave films was sustained in films of the 1980s and 1990s. However, the old anxiety
about the corrupting effects of consumption or embourgeoisement was replaced by
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the new anxiety about the damage wrought by de-industrialization, mass
unemployment and poverty. The brass band has been appreciated through all decades
as a symbol of authentic working class traditional culture. In A Kind of Loving, it was
treasured by Vic, but devalued by Ingrid and her mother. In Brassed Off and The Full
Monty, the brass band is revived to suggest local pride and the centrality of

masculinity, both phenomena eroded by the hegemony of the south. In the former, it
is glorified, but in the latter, it is seen sentimentally as the "only thing left going
here."
Youth unemployment and subcultural resistance.

The

working

class

youth

experienced

shifts

and

fragmentations

of

de industrialization in direct material, social, economic and cultural forms. In
addressing the anxieties of young male audience, the youth underclass films presented
joblessness and social exclusion as taken-for-granted facts with no history, no
proposed solution and no expectation of change. With detached irony, they framed the
male underclass (their drug-taking, petty crimes) "not as a 'social problem,'" which
requires a solution, "but as a subcultural 'lifestyle' with certain attractions for a young,
post-political male audience" (Monk, 2000a, p. 160). Instead of attempting to arouse
consciousness or anger, Trainspotting (1996) and especially Twin Town (1997)
encourage subcultural dissent and escape from the demands of adulthood, women and
work with their story of heroin users and petty criminals, although irony is never
absent from this framing. Beynon sees their exploration of the under-side of British
society as through the use of "black humor" (2001, p. 39). But Loach's Sweet Sixteen
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deals with the issue in a serious way, encouraging people to trace the reasons behind
Liam's tragedy. For Hall, there is simply no "subcultural solution" to working-class
youth unemployment, educational disadvantage, dead-end jobs, low pay and the loss
of skills (Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 47).

Cultural hybridity - the intersection of class with other identities.
Since 1980s, echoing the postmodern shift of concern from working class to
other marginal groups, working class has been represented in the form of cultural
hybridity. Filmmakers began to explore the intersection of class with other identities
such as race, gender, and sexuality best represented in such films as My Beautiful

Laundrette (1985) and Sammy and Rosie Get Laid (1987).
Stuart Hall argues that "the postmodern subject" is conceived not as having
"fixed, essential or permanent identity" but rather as assuming "different identities at
different times" (as cited in Hill, 1999, p. 207). Concerning the multidimensional
identities, Rani's identity, in Sammy and Rosie Get Laid, is not simply a working-class
Asian, female, or lesbian, but one which is "overdetermined" and shifting. Hill agrees
with Bhabha on that the identities in these films are not then simply overlaid, or added
on top of each other, but are themselves '''interstitial,' formed, 'in-between,' or in
excess of, the sum of the 'parts' of difference" (Hill, 1999, p. 208).
Central to the films My Beautiful Laundrette and Sammy and Rosie Get Laid is
the insistence upon difference. In line with Hall's idea of the "living" of "identity
through difference," the films stress upon heterogeneity without any attempt to give
expression to one "authentic" or "essential" "black" or "Asian" experience, or offer

291

straightforward "positive" images (Hill, 1999, p. 209). In these films, the dealing of
homosexual relationship is also designed to be taken for granted as "difference" rather
than as "problem."
This tendency of showing cultural hybridity continues in the 1990s, but the
strength is somewhat weakened. Jorge in Ladybird. Ladybird, a political exile from
Paraguay, is positively depicted. He is the one who attempts to cooperate with the
social services, who "brings his intellect to bear on the case, ... not out of cowardice,
but in order to survive" (Francke, 1994, p. 47). In Brassed Off and The Full Monty, we
see unemployed black and gays but there is not much difference between their life and
the life of the white male workers. Racial interactions are quite utopian. For Luckett,
the "strategy of inclusion" subsumes cultural difference for an exotic, updated
national image; yet the "multiculturalism" is "superficial" and only exists "at the level
of the unifying image" (2000, p. 96). Paul Dave agrees that The Full Monty relies on a
"facile populism and multiculturalism" which act to conceal class struggle and
continuing ethnic division and conflict (2006, p. 70).
Diversity in solutions.
In tackling working class problems, no real solutions can be given. In New
Wave films, resolutions include social conformity, escape through climbing the social
ladder, or rebellion. And it is common for the desire for escape to prove impossible, or
to demand too high a cost. Films since the 1980s have also involved diverse kinds of
endings.
Mike Leigh's antagonists more often take life as it is, value family and endure
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with positive attitudes, though his Naked is more tragic. Loach and Oldman's films
are social tragedies, showing men caught in circumstances they cannot change; the
central protagonists mostly face defeat in the end with absolutely no hope of escape.
For Joe in Loach's My Name Is Joe, "Some of us don't have a choice. I didnae have a
fuckin' choice." Tn Oldman's Nil by Mouth, Ray's alcoholism, drug abuse and
violence render the whole family vulnerable. Sweet Sixteen breaks our heart with the
impossible dream of the 16-year-old Liam to live together with his mother. My

Beautiful Laundrette by Stephen Frears offers solution of gay love, suggesting how
sexual desires may permit the crossing of borders and provide forms of connection
which subvert conventional social divisions or pieties. As Omar announces to Salim,
in his opinion, "much good can come from fucking."
The 1990s commercial comedies offer more positive resolutions, transforming
the problems of male unemployment, economic hardship, loss of self-esteem, and etc.
into up-beat, feel good stories. Working-class characters regain male pride and dignity
through collective actions and mutual support, a tendency identified by John Hill as
"utopianism" (2000a, p. 178). Through re-establishing the bonds among men, the two
films have achieved the recovery of masculinity and community, and even mark a
return to the class consciousness and collectivity repressed in the 1980s. So, utopian
fantasy is used to relieve the stress, hardship and agony. Such resolution is naturally
ambivalent. Claire Monk complains that The Full Monty, along with Brassed Off,
seeks to resolve the problems of class disadvantage in terms of gender relations and
the "healing powers" of the all-male group (2000b, pp. 280-282). Hill sees the explicit
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reliance on fantasy as "an acknowledgement of the very 'impossibility' of escape, a
'magical' resolution to conflicts which remain unresolved, and an ironic recognition
of the actual impotence" (\ 999, p. 170). So the solutions offered can only be symbolic
and inevitably problematic.
In 2000, Billy Elliot brought the old theme of personal escape into full play with
the glamorous success of the working class ballet star Billy. The final scene of strong
and broad-shouldered Billy doing a high masculine vertical jump glorifies masculinity,
yet obviously Billy's escape can only by personal and rare. Happy Go Lucky (2008)
explores how one, who still stays at the lower social stratum, should live in today's
society with a proper attitude. While Billy escapes by resorting to individual talent
and sticking to one's own belief and with the help of the working-class community,
Poppy in Happy Go Lucky escapes through her irrepressible happy-nature and
optimistic life attitude in coping with the hard reality.

294

CHAPTER VII
IDEOLOGY, CULTURE, IDENTITY:
ANALYSIS OF WORKING CLASS REPRESENTATION

This chapter will analyze working class identity in post-war social realist films
within the context of post-war political ideology and cultural condition using British
Cultural Studies as theoretical framework.
The

logical

connection between

film

and

society has

been

widely

acknowledged. Aldgate & Richards are more wholesome in suggesting that the
cinema functions "to reflect and highlight popular attitudes, ideas and preoccupations,
and to generate and inculcate views and opinions deemed desirable by film-makers,"
as well as to "act as a potent means of social control, transmitting the dominant
ideology of society and creating for it a consensus of support" (1999, p. 2). Stuart Hall
in "Culture, the Media and the 'Ideological Effect'" identifies three ideological effects
under capitalism. The first appears to be that of "masking and displacing" of class
domination or the class-exploitative nature of the system. The second is that of
"fragmentation or separation" of the collective interests of the working classes. The
third is that of "imposing an imaginary unity or coherence on the units so
re-presented" under such ideological totalities as "the 'community,' the 'nation,'
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'public opinion,' 'the consensus,' the 'general interest,' the 'popular will,' 'society,'
'ordinary consumers. '" (Hall, 1977, p. 337)
This chapter intends to deconstruct British working-class screen identity to see
how far they reflect historical change, what common "structure of feeling" of
filmmakers leads to the common features of each cycle of representation, and to what
extent the identity reinforce or undermine the dominant ideology. The analysis will
make substantial reference to Hoggart, Williams and Hall's writings.
The New Wave Representation: The Ideology of Affiuence and the New Left
Hall on affluence, embourgeoisement and consensus.
The post-war social development was characterized by three dominant
sociological terms of the time:

affluence, embourgeoisement, and consensus. The

Conservative Right argued that "economic growth dissolved the old class structure
and created new social groups, in particular affluent workers and the technical
intelligentsia, whom a dynamic Toryism could attract" (Gamble, as cited in Hill, 1986,
p. 7). In such a context of political agreement, "it became plausible to suppose that the
consensus between the parties ... reflected a consensus in the nation. In the spectrum
of political opinion from right to left, the majority of the electors had moved towards
the middle, the breeding ground of the floaters, leaving only minorities at the
extremes ... Success in the political market now seemed to depend on capturing the
centre and winning the support of the floaters" (Gamble, as cited in Hill, 1986, p. 7).
At the same time, affluence was dismantling old class barriers, "embourgeoisifying"
the old working class with rising living standards and an accompanying conversion to
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"consensual" middle-class values. In Resistance Through Rituals, Hall et al. argue
that the whole debate depended crucially on the validity of these three common-sense
concepts.
In Resistance Through Rituals, which Hall edited, Hall thinks affluence,
embourgeoisement, and consensus are highly ideological terms "woven together into
an all-embracing social myth or 'explanation' of post-war social change" (Clarke &
Hall,1976,p.21).
"Affluence" refers to the postwar economic boom of full employment, rise in
income and mass consumption, especially working class consumption. In general
terms, it is an inarguable fact that the years 1951-64 experienced greater
improvements in living standards than at any other time in this century. Between 1951
and 1963, wages rose on average by 72 per cent while prices rose by only 45 per cent.
In 1961 the working week was reduced from 48 to 42 hours. The worst of the housing
shortage was cleared over; in 1954, 354,000 new houses were built compared with
284,230 in 1947 (the best year of Labor's term). This was added by some important
extensions of the Welfare State and educational expansion, with about 6000 new
schools and 11 new universities. (Lowe, 1989, p. 575).
However, the other side of the coin revealed that the affluence as a matter of
fact developed from the improvement in world trade (e.g. the fall in world commodity
prices), rather than government policies of economic restructuring or long-term
investment. The "stop-go" fiscal policies l7 carried on by the governments actually

17

For details of the "stop-go" economy, see Lowe, 1989, pp. 576-577.
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hindered the country's economy. Soon, in the early 1960s, the economy seemed to be
stagnating. There was the balance of payments crisis in 1961 and subsequent
imposition of a pay-pause, credit squeeze and higher taxation. By early 1963, almost
900,000 people were out of work (Lowe, 1989, p. 578). Due to its unwillingness to
devalue the pound and its high expenditure on defense (7-10 per cent of GOP) to
maintain global power, Britain was repeatedly troubled with the balance of payment
crisis. Facing increasing competition in world markets, it was losing its share of world
output and exports. Its level of investment and economic growth was low by
international standards. So, British economic growth only looked impressive in
isolation, but lagged far behind almost all her main industrial competitors. The
Conservative governments' devotion to "stop-go" economic management was seen by
Pinto-Duschinsky as "the sacrifice of policies desirable for the long term well-being
of a country in favor of over-lenient measures and temporary palliatives bringing in
immediate political return" (as cited in Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 23). For example, the
"give-away" inflationary budget of April 1955 was followed by a snap April election,
and then by the deflationary autumn "cuts" after the election and hence the stagnation
of 1956. As such, Britain's affluent "miracle" was rested upon purely "temporary and
fortuitous circumstances" (Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 23).
So, for Hall et aI., "affluence was, essentially, an ideology of the dominant
culture about and/or the working class, directed at them (through media, advertising,
political speeches, etc.)" in order "to give the working-classes a stake in a future
which had not yet arrived, and thus to bind and cement the class to the hegemonic
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order." In so doing, the ideology of affluence "reconstructed the 'real relations' of
post-war British society into an 'imaginary relation.'" So, affluence is a "full-blown
ideology" or myth used to conceal real inequalities. (Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 37) By
the end of 1960s the dominant ideology of affluence no longer held hegemonic sway.
"Consensus" refers to the broad "agreement" across political parties and the
electorate after 1945 on constructing postwar British society along lines such as the
welfare state and mixed economy. Even a political term "Butskellism" was coined
from the surname ofR. A. Butler (Churchill's Chancellor of the Exchequer) and Hull
Gaitskell (leader of the Labor party 1955-1963), to show that this was a time of
consensus politics. On the basis of the war-time practice of political coalitions,
economic planning, and enforced egalitarianism, the post-war Labor governments
(esp. between 1945 and 1951) conducted social reforms of welfare safety-net, mixed
economy of private and public ownership, and etc. The Conservative governments
after 1951 largely complied with this notion of "a 'reformed' capitalism, a
socially-mindful capitalism with a 'human face'" (Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 23).
Anthony Crosland argued that "capitalism is undergoing a metamorphosis into a quite
different system " (as cited in Laing, 1968, p. 14). The success of Conservative
management seemed to prove their superior fitness to run a welfare capitalist system,
and to negate the need for Labor's continuing commitment to public ownership of the
economy. The Labor leadership, on the other hand, in trying to attract votes from
outside the working class, became less radical in posing party opposition.
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Hall et al. acknowledged the tendency in party politics toward the politics ofthe
center, but he saw the fragility of this consensus as revealed "in the nature of the party
struggle" during these years and challenged the Conservative superior fitness for
governing the country. He agreed with Duschinsky that despite the continuous Tory
rule for 13 years, "the political battle was desperately close throughout the whole
period" (Duschinsky, as cited in Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 23). The notion of a political
consensus obscured the fact that the Conservative survival was largely rested upon the
vote-catching "politics of bribery" most notoriously exemplified by Sutler's purely
expedient pre-election budget of 1955. Even despite the "politics of bribery," for the
whole 13 years of Tory rule, practically half the electorate voted against the Tories at
each election. As Goldthorpe et. al. found out in their survey, "the large majority" of
the affluent workers "were, and generally had been, Labor supporters" (1969, p. 172).
So Hall et al. recommended reading "consensus" in a different way "as betokening a
waiting attitude by the British working class (often mistaken at the time for 'apathy')
which an effective lead to the left by Labor at any point in the period might
effectively have crystallized in a different direction" (Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 24).
"Embourgeoisement" refers to the erosion of the working class and reunification of British society around middle-class values, an assumption of "classlessness."
With rising living standards and educational expansion, the concept suggests that
working-class life and culture was losing its distinctive features, with the members
assimilated into middle class styles, aspirations and values. Embourgeoisement
centers on the meritocratic ideology of social mobility primarily through the
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education system and views consumption as an important indicator. Though having
some real basis, Hall held that embourgeoisement was "the most constructed term of
the three," since "the frailties of the other two terms were compounded in it" (Clarke
& Hall, 1976, p. 24). It should be understood as an ideological term, rather than a

matter of fact.
He made reference of the empirical research by Goldthorpe et. al. which shows
that "embourgeoisement" is far more limited in scope than imagined by its promoters:
"what the changes in question predominantly entailed was not the ultimate

assimilation of manual workers and their families into the social-world of the middle
class, but rather a much less dramatic process of convergence, in certain particular
respects, in the normative orientations of some sections of the working class and of
some white-collar groups" (Goldthorpe et. aI., 1969, p. 26). He asserted that, looking
at the Goldthorpe and Lockwood's "affluent worker" from the perspective of the later
1960s and 1970s and at the sustained wage militancy and militant shop-floor union
organization, "the whole 'embourgeoisement' thesis looks extremely thin and shaky"
(Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 25).
Absolute increases in income and wealth did not mean automatic decrease in
relative inequalities. As a matter of fact, increase in income, shifts in occupational
structure or changes in value located more movements within classes. Social
democratic policies for meritocratic advancement through expansion in education,
while benefiting a minority of working class, benefited more of the middle class. The
fundamental relations of power and wealth remained unchanged and hard to challenge.
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As Westergaard and Resler detected, despite some redistribution of income following
the Second World War, the overall pattern is that of "continuing inequality" (as cited
in Hill, 1986, p. 9).
Hall had argued as early as in 1958 in his essay "A sense of classlessness" that
popular cultural transformations had not seen class differences disappear, as was
commonly assumed. Rather "classlessness" was an ideological effect of the new
consumer culture, promoting a sense that increasing access to commodities had driven
away working class poverty. Actually, the purpose of a great deal of advertising was
to break down the class resistance to consumer-purchase which had been an integral
part of working class consciousness. He used the Morris advert as an example to
illustrate his point. The Morris advert "When you buy your second car, make sure it's
a Morris" was "far from innocent." The personal pronoun "you" constructed the
worker "as a freely choosing individual rather than a communal member of the
working class." Such adverts "erode[ d] class alliances and, therefore, the possibility
of resistance." (Procter, 2004, p. 18)
Through these three terms, Hall et al. sought to demonstrate that while there
was a "real basis" for all three terms in the postwar economic boom, it had not produced the classless society many commentators claimed it had, with "the stubborn
refusal of class" to "disappear as a major dimension and dynamic of the social

structure" (Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 25). The general rise in living standards obscured
the fact that the relative positions of the classes had remained virtually unchanged.
Hence "affluence" and "classlessness" are "full-blown ideologies" which worked to
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"cover over the gaps between real inequalities and the promised utopia of
equality-for-all (Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 37). The role of "affluence" and
"embourgeoisement," as an ideology, was to "dismantle working-class resistance and
deliver the 'spontaneous consent' of the class to the authority of the dominant classes"
(Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 40), since with a "classless" society, there seemed no need
preaching class consciousness.
In Resistance Through Rituals, Hall also identified the rise of working-class
youth as a dramatic representation of social change. He quoted Colin Macinnes who
speculated that "The 'two nations' of our society may perhaps no longer be those of
the 'rich' and the 'poor' ... , but those of the teenagers on the one hand and, on the
other, all those who have assumed the burdens of adult responsibility" (as cited in
Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 27). While the disappearance of class was intensely arguable,
there seemed no doubt that youth was making an impressive appearance. Alongside
the social rise of working class man, youth caught media attention through leisure
consumption, subculture style and managed to establish a distinctive cultural identity.
As Harry Hopkins puts it, "Never had 'Youth'-- with the capital 'Y'-- been so
earnestly discussed, so frequently surveyed, so extensively seen and heard" (as cited
in Hill, 1986, p. 10). The Angry Young Man novels and plays quickly discovered and
presented the youthful energy and rebelliousness. New Wave films affirmed this and
popularized the images.
The cultural concerns of the New Left.
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The New Left was represented by scholars such as Richard Hoggart, E.P.
Thompson, Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall, who explored British working class
from cultural aspects and inspired people to broaden their notion of British culture.
The New Left emerged after Russia's invasion of Hungary, an event which was
considered so immoral by Communist Party members such as E.P. Thompson and
John Saville that they responded by resigning from the party (along with 7000 others)
(Hill, 1986, p. 26). Discontented with both the "barbarities of Stalinism" and the
debilitated politics of the Labor Party, these scholars initiated a new magazine New
Left Review and started studying working class mainly from the perspective of culture.

On the other hand, with the working class transformed from primary producers to key
consumers, the new climate of consumerism in postwar Britain gave a blow to the
traditional Left. It challenged their faith in the working class capacity for a socialist
revolution. Their concern then was shifted to the effects that working-class
"affluence" and an Americanized mass culture might have on traditional working
class communities and politics.
Under

the

dominant

discourse

of

"affluence,"

"consensus,"

and

"embourgeoisement," the political and economic aspects of the issue of class seemed
settled facts. Culture became a key arena for contestation about the disappearance (or
not) of the British working class. Even the New Left took the economic affluence for
granted, though dismissed it as a myth. It was the moral and cultural aspects that were
now open to question. Perry Anderson observed, "As material deprivation to a certain
degree receded, cultural loss and devastation became more and more evident and
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important" (as cited in Hill, 1986, p. 26). So the New Left scholars such as Hoggart
and Williams provided views of seeing the working class culturally in their respective
works The Use of Literacy (1957) and Cultural and Society (1958}--influential and
founding texts for the New Left, as well as for the discipline of Cultural Studies which
emerged at this period. Stuart Hall, from the late 50s, began to be engaged with the
New Left in the serious analysis of the new consumer society and the popular cultural
forms and lifestyles associated with it. Thus class as economic category or political
entity yields to class as primarily cultural identity (Kirk, 2003, p. 59), for which the
New Left were criticized as "being more of a cultural than a political movement"
(Procter, 2004, p. 14). Yet a significant contribution of the New Left was to
demonstrate that popular culture is itself political and that "cultural politics" (culture

as politics) should be taken seriously as culture is not a secondary reflection of
economic conditions, but a constitutive dimension of society, a view challenging the
reductionism and economism of Marx's base-superstructure metaphor. Both Hoggart
and Williams were concerned with the erosion of the traditional working class and its
popular culture. Williams even went as far as rejecting mass culture as the culture of
the working class, "arguing that it was not produced by them, but for them" (Kirk,
2007, p. 65).
For Hoggart in Uses of Literacy, traditional working class culture developed
from working class communities which were bound together by material hardships. In
these communities, the individual's most valuable resources were collective: family,
community, and a shared culture of mutual support and of resistance with a clear
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sense of "us" and "them" class divisions. As working-men's lives were mainly
defined by work, characterizations of the traditional working-class community and its
culture were masculine and work-related ones. But now, rise in income and housing
relocations into new estates which isolated them were feared to be breaking the ties of
such community. Modern mass-produced goods as well as consumerism were offering
new aspirations and new temptations. Affluence and the new mass culture were
undermining the old values and destroying traditional working class cultural life, as
could be seen in Hoggart's portrait of the 'Juke-box boys ... who spend their evenings
listening in harshly lighted milk-bars to the 'nickelodeons'" (Hoggart, 1998, p. 189)
and in his observation that "[t]he hedonistic but passive barbarian who rides in a
fifty-horsepower bus for three pence, to see a five-million-dollar film for
one-and-eight-pence, is not simply a social oddity; he is a portent" (Hoggart, 1998, p.
191). Hall saw that the worst effects of the new "mass culture" was "its tendency to
'unbend the springs' of working class action and resistance" (Clarke & Hall, 1976, p.
19). Hoggart's book crystallized the fears about the erosion of working class culture
with the shift offocus from work to leisure. The writing set in the traditional Northern
working-class community was "a nostalgic affirmation of the values and strengths of
a way of life whose imminent passing it lamented" (Lovell, 1990, p. 360). Hoggart's
community was the one experienced in childhood, and remembered with affection.
The point of view of The Uses of Literacy was Hoggart's own -a working-class
scholarship boy whose education had taken him away, literally and culturally. It was
an insider's view from outside.
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For Williams in Culture and Society (1958), the crucial distinction between
bourgeois and working-class culture is "between alternative ideas of the nature of
social relationship," not evidence as housing, dress and modes of leisure in which
industrial production tends to produce uniformity (p. 325). The bourgeois social
relationship is marked by "individualism," in which each individual is "free" or has "a
natural right" to pursue his own development (p. 325). The reforming bourgeois
modification of this version of society is "the idea of service" (p. 325). This can be
sharply-contrasted with the idea associated with the working class: "an idea which,
whether it is called communism, socialism or cooperation, regards society neither as
neutral nor as protective, but as the positive means for all kinds of development,
including individual development.. .Improvement is sought, not in the opportunity to
escape from one's class, or to make a career, but in the general and controlled
advance of all... Not the individual, but the whole society, will move." (p. 326) In
short, working-class culture is "the basic collective idea, and the institutions, manners,
habits of thought and intentions which proceed from this" whereas bourgeois culture
is "the basic individualist idea and the institutions, manners, habits of thought and
intentions which proceed from that" (p. 327). The culture which the working class has
produced since the Industrial Revolution is ''the collective democratic institution,
whether in the trade unions, the cooperative movement or a political party" (p. 327).
Working-class culture is "primarily social (in that it has created institutions) rather
than individual (in particular intellectual or imaginative work)" (p. 327).
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In Culture and Society, Williams also offers his unique understanding and
critique of the idea of individual opportunity-climbing the social ladder. The social
conscience of this idea requires the service from government only in providing such a
ladder, in industry, in education and elsewhere, and in extending the ladder to the
working class. Yet, for Williams, the ladder image is "a perfect symbol of the
bourgeois idea of society, because, while undoubtedly it offers the opportunity to
climb, it is a device which can only be used individually: you go up the ladder alone"
(p. 331). He therefore objects to this ladder version of society as it "weakens the
principle of common betterment, which ought to be an absolute value" and as it
"sweetens the poison of hierarchy" (p. 331).
The major directors of the New Wave films were associated with the New Left
and quite some script writers belonged to the Angry Young Man team. Deeply carried
by social democratic concerns, they projected a broad social awareness and general
sense of political responsibility in filmmaking. Anderson attacked traditional English
cinema as "snobbish, anti-intelligent, emotionally inhibited, willfully blind to the
conditions and problems of the present, dedicated to an out-of-date national ideal"
(McFarlane, 1986, p. 137) and called for a more socially conscious and responsible
British cinema as well as for personal vision. He declared that "I want to make
people-ordinary people, not just top people-feel their dignity and their importance"
(Hill, 1986, p. 128). This determination to put working-class characters on the screen
confirmed their humane values and the value of a "socially committed" cinema.
The representation in New Wave films.
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The New Wave films contributed to the accurate portrayal of British working
class in the changing conditions of affluence and consumption. In so doing, there was
a prominent structure of feeling to convey the sense of social rise of new working
class with their ample masculine confidence, youthful sexuality and rebelliousness as
well as the sense of frustration and alienation they felt in the time of change.
Responding to the affluence and political consensus of the time and echoing the
cultural concerns of the New Left, there was also the structure of feeling to articulate
the sense of loss of politics, the loss of radical intent on the part of the working class
and of a deep anxiety about the decline or demise of traditional working class culture
under the threat of the mass culture consumption. The protagonists all display mixed
feeling toward the ideology of affluence and toward working-class consumerism.
What New Wave films depicted was not the traditional working class, but the
rise of new working class-the affluent workers. The protagonists are mostly
benefiting from the affluence of the time, e.g. rich income, secure employment and
diversified choice of consumption. Occupational and educational change leads to
better chances of limited upward and outward mobility.
Arthur Seaton, an efficient and well-paid worker and big-spending consumer, is
a typical example for the new affluence. Murphy comments that "'terribly limited in
his sensibilities' and 'narrow in his ambitions' though he is, Arthur is still able to take
advantage of full employment and a fat wage packet to assume a belligerent,
devil-may-care

attitude

to

the

world"

(1992,

p.

30).

For working-class

grammar-school boys like Joe and Vic, they don't have to follow their father's
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footsteps into mines and factories and have moved into comfortable white-collar jobs
and thus are good examples for embourgeoisement. Joe's final success in marrying
Susan and climbing up is sincerely congratulated upon by his colleagues, which
shows wide public approval for working-class entitlement for betterment. In 1950s
British society, his ambition is reasonable and legitimate. In A Taste of Honey, the
stark economic necessity cut against the gain of the ideology of affluence.
On the whole, the New Wave films conformed to the dominant ideology of
affluence. This is vividly displayed through the lifestyle of Arthur, Joe, Frank, Colin's
mother and the new housing estates enjoyed by Doreen and Ingrid's mothers and
which can be afforded by Arthur and Doreen in the near future. However, echoing the
sociological denial of classlessness, the films undermined the dominant ideology of
embourgeoisement and more reflected the illusionary nature of such ideology. As I
have explored in Chapter IV, class difference and antagonism is clearly shown in
Room at the Top; class consciousness (of economic exploitation) and class hatred are
explicit in Saturday Night and Sunday Morning and The Loneliness of the Long
Distance Runner. Embourgeoisement is denied and seriously mocked in The
Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner and is seen to be won at huge cost in Room at
the Top. In all these films, whether overt or implicit, the class structure in British
society is seen as an important cause of alienation felt by the protagonists. The
suffocating and tiresome work for Arthur, the bleak, drab living environment for all
protagonists, the sense of hopelessness felt by Colin, and of perplexity felt by Joe, all
influence their conception and behaviors. As Street has observed, "the existence of a
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Labor Government did not mean that class divisions were eroded, and many sections
of the working class still experienced profound economic difficulties despite the
media's obsession with affluence" during this period (1997, p. 80). With protagonists
like Arthur, Joe and Frank who earn a relatively satisfactory amount of income, the
money seems comparatively meaningless to them: "it is something to be spent or
wasted" (Shafer, 2001, p. 7). For those who sincerely seek outside mobility, the social
hierarchy is too rigid for them to breach, as Joe is told in Room at the Top in reference
to Susan Brown, "That's not for you, lad." Despite Joe's bitter protest that "it's old
fashioned, all that class stuff," all these representations provided evidence to the
persistent class system in Britain, and negated the "classlessness."
Concerning working-class desire for upward mobility into the middle class,
different explorations have been given. John Braine, author of Room at the Top,
pointed out, "Most ambitious working-class boys want to get to hell out of the
working class. That was a simple truth that had never been stated before. The English
working classes are the least politically-minded in the world; they always have been.
Give the English working-class man half a chance and he becomes a bourgeois." (as
cited in Murphy, 1992, p. 13) Film historian Anthony Slide also shared the view: "the
British working class has one overall ambition-to become middle class ... " (as cited
in Shafer, 2001, pp. 7-8). Yet Raymond Williams in Culture and Society is against
such assumption. He is against the suggestion that "the working class is becoming
'bourgeois,' because it is dressing like the middle class, living in semi-detached
houses, acquiring cars and washing-machines and television sets," arguing that "[t]he
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worker's envy of the middle-class man is not a desire to be that man, but to have the
same kind of possessions." He holds that the English middle class tend to think of
themselves as a standard and to suppose that the working class is "desperately anxious
to become just like itself." Long deprived of the means for material wealth, "[t]he
great majority of English working people want only the middle-class material
standard and for the rest want to go on being themselves." (1958, pp. 323-324) Such
contradictory feelings are clearly reflected in the deep confusion and alienation felt by
Joe and Frank. Hall views the limited mobility as involving the young people "valuing
the dominant culture positively, and sacrificing the 'parent' culture" accompanied by
"a distinct sense of cultural disorientation" (Clarke & Hall, 1976, p. 51). While this is
largely true, however, in breaking away from traditional working-class and being
adrift in a world where the rules are uncertain, they also retain a defensive affection
for old values.
Changing trends

In

production, increasing social and geographical mobility,

urban redevelopment and mass culture were breaking up traditional or "old"
working-class marked by the intimate relationship between work and cultural identity,
and the "proletarian consciousness" characteristic of the "occupational community"
especially in industries such as mining. The identity of the rising affluent or "new"
working class was characterized less by work or production than leisure, patterns of
consumption and entertainment. Thus, as Colin Sparks has observed of the work of
writers like Hoggart, there is a significant absence of a discussion of work and trade
unions in their consideration of patterns of working-class culture (Hill, 1986, p. 154).
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This shift of concern of the New Left and the sense ofloss of politics are reflected in
the New Wave films, which acknowledged, if not consolidated, the dominant
ideology of affluence and consensus. The political field simply has to be given up by
the Left. Many of the New Wave films are less concerned with "a reassertion of the
continuing gap between capital and labor" (Hill, 1986, p. 174) than with exploring the
transformation of working-class life in the face of affluence and consumerism.
Politically, the working class tends to be represented as largely "inert and conformist"
(Hill, 1986, p. 174). Industrial action and collective activity are hardly possible
alternatives; only individual working class members may rise above or rebel against
the general condition. So in the films we see little depiction of radial class politics or
radical class conflicts. Strikes is a rarity which only appear in I'm Alright, Jack, in
which it is shown to be laughed at, with union leaders depicted as clowns and workers
as lazy greedy trouble-makers. The targets for political anger are generally ambivalent,
directed towards authority or establishments and continuing social injustice.
Conscious of economic exploitation, the protagonists can only exert passive resistance
by choosing not to have a job or not to work too hard. This evident lack of collective
political response to alienation and exploitation in New Wave films constituted a
recognition that collective potential had been harnessed by the false promises of
affluence, which had improved material aspects of working-class life but robbed it of
the possibility to forge a political economy and culture more definitively of its own.
The

protagonists' anger

and

personal

revolts

assert their

"working class

consciousness" and present a challenge to the conformity of the Conservative 1950s,
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but that's as far as they can go. As Hill commented, "'The class war' might not be
quite over in Macmillan's sense, but it certainly has become contained and
constricted" (1986, p. 174). The prevalence of individualism caused the lack of group
depiction of working-class characters in New Wave films.
Under the influence of the New Left, the New Wave films privileged the
representation of the working class from cultural aspects, shifting the emphasis on
work and production in the Documentary tradition to leisure and consumption. Alan
Lovell notes how the concerns and representations of The Uses of Literacy can be
seen in the films of the British New Wave. They share a "structure of feeling" defined
as "a sympathetic interest in working class communities, [combined with] unease
about the quality of leisure in urban society" (as cited in Lovell, 1990, p. 358).
Hoggart's hostility to the new materialism, to affluence and to the homogenizing
effect of the mass media was also widely shared by the mainly left-wing directors and
script writers of the New Wave. As Hill points out, respect for the traditional working
class and hostility to the corruptions of modem mass culture is "a tension ... which is
characteristic of the work of the 'new wave' as a whole" (Hill, 1986, p. 152). The
New Wave films show that the post-war explosion of material and cultural goods,
while representing social progress (affluence), leads to the erosion of traditional
values and therefore arouses concern about the decline or demise of the traditional
working class associated with work and community and anxiety about the growing
"corruption" of the working class by consumerism. Yet the working class themselves
are not to blame for the "corruption," because they have their situation settled by
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other forces. Doreen's aspiration for a new housing estate in Saturday Night and

Sunday Morning is reasonable for the time.
Women played a vital role in the post-war affluence not only because of their
contribution to the rise in household income with their job earnings but also because
of their patterns of consumption. But in New Wave films female characters are
endowed with subordinate role and the representation of their relationship with
"affluence" is less female labor than female consumption. Women are degraded to
consumers. The female "consumer" imagery is simply portrayed as the target for the
objection of the male anger. On the whole, the portrayal of women is negative and
"dismissive." The dominant ideology in British society of the time was still to see
women belonging to domestic sphere. A variety of stratagems were designed to
encourage women back home from work, especially in the fields of psychology and
social welfare. Thus it was not surprising for the New Wave films to reveal
misogynist tendency and a failure to acknowledge the changing social and economic
role of women in British society other than as consumers. Placed in social and
historical context, they could be seen to be "confirming, rather than querying and
challenging, the dominant ideological assumptions about a 'woman's role'" (Hill,
1986, p. 174).
The New Wave films also reveal a general conservative mood, represented in
the treatment of sex relationships, the subordinate position of women, and the
conservative endings of stories. The conservative resolutions favored were
"remarkably consistent with the ideological values and assumptions of the period"
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(Lay, 2002, p. 66). The male protagonists' settling down for marriage suggests their
conformity to the social mainstream and signifies a kind of "closure" oftheir personal
revolts of cultural resistance. Morally conservative solutions are chosen for female
characters concerning the expression of their sexuality, e.g. Brenda's returning to her
husband and avoiding the abortion.
The treatment of sex in New Wave films is featured with an honest exploration
of sexual relationship, which was more permissive than past decades due to the
changing time and the baby boom, and which was tolerated and guided by the BBFC.
However, sexual "permissiveness" in the 1960s was only in relative sense and was far
from rampant. Unwanted pregnancy was certainly a very real fear for many women in
the early 1960s, and most of the cases resulted in marriage. This is all indicated in
New Wave films despite all the lure of greater sexual explicitness.
The major directors of the New Wave films, as working class "scholarship
boys" who climbed up, are "the university educated bourgeois making 'sympathetic'
films about proletarian life but not analyzing the ambiguities of their own privileged
position," according to Roy Armes (as cited in Hill, 1986, p. 133). They offered an
"outsider's view" which tended to romanticize individual male working-class figures
rather than presenting radical viewpoints. As a result, the significance of class
relationships was obscured and sexual attitudes had a rigid conformity.
In conclusion, the New Wave films echoed the progressive trend of the British
Cultural Studies to extend to the working class and achieved a breakthrough in the
positive, dignified and more rounded representation of working-class identity. They
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"assisted in 'opening up' the British cinema with their innovatory contents and more
socially enquiring attitudes" (Hill, 1986, p. 174). However, Hill has a point here in
suggesting that the films were, in the end, "something less than radical" as the ideas
and politics which they inherited from the 'Angry Young Man' and the New Left
were still "shaped and structured by the dominant discourses of 'affluence'" (Hill,
1986, p. 174). For me, I see a reasonable balance in the representation between the
power of the dominant ideology and the cultural rebellion/resistance of the Left.
Films of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s: Neo-Iiberalism and Working-class Identity

The post-war social democratic political consensus remained a cardinal
principle of British public life until 1979, when it was abolished and ever since
replaced by Thatcherite New Right political and economical ideologies. Mrs Thatcher
has given the "swing to the right" "a powerful impetus and a distinctive personal
stamp" (Hall, 1983, p. 19), remarkably reversing the whole postwar social democratic
trend and rolling back the historic gains of the labor movement and other progressive
forces, such as full employment, welfare state and the "caring" society. The
opposition of the Labor and trade union movement were effectively disorganized.
Labor was split and transformed; the labor movement was undermined through
exploiting the unpopUlarity of the trade unions. Unemployment was deliberated
created and made use of to compel workers to accept the harsh reality of low wage
settlements or the dole queue. Mrs Thatcher massively transformed the country,
shifting the balance of political forces "in favor of capital and the right" (Hall and
Jacques, 1983, p. 13). Through ideologically moulding the return to possessive
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individualism and free-market competitiveness "look like 'common sense'" (Hall and
Jacques, 1983, p. 14), Mrs Thatcher established and consolidated the hegemony of
neo-liberalism. Blairism of the New Labor Party was not much different in the main
direction, though some effort was made to balance a bit the weight of equality of
opportunities. Tony Blair's Cool Britannia is a vision of a middle-class nation built on
"creative" entrepreneurialism.
Neo-Iiberalism, authoritarian populism and Blairism.

Neo-liberalism, or "neo-liberal" capitalism, has been clearly defined by Paul
Dave. "Neo" signals "the return of 'free' market after the post war interlude of social
democratic regulation." "'Liberal' signals that any such regulative, welfarist
tampering with the market is to be viewed as an infraction of the 'liberty' of capital."
(Dave, 2006, p. xiii) Neo-liberalism, in its ideology and practice, seeks to "replace
society with the market" (Dave, 2006, p. 46).
The context for neo-liberal ideology is that capitalism has transformed into
post-Fordist production, a stage which is called by Wood as the "commercialization
model" of capitalism (as cited in Dave, 2006, p. xiv). In this model, the importance of
production is eclipsed; emphasis is laid on commerce, trade and finance services. In
the cyber-assisted world, wealth is now believed to be created by the market itself and
by the flow of finance capital. So it seems that capitalism has successfully
emancipated itself from the labor of the working class, whose value can be ignored.
Neo-liberalism has immense ideological impact. In this "post-historic,
post-political reality of capitalism," it is the capital, not labor, which is viewed as "the
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exclusive origin of social wealth" (Dave, 2006, p. 161). So the location of social value
is generally shifted away from labor, and decisively towards capital. The New Right
managed to promote the ideology of "irresistible capitalism" and "politically finished
proletariat" (Dave, 2006, p. 161). Labor is demanded to adapt to flexible employment
and to engage with capital outside the regulative, welfarist activities of the state or
trades union. Jobs are not only "not for life", but also "not/or the 'working class' at
all" (Dave, 2006, p. 161). The widening inequalities between the beneficiaries and
victims of neo-Iiberal capitalist modernization have been ideologically underscored in
New Right political discourses as a division between "winners" and "losers," with the
latter viewed as the "undeserving poor."
So the vast number of laborers nationwide is "to be consigned to the historical
dustbin" through the long process of de-industrialization and the creation of a
north/south divide. In 1989, Alan Sinfield observed that unemployment in Britain was
not just a consequence of recession. Out of the unemployment rise between 1979 and
1983, "40 to 50 per cent has been variously estimated as due to government policies"
(1989, p. 254). Tom Nairn suggested that Mrs Thatcher's economic policy was "no
more than an attempt to utilize the recession to hasten and complete the dominance of
financial capital. The apotheosis of 'Freedom' is de-industrialization ... " (as cited in
Kirk, 2003, p. 78).
For Stuart Hall, "it is difficult to call an economic strategy which results in
some four million unemployed and the shutting down of substantial sectors of the

319

economy, a 'success'" (1983, p. 12). Yet Mrs Thatcher successfully consolidated
social support or "consent" through authoritarian populism.
On national identity, inheriting a land caught in "British Disease" of slow
development, high inflation and industrial disputes of the 1970s, Mrs Thatcher strived
to cut across divides and conflicting interests and unite people through mobilizing
populist patriotism and a sense of belonging around identity politics, with the focus on
the nation and ideas of Englishness. The official interpellation of "We British"
represents a cultural and political hegemony which "facilitates the articulation of a
selective past for the construction of an acceptable present" (Kirk, 2003, p. 165).
People are constructed in alliance with the new power bloc in a great national crusade
to "make Britain 'Great' once more" (Hall, 1983, p. 30). The Falkland crisis was
constructed ideologically into a war of populist patriotism.
Economically, Mrs Thatcher wisely and effectively translated hard-faced
economic doctrine into the language of "experience, moral imperative and common
sense," substituting the "caring society" with an alternative ethic of individualism and
competition" (Hall, 1983, p. 28). The national economy was debated on the model of
the household budget-"You can't pay yourself more than you earn!!"- and "being
British" became once again identified with the restoration of competition and
profitability (Hall, 1983, p. 29). The essence of the British people was identified with
self-reliance and personal responsibility, as against the image of the over-taxed
individual and welfare-dependent. This assault, not just on welfare overspending, but
on the very principle and essence of collective social welfare-the centerpiece of
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postwar consensus politics-was mounted through "the emotive image of the
'scrounger': the new folk-devil" (Hall, 1983, p. 29).
Politically, Thatcherism launched a fierce attack on "the State," which was
transformed into "the enemy." It is ''the State" which "has over-borrowed and
overspent; fuelled inflation; ... above all, interfered, meddled, intervened, instructed,
directed - against the essence, the Genius, of The British People." It is time, as she
says, with conviction, "to put people's destinies again in their own hands." (Hall,
1983, p. 34) In the polarization of "state" and "people," Labor is made to equal the
state, which is "the bureaucratic embodiment, the powerful organizing centre" (Hall,
1988, p. 23) whereas Mrs Thatcher, "grasping the torch of Freedom with one hand," is
seen to identify "with the people" (Hall, 1983, p. 34).

In ideologically identifying with "the people," Mrs Thatcher once told the
readers of Woman's Own: "Don't talk to me about 'them' and 'us' in a
company ... You're all 'we' in a company. You survive as the company survives,
prosper as the company prospers--everyone together. The future lies in cooperation
and not confrontation." (Hall, 1983, p. 31) Thus the traditional binary opposition of
"them" and "us" was easily replaced with the high-sounding "we-the people" in a
particular relation

to

capital:

dominated

by

its

imperatives

(profitability,

accumulation); yet identified with it. This ideology is what lay behind the
"share-owning democracy" Mrs Thatcher practiced.
Socially, Mrs Thatcher was hostile to collectivism of all sorts. In a September
1987 interview with Women S Own magazine, she lambasted people for looking to
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"government" or, worse, "society" for solutions to their personal problems and
delivered her most notorious statement of her conception of society: "[W]ho is
society? .. There is no such thing! There are individual men and women and there are
families and no government can do anything except through people and people look
to themselves first." (as cited in Mandler, 2006, p. 232)
Mrs Thatcher's way of dealing with the miners' strike of 1984-5 can be seen as
a typical example of how she maneuvered neo-liberalism and authoritarian populism
to full extent in the "national" interest of the capital. The 1974 miners' strike has been
accused of "holding the nation up to ransom" by the then Heath government. So this
time, to arouse stronger national antagonism, the Thatcher government charged that
the government and indeed the whole society is now "run by the trade unions." (Hall,
1988, p. 26) Ideologically, the striking miners were designated and condemned as the
"enemies within" (Mandler, 2006, p. 232) and those who did not withdraw their labor
were thus, in Thatcher's words, "working for Britain"-a mode of identification with
the state (Kirk, 2003, p. 167). To fully defeat the miners, after 1984, subsidies had
been provided to other energy sources, such as gas and nuclear power, so that they
could compete with coal, which is ironic for neo-liberal free market principle. As
Seumas Milne points out, at the time of the large scale pit closures of 1992, there was
a "sea-change in popular attitudes" towards the strike of 1984 (as cited in Dave, 2006,
p. 64). A ruling-class conspiracy was sensed. The Tories' economic arguments against
the miners (the National Union of Mineworkers) were easier to be seen in 1992 as
part of an ideological offensive of a ruthless class war.
322

In The hard road to renewal: Thatcherism and the crisis of the Left, Hall holds
that traditional class alliances had become unstable and contradictory. The old
political identities were collapsing; there was no such thing as a unified working class
to be rescued. For him, Labor was very much split: "Socialist Man, with one mind,
one set of interests, one project, is dead" (Hall, 1988, p. 169).

And Labor was too

weak to face the challenge to the left which Thatcherism and the New Right posed
directly. The Labor Party, the labor movement and the left had "no national
paper. .. [n]o powerful journal of opinion, no political education, no organic
intellectual base from which to engage popular consciousness ... " (Hall, 1988, pp.
73-74). Hall insisted that the renewal of the Left could not simply be thinking and
acting in the same way "only more so, harder, and with more 'conviction'" (Hall,
1988, p. 11), but that it had to begin by learning from the lessons of Thatcherism.
In late 1980s, a decade before Tony Blair became British Prime Minister, Hall
and Jacques wrote of the danger "that the Left will produce, in government, a brand of
New Times which in practice does not amount to much more than a slightly
cleaned-up, humanized version of that of the radical Right" (1989, p. 16). This is not
for the first time that Hall's prediction about contemporary British politics appeared
prophetic and turned out to be true later. New Labor under Tony Blair appeared to
have learned Thatcher's lessons only too well. It won a landslide victory in the 1997
election, building support through presenting itself as a "modernizing" catch-all party.
Yet it is largely agreed that the success was more based on ideological wordings than
substantial economic policy changes. The re-branded, re-packaged Labor Party
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displayed its capacity of quickly imitating Mrs Thatcher and entering into the
ideological struggle over image and imagery.
The attempt, for Hall, has been less to re-articulate the new times for the Left,
than to re-occupy the old terrain of the Right. In his 1998 essay "The great moving
nowhere show" (Hall wrote "The great moving Right show" in 1979), Hall argued
that at global and domestic levels, the neo-liberal "tum" which Thatcherism made had
not been radically modified, not to mention reversed. It seemed that the economics of
neo-liberalism had become unquestionable and unchallengeable; there was not much
room left for Blair. The pressure for the left to modernize was so enormous that old
thoughts like class and left politics were dismissed as redundant. The pessimism was
shared by many more academics. Chantal Mouffe described Tony Blair as Thatcher's
final victory and Isaac Julien saw New Labor's reign as "really just business as usual"
(Julien, 2001, p. 181). Julien felt that the neo-liberal shift is unstoppable and more
class divisions and problems will be created.
The ideology of Blairism was centered on the imagery of "Cool Britannia"--a
vision of a middle-class nation built on "creative" entrepreneurial ism. The rebranding
of Britain proposed by think-tank Demos involved the ridding of Britain's
international image as "a backward-looking island immersed in its heritage ... bogged
down by tradition, riven by class and threatened by industrial disputes" and promoting
a new Britain as a highly creative and diverse country, innovative, dynamic,
forward-looking and optimistic (as cited in Monk, 2000b, p. 283). The "modernized"
new British national identity Blair wanted to build, as analyzed by Driver and Martell,

324

mainly emphasized three aspects, namely, "patriots and populists in the 'giving age,'"
"creative Britain" and "the young country" (2002, pp. 145-148). By "patriots and
populists in the 'giving age, '" Blair positioned the Labor Party as the "patriotic party"
with a strong sense of history and tradition, as a "People's party" (with the "people's
budget") serving public good and aimed to inspire a sense of community by appealing
to national pride underpinned by the collective values and institutions such as social
justice and National Health Service. By "creative Britain," Blair meant to tap the
potential of the British nation as an inherently creative people for the historical
inventions

initiated

in Britain.

Lastly, "the young country" indicated the

characteristics of being creative, inventive, dynamic and forward-looking which Blair
wanted the country to be associated with in globalization age. So New Britain was
marked by the Blairite repression of class.
The ideologies of Conservative Thatcherite neo-liberalism and New Labor
Blairism have had much impact on the representation of class across a range of
different types of film, from art cinema of Loach and Leigh to the more commercial
mainstream films of the 1990s.
Anti-Thatcherism of independent filmmakers: Leigh, Loach and Frears.

Thatcherism, despite its powerful ideological intepellation, did not command
popular ideological appeal among lefiwing intellectuals and large section of the
working class, failing to win over their "hearts and minds" (Hill, 1999, p.29).
Although Thatcher did not create a favorable climate for the film industry (abolishing
the quota system and the Eady Levy, and privatizing the National Film Finance
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Corporation), her policies did help create the subject for British directors. The intense
and unwavering hatred for Margaret Thatcher ignited the creativity of Britain's
filmmakers to new heights, offering "a viable alternative to officially sanctioned
versions of the truth" (Friedman, 1993, p. xix). More social realist films which are
anti-Thatcherism or with anti-Thatcher sentiments were produced.
In the words of Peter Wollen, "independent filmmakers of the eighties reacted

strongly against the effects of Thatcherism. They responded to the imposition of
market criteria in every sector of society, to political authoritarianism, to the 'two
nations' project of Thatcherism, and to the leading role of the City" (1993, p. 35).
Stephen Frears chose the feature film to attack Thatcherism, claiming that his film
Sammy and Rosie Get Laid was "an attempt to bring Margaret Thatcher down"
(Dixon, 1994, p. 233). Hence, Lester Friedman argues that what united the British
directors during the 1980s was "their revulsion, to one degree or other, for the
ideology of Thatcherism" (1993, p. xix). Leonard Quart sees that the "film
renaissance" of this period was "one of the more positive by-products of the Thatcher
ethos, though in an almost totally oppositional and critical manner" (1993, p. 17). The
films made in response to enormous social changes under Thatcherism are, "if not
completely socially committed, at least socially aware" (Lay, 2002, p. 82).
One of the most effective anti-Thatcherism products is Mike Leigh's High Hopes,
in which class difference is a central theme. Leigh's interest in class is solid. As he
explains himself: "This is a deeply class-ridden society like nowhere else, and
everything resonates around that. Since I make films which are about England,
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because I'm specifically concerned with creating a real world, implicitly and
inevitably, problems of class are part of the texture." (as cited in Watson, 2004, p. 185)
His concern about class leads to the comment of his works by Dennis Potter as "often
in the minefields of English class consciousness" (as cited in Watson, 2004, p. 12).
High Hopes provides serious attack on Thatcherite greed, possessiveness and

selfishness represented by the "new rich" couple and the upper-middle-class couple.
At the same time, it glorifies the working-class consciousness for equality and
fairness and working class human kindness and sincerity typically represented by
Shirley and Cyril. The focus of the film is on the ordinary, the everyday, the family,
the relationship, the lifestyle. Hill points out that no equal attention is paid to work or
the community surrounding the work. In so doing, the film then offers "less an attack
on the economic hardship suffered by the losers" in Thatcher's Britain than "a critique
of the cultural 'barbarianism' associated with its economic beneficiaries" (1999, p.
193). Leigh is concerned about conflict and tension of different classes, not just of
working class figures. The working class he picks up in his films are not the
traditional enterprise workers of collective labor, but mostly the isolated labor of
service industry. So we sense from his films an end to the working class as a
collective force in the 1980s. Besides, in High Hopes, working-class consumption of
the 1960s is also gone, replaced by the middle-class consumption.
Ken Loach made directly political documentaries in the 1980s. For him, the
experiences were frustrating and restrictive. His documentary Which Side Are You On?
about the miners' strike in 1984-5 was censored and rejected by London Weekend
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Television's South Bank Show (though later shown on Channel 4). In order to get his
message across to more people, he slightly modified his style in the 1990s. Since the
de-politicization left no hope for successful collective political struggle or radical
political change, even Loach turned to depend on individual experience, and began to
avoid political consciousness or seeking for any political solution in his films. Active
individual fighting back in the films only led to worse-off dilemma; and personal
"escape" was impossible.
Pessimism is the dominant mood for Loach's films in all the decades. His
political pessimism extends to the prospects for any social democratic, cross-class
solidarity in the face of neo-liberalism 's impact on the most vulnerable sections ofthe
working class. Ladybird, Ladybird and My Name is Joe both demonstrate how
working-class dilemmas tend not to be amenable to the solutions offered by
middle-class, professional intermediaries associated with the welfare state. However,
the determinist pessimism of a film like My Name is Joe needs to be seen as a
response to the moralizing prejudices and class antagonisms fostered by the illusions
of unconstrained individual choice that have flourished under neo-liberal political
regimes--illusions which support the ideology behind that paragon of poor choices,
the "underclass."
In the new millennium, Loach's films continue to draw attention to the losers in
society. Sweet Sixteen is a warning to anyone who thinks that kids who drop out of
school and grow up to be drug addicts and drug dealers have only themselves to
blame. What's particularly disturbing and sad is that Liam and Pinball, two teenagers,
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instead of being protected, are actually made use of and even ruined by the adults
close to them. Drug selling becomes the reachable business for decent life.
For Peter Mathews, "A certain lack of novelty is the price Loach pays for his
conviction that human misery is systemic. The basic rules of capitalism haven't
changed, and he keeps plugging away at that unfashionable truth for the few who care
to listen." (2002, p. 56) His films all address the limited choices facing those at the
bottom of the society.
Race began to draw serious concern in the 1980s. Several films were to subvert
and extend prevailing definitions of the working class with acute and complex
portrayals of race, ethnicity and national identity, e.g. My Beautiful Laundrette, Queen

and Country. What's so unique about Frears' My Beautiful Laundrette is that class is
seen as a more determining factor than race in a film about the colored. In a culture
hegemonized by neo-liberal capitalism, enterprise culture is identified. For example,

My Beautiful Laundrette is critical of Thatcherism, materialism and the selfishness
which they generate, but the enterprise culture is taken as providing opportunities and
furnishing the Asian immigrants with status. Those who embrace the enterprise
culture have learnt, as Nasser puts it, how to "squeeze the tits of the system" and they
embrace it to win wealth as "revenge." Enterprise culture is also shown in Riff-Raff,
the hero is divided between self-interest and the collective struggle for survival. He
dreams to become a successful businessman by selling boxer shorts and set up his
own market stall, but is no nearer his goal at the end of the film than at the beginning.
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Paul Dave suggests that My Beautiful Laundrette "proposes a liberal-libertarian
'politics of irony' that has a relationship of flat rejection towards traditional forms of
left politics grounded in class" (Dave, 2006, p. 97). The film is critical of the social
inequity and brutalization of life in Thatcher's England, but it does not intellectually
explore "an alternative political vision" and that absence of political certainty "is in
itself an eloquent statement of where the Left stands in the late eighties and early
nineties" (Dixon, 1994, p. 248).

Entertaining working-class images: the "feel-good" comedies.
Postmodern commodification of the "underclass."
In the 1990s, although working class had been marginalized in British politics
and social life, in film it seemed to become an icon or marker of Britishness for export
to the international market. Films like The Full Monty or Trainspotting were widely
consumed in both the UK and the USA.
The tendency was promoted on two grounds. One is the self-adaptation of the
British film industry. Faced with deepening Hollywoodization of British cinema and
more intense cultural globalization, the British film industry since the 1980s had
adopted art cinema strategy to promote national cinema by avoiding direct
competition with Hollywood. The strategy aims "to differentiate itself textually from
Hollywood, to assert explicitly or implicitly an indigenous product, and to reach
domestic and export markets through those specialist distribution channels and
exhibition venues usually called art house" (Crofts, as cited in Hill, 2009, p. 15). With
the unique British class culture, the working class was taken as "recognizably British"
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codes or icons that could be highly marketable to ensure cinematic success. So British
working class transformed into profitable "exportable" images to be consumed.
The other is New Labor's rebranding of Britain into an imagery of Cool
Britania of a competitive and innovative enterprise economy in the late 1990s. Monk
sees the close association of the commodification of underclass films with the
inherently market-driven "modernizing" project adopted by Tony Blair's New Labor
Government. This is reflected in the paradox that the focus on underclass "on the
whole supports this projection of an optimistic, 'modernized' Britain rather than
undermining it" (Monk, 2000b, p. 283).
The films were marketed on a highly stylized and stereotypical set of class
images, with the focus on the traditional industrial regions (esp. northern England)
and traditional jobs (e.g. iron and steel, coal mining), reinforcing the notion of what is
national can become international. The films celebrated locality, yet at the same time
commodified the cultural identities of the working class, re-packaging their
experiences for sale in the global marketplace and "post-modernizing" the cultural
landscapes of such cities as Sheffield, Liverpool and Glasgow.
Neo-liberal self-help and enterprise culture.
Within the "millennial" ideologies of neo-liberal capitalism, opportunities
demand strenuous efforts of self-reinvention. Success seems to depend on "a
relationship in which there is nothing the worker will not do or be asked to do, and in
which there is nothing that the magical world of neo-liberal capitalism will deny such
compliant workers" (Dave, 2006, p. 71). While in the deindustrializing elegies like
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Brassed Off, unemployment is still seen as a sign of political crisis, representing a
break in the lives of traditional industries and communities, in The Full Monty
unemployment is viewed more as an accepted challenge to labor and as a structural
part of new, post-industrial labor markets. It is the unemployed individuals who
should try every means to meet the challenge. The Full Monty explores unemployed
workers putting on a show of striptease which is "a pitiless test of the willingness to
do whatever it takes, in the name of self-help" to seek magical fortunes (Dave, 2006,
p. 71). So in the film we see Gaz calculating the monetary rewards of stripping in
terms of a miraculous multiplication sum.

In neo-liberalist ideology, unemployment is changed from a vicious structural
problem of capitalist system into simply a problem of training. A Department of
Employment advertisement from the late 1980s went like this: "Let's train the
workers without jobs, to do the jobs without workers" (Dave, 2006, p. 62). So the
unemployed needed to learn and adapt themselves to jobs without workers--those new
kinds of jobs, which are in reality the "Mcjob"--casualized and "flexible" working
practices of low pay, low prestige and most exploitation, e.g. the security guard job,
the packing job in The Full Monty and the kind of jobs featured in Late Night

Shopping. Such ethos shifts the responsibility as well as the blame away from the
government and management onto the jobless underclass themselves. Yet, in
denouncing the security guard job, Gaz is actually trying to keep his dignity as an
experienced skilled steelworker.
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The job center in the past was now changed into the mandatory "job club" in

The Full Monty for the unemployed The Full Monty (in Brassed Off, it is "Rescue
Room"). Like the change of "Unemployment Benefit" into "the Job-seeker's
Allowance," such clubs are reoriented according to neo-liberal principles to "place
greater emphasis on self-help and responsibility as opposed to entitlement" (Dave,
2006, p. 72). The club is for training and exchange of information, but the workers
play cards in it as a kind of resistance. Gerald, Gaz's former supervisor, forms a
contrast in attitude toward looking for new job. His seriousness toward filling forms,
attend interviews all comply with the mainstream desire of self-help in enterprise
culture.

The Full Monty projects creative entrepreneurial values. As Monk comments,
"if these guys (skinny, fat, middle-aged, unsexy) can succeed as male strippers, it
surely follows that Britons (or anyone) can make a success of any enterprise" (Monk,
2000b, p. 284). Hence, leaving the underclass is "simply a matter of exercising free
choice" (Monk, 2000b, p. 285).

New-Labor optimism
The historical context for the feel-good comedies is the collapse of heavy
industries during the Conservative Thatcher and Major administrations. Yet the films
actively work to "heal the wounds" through "a Blairite vision in which 'Things Can
Only Get Better'" (Lay, 2002, p. 122), offering utopian solutions to the dilemma of
protagonists. Tragi-comic scenes dominate the film as the pain of divorce,
unemployment and attempted suicides are explored through humor. Eventually the
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redundant workers meet the challenge and endure, though through becoming
performers. The highlighting on working-class endurance, imagination and survival is
also the way Hollywood has best dealt with the world of labor. So the New Labor
optimism goes hand in hand with the American dream.

Imagined community.
The realist comedies display the imagery of northern working-class community,
which "regain their pride through a healthy burst of team spirit" (Beachment, as cited
in Mather, 2006, p. 5 ) This collectivity/community is so out of step with the historical
context that it attracted wide critique. Paul Dave sees it as representing an imagined
community of inter-class and cross-class solidarity (2006, p. 11). Julia Hallam sees it
as representing a "hankering for the spirit of Ealing ghosts," that is to say for "an
idealized image of a nation united by adversity" (2000, p. 267). Hill detects in it "a
certain yearning for 'national wholeness' in the face of economic and social divisions
and the rise of self-interested individualism that characterized the Tory years" (2000a,
p. 184). In the films, middle class or upward mobile characters such as Gerald, Gaz's
ex-wife Mandy in The Full Monty and Gloria Brassed Off are all willingly incorporated into the working-class community. From such, the films can be read as
"calling on the assistance of superficial, multicultural images of collectivity in order,
like New Labor, to banish an older world of class and class conflict, and move into a
stylish, modernized future" (Dave, 2006, p. 61).

Working-class poverty and capitalist exploitation.
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As illustrated above, working-class comedies manifest much dominant
neo-liberal ideologies that had been prevalent for over a decade. But on the other hand,
they also successfully exposed the poverty and tragedy of working-class families.
Unlike the New Wave films, there is now little sense of the corrupting effects ofaffluence or embourgeoisement. What is foregrounded is the damage wrought by
de-industrialization, mass unemployment and poverty typical of the Thatcher years.
Phil's poverty, breakdown and attempted suicide, Gaz's inability to find money for
joint custody of his son and the stealing of girder iron, the "funereal" facial expression
and pace of the miners after the vote for redundancy, Danny's collapse and
subsequent illness, all display to us a elegy of the post-industrial "New Times."
Loan-sharks behaving cruelly is a common scene both in comedy films as well
Loach's films.
Despite the feel-good mood, the comedies present masculinity in crisis of the
1990s workers. The continued success of consumerism in the absence of any real
work propuces male trauma concerned with the sense of loss of bread-winning power,
sexual attractiveness and a social space. Pictured as "Nostalgically patriarchal,
impotent and domestically confined" (Dave, 2006, p. 61), we see a working class
struggling to cope with economic dilemmas and reserve their last bit of dignity and
respect.
Capitalist exploitation and cruelty was severely attacked. Brassed Offreveals to
us indirectly what happened to the coal industry after the 1984 miner's strike through
the characterization of the pit manager McKenzie. The neo-liberal market and Mr
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McKenzie are seen as pitiless toward working class sufferings.

Danny's "coughing

coal" breaks the audience's heart. Mather notes that Danny's sentiments and
denouncement echo the observations of Raymond Williams in a New Socialist article
written during the miners strike of 1984-85 in which he rebukes "the logic of a new
nomad capitalism, which exploits actual places and people and then ... moves on" (as
cited in Mather, 2006, p. 41). Brassed Off, in attempting to balance the relationship
between the political and the cultural, ultimately proves that culture has no value and
cannot function without the support of the economic base. However, in displaying the
liveliness and longevity of brass band (existing even after the closure of workplace),
working-class traditional culture is given due value and appreciation.
The powerfuL effect of comic satire.

Monk argues that the commodification of the underclass in such comedies is
"symptomatic of the abandonment of the project of a socially committed British
cinema" (Monk, 2000b, p. 277). Lay also comments that "class politics as a major
preoccupation of British social realist texts have been abandoned in favor of
autobiography and nostalgia" (Lay, 2002, pp. 122-123). While they all have a point
here, I would argue that the effect of comic satire can be as powerful taking into
consideration of the large number of audience they reach. So in this post-working
class age, so long as humor goes hand in hand with satire, all should be welcome.
For Williams' "Equality of Being:" The Need of Cultural Policy Support

Raymond Williams in Culture and Society argues, "The only equality that is
important, or indeed conceivable, is equality of being" (1958, p. 317). A common
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culture is not an equal culture, yet equality of being is essentially necessary to it. In
acknowledging human individuality and variation, inequality in the various aspects of
man is seen to be inevitable, yet inequality which "denies the essential quality of
being" is "evil" and intolerable as it "rejects, depersonalizes, degrades in grading,
other human beings" (1958, p. 317). "The struggle for democracy is a struggle for the
recognition of equality of being, or it is nothing" (1958, p. 337).
British cultural studies academics see the present suffering from social
deprivation of British working class more from the cultural perspective of "dignity"
and "respect." Throughout the two world wars and the immediate postwar decades,
the lower classes were widely revered for their courage in battle and their stoicism in
peace. Values such as "solidarity, thrift, cleanliness and self-discipline" were
regularly identified as characteristic of them. But this is no longer the case in the
present post-industrial and post-modern stage. Mount argues that, for the ultimate
deprivation that the English working class has suffered-in fact the consequence of
all the other deprivations-is "the deprivation of respect" (Mount, 2004, p. 108).
Annette Kuhn sharply points out, "Class is something beneath your clothes, under
your skin, in your psyche, at the very core of your being. In the all-encompassing
English class system, if you know that you are in the 'wrong' class, you know that
therefore you are a valueless person." (as cited in Lawler, 2000, p.117)
The New Right has relentlessly politicized poverty, with their ideology of the
"undeserving" and "unrespectable" poor working class. Michael Young, in his
satirical book The Rise of the Meritocracy, which is a history of English education
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between 1870 and 2003, challenged the decency of meritocracy ethos. "Today the
eminent know that success is just reward for their own capacity, for their own efforts,
and for their own undeniable achievement. They deserve to belong to a superior
class." Their social inferiors are also inferior in the two vital qualities, "of intelligence
and education." (as cited in Mount, 2004, p. 59) So the lower classes have an inferior
status not as in the past because they were denied opportunity. Both Young and
Mount uttered their suspicion and denunciation that the emphasis on meritocracy is
intended to throw the responsibility and blame on the poor themselves.
The working class oflate capitalism is experiencing a pressing existential crisis.
They no longer have the power to make effective revolt. In a culture hegemonized by
neo-liberal capitalism, despite all its benefits, working class face its cold indifference
which is hard to cope with, both in theory and practice. This cruel dilemma must be
seen and understood through whatever sources of media communication. "Class is not
a thing but a relation and one that puts a heavy burden on representation" (Hitchcock,
2000, p. 23). Stuart Hall has categorized theories of representation as "reflective,
intentional, or constructionist" (Hitchcock, 2000, p. 22). Edward Said from a different
aspect has argued, ''the power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming
and emerging" represents a crucial mode of cultural hegemony (as cited in Kirk, 2003,
p. 187). From such, the significance of representation can be easily understood. For
the working class subjectivity, they "must be seen in order to confirm that class is
there and negotiable in stable and unthreatening ways. The 'must be seen' of
working-class subjectivity is intimately connected to modes of representation and
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power." (Hitchcock, 2000, p. 21) Here, I am strongly for Tony Bennett's stand in
"Putting Policy into Culture Studies,,18 and would argue for state cultural policy
support for the screen representation of working-class identity, as this will bring
concern about the dignity of working class. This is logical and feasible in the sense
that cinema not simply reinforces dominant ideology, but also reflects the humanistic
structure of feelings of (left-wing) filmmakers.
In British film industry, the debate about film as business or film as culture is
never-ending. The common agreement in the 1990s film culture seemed to be that
film is both business and culture, though the weight lay much more with the former.
Caught between the European cultural mode of film production and the Hollywood
business mode, the necessity for a national cinema which can represent the different
components of the national whole has been confirmed by the government agencies as
well as filmmakers. The conviction that films should also be a moral force with a
social purpose, rather than being merely entertainment, is shared to varying degrees
by almost all the filmmakers. "The realist tradition from the 1930s to the 1990s has
always been promoted in terms of cultural value, pitting the authentic, indigenous
culture of 'ordinary people' against the Americanized culture of glamour, spectacle,
commercialism and mere entertainment." (Ashby & Rigson, 2000, p. 9). So, cultural
policy support has an essential role to play here. But having said that, we need to also
acknowledge that commercialization is a powerful trend of the postmodern age. So
the incorporation of diversified styles of representation is reasonable in order to win
18 Among his arguments, Bennett calls for "intellectual work calculated to make more strategic interventions within the operating procedures and
policy agendas of specIfic cultural institutIOns" (1992, p 32)
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audience, so long as it shows concern about the disadvantaged "one-third" of the
population.
To conclude, this chapter argues that continuity and change in major themes of
working-class identity in post-war social realist films from the New Wave to the
present have reflected and reinforced dominant ideological position; but at the same
time conveyed more left-wing progressive views. Identity is an important matter as
individuals and groups want to be seen and considered as possessing cultural
significance and dignity. The neo-liberalism of the New Right is making capitalism
irresistible and the proletariat politically finished and culturally dwarfed. So, cultural
policy support for socially purposive British national cinema is crucial here to keep
social realism as a democratization of representation of national cultural life as well as
a sustained concern for working-class dignity.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION

Class matters not only in sociological sense, but also in cultural sense. In
Britain, there has been a rich tradition of social realist film-making from the
documentary movement in the 1930s to the present, playing a crucial role in the
construction of working-class identity.
The Grierson Documentary Movement contributed tremendously to the
humanist and social democratic representation of working class, presenting the
dignity and heroism of labor. This resulted from a social democratic consensus in the
1930s based around "the middle way" between unrestrained capitalism and a
nationalizing socialism (Addison, 1994, p. 35). Then in the 1950s, the call for "social
extension" by the New Left helped to consolidate social realism as a way of artistic
expression. Because of this "social extension," social realist film has become a proud
tradition and a special national color for British cinema, almost a brand.
British New Wave cinema was born out of the social and cultural changes of
the late 1950s that embraced the rise of working-class affluence, the emergence of a
distinctive youth culture, the passionate anger of the Angry Young Man, and the
revival of the intellectual left. The films portrayed the social rise of new working class
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in the changing conditions of affluence and consumption. Room at the Top (Jack
Clayton, 1959) and Saturday Night and Sunday Morning (Karel Reisz, 1960) display
the ample masculine confidence, youthful sexuality and rebelliousness as well as the
sense of frustration and alienation of their protagonists in the time of change.
The New Wave films so accurately and powerfully caught the mood of time
that their dominating status was widely acknowledged. An article by a film critic
wrote that "A British film nowadays, if it is to be taken seriously, must set its scene
among the more or less rebellious young people of the industrial North or Midlands; it
must be tough, realistic, iconoclastic (possibly nihilistic, too) and thoroughly working
class" (The Manchester Guardian, 25 September, 1962; as cited in Walker, 1974, p.
68).
Brown notes that this history includes an iconography: "Think British realism,
and you think inevitably of kitchen sinks, tall chimneys, cobblestones, railway arches,
bleak stretches of moor or beach, graffiti-lined council estates, people and landscapes
placed in spare and striking juxtaposition. You also tend to think black-and-white: the
perfect color scheme for gloomy skies, smokestacks and poetic melancholy." (2009, p.
29) This fits more with the New Wave films. In later decades, styles have been much
diversified.
Representing the rising postwar new working class, the New Wave protagonists
are confident about the social change for betterment and proud of or dignified about
their class background despite the frustrations they experience. Joe in Room at the

Top claims "I am working class ... and proud of it!" Jimmy Porter in Look Back in
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Anger is a university graduate but chooses to run a market stall to show solidarity

with the working class.
But such confidence or pride has disappeared in the working-class films since
the 1980s. Films since the 1980s have focused on the exploration of the damage
brought by de-industrialization, mass unemployment and poverty, showing life as a
difficult struggle in a society dominated by social injustice and greed and projecting
pessimistic images of masculinity in crisis. In the 1990s, substantial attention has been
given to the "underclass" rather than the industrial workers with decent jobs. More
focus was on masculinity crisis, projecting victim images of masculine anxiety,
alienation and social impotence. The serious social criticism films represented by
High Hopes (Mike Leigh, 1988), My Beautiful Laundrette (Stephen Frears, 1985), and
Sweet Sixteen (Ken Loach, 2002) by independent directors are bleaker and angrier

films, whereas the commercial comedies of the 1990s represented by The Full Monty
(Peter Cattaneo, 1997) and Brassed Off (Mark Herman, 1996) transform gritty
underclass material through humor and utopianism into an appealing, profitable and
exportable commodity.
The works unanimously articulated a "sense of loss" (Kirk, 2003, p. 78).
Compared with the sense of loss of politics in the New Wave films, this time it's the
loss of job or income, political power, union support, and the associated loss offamily,
traditional community, traditional male role, and etc. All these factors have been
essential for the construction of working-class identity. So the loss of so many factors
all together has contributed to the loss of old form of working-class identity. The
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films are seen, to varying degrees, "elegies for an older, industrial, northern working
class" (Dave, 2006, p. xiii).
In short, from statements, such as, "I'm working class and proud of it" in Room
at the Top (1959) to "We're obsolete. Dinosaurs. Yesterday's news." in The Full
Monty (1997), the working class experienced heartbreaking transformation from an

identity of masculine energy, pride and dignity to "underclass" collective shame and
loss of respect.
The way of defining working-class identity after the Second World War has
been continuously dominated by consumption rather than production, by the private
and personal rather than the public and political, and has become more inseparable
with other identities such as gender, race and sexuality since the 1980s. The concern
about working class traditions has survived all decades, with the 1990s commercial
comedies picking up working class collectivity and solidarity to a utopian new height.
The attack on consumerism remains and is as usual linked with women. The way to
escape is individualistic through education or highly utopian through special talents.
Yet there has been a tendency to marginalize, or under-estimate, the experience of
women and black and Asian workers, ignoring the multicultural nature of British
society and the rising importance of female workers. The elevating skilled working
class, associated with the rise ofThatcherism, is also neglected.
The shift reflects changes in fundamental attitudes in British post-war society
from welfare egalitarianism to the neo-liberal enterprise culture. The cinematic
representation has reflected and reinforced dominant ideological position, but at the
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same time conveyed more left-wing progressive views of filmmakers.
Among the New Wave films there is also a prominent structure of feeling to
articulate the sense of loss of politics, the loss of radical intent on the part of the
working class which is in fact a response to the affluence and political consensus of
that time, as well as a structure of feeling which privileges and appreciates traditional
working class culture, which was threatened by the emerging mass culture in the
post-war society. Also apparently, a structure of feeling to reveal a "sense of losses"
among the films of the 1980s and 1990s was driven by the enormous social changes
under Thatcherism.
Social realism films can be taken as contributing to the contestation about the
existence of working class. The structural inequality and exploitation still affect the
life-chances and the lifestyles of the working class people, as we can see in the films.
Thinking over the long history of British social realism, its greatest achievement
should be, in Hill's words, "provid[ing]--despite the persistence of politicians in
arguing for the classlessness of British society--a reminder of the continuing
economic divisions within Britain as well as giving voice to the desire for a different
kind of society in which community and social attachment are accorded greater
importance" (2000a, p. 186).
In the 21 51 century, the working class is definitely faced with more severe
challenges. It has declined drastically as a cultural and political force. The "classless"
ideology keeps its dominance. With the shrinking in number and the diversification in
structure, it is now even more difficult to define the working class, which has been
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termed as the "post-working class." The growing complex of jobs and labor contracts
combine with gender and ethnic difference to produce a mosaic that is not easily
represented in simple images. Taking all this into consideration, it should be of
growing difficulty to keep a distinguished cycle of working class films in the future.
Creative adjustment from filmmakers is crucial to find new perspectives if he or she
wants to make working class films. Mike Leigh is focusing on family and personal
adaptation; Ken Loach is also stressing more personal life in families and his films are
funnier. The social realist comedies are commercializing working-class experiences.
In fact, the potential for working class films to be successful is a common sense
among many directors. As Lee Hall, the screenwriter of the successful Billy Elliot,
once said, "I always knew that if you can write something about working class people
with some integrity, and can represent their lives ... there 's a real chance of it being
successful" (Hall, 2000, para. 2). I hold that so long as social realist films continue to
care about the laboring public, the "one-third" in New Times, it is functioning its role.
In short, working class films will keep its place in British cinema, and continue to be
successful when certain film-makers make it right. With the changing political
economy, it seems clear that the commercialization of British working class images
(favoring comedy) and the focus on the private and the personal will continue into the
future.
In short, from masculinity to crisis of masculinity, the public to the personal,
alienation from community to collective action, and realistic presentation to more
aesthetic one, the British cinema never fails to show a concern for the life of
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working-class in the changing society. In the face of more severe challenges in the
new century, this dissertation calls for cultural policy support for socially purposive
British national cinema to keep social realism as a democratization of representation
of national cultural life as well as a sustained concern for working-class dignity.
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